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中国经济管理大学 Mini-MBA《商务谈判》7-15 Relationships in Negotiation

中国经济管理大学 

中国经济管理大学 Mini-MBA《商务谈判》7-15 Relationships in Negotiation 

中国经济管理大学/中國經濟管理大學


Chapter 7

Communication

 

Chapter Overview

Reduced to its essence, negotiation is a form of interpersonal communication. 

  • Communication      processes, both verbal and nonverbal, are critical to achieving      negotiation goals and resolving conflicts.

In this chapter we examine the process by which negotiators communicate their own interests, positions, and goals—and in turn make sense of those of the other party and of the negotiation as a whole.

  • This chapter opens with a discussion of the basic      mechanisms through which messages are encoded, sent, received, and      decoded.

  • We then will consider in some depth what is communicated in a negotiation, followed by an      exploration of how people communicate in      negotiation.

  • The chapter      concludes with discussions of how to improve communication in negotiation      and of special communication considerations at the close of negotiations.

Learning Objectives

1.          Understand the basic components of communication flow in a negotiation.

2.          Explore what is communicated in a negotiation and how people communicate.

3.          Consider the ways that communication might be improved in negotiation.

4.          Gain practical tools for how to improve communication processes in any negotiation.


Chapter Outline

  1. Basic Models of Communication

A.    Distortion in Communication

  1. What Is Communicated during Negotiation?

                                    1.      Offers, Counteroffers, and Motives

                                    2.      Information about Alternatives

                                    3.      Information about Outcomes

                                    4.      Social Accounts

                                    5.      Communication about Process

A.    Are Negotiators Consistent or Adaptive?

B.     Does It Matter What Is Said Early in the Negotiation?

C.     Is More Information Always Better?

  1. How people Communicate in Negotiation

A.    Characteristics of Language

B.     Use of Nonverbal Communication

C.     Selection of a Communication Channel

  1. How to Improve Communication in Negotiation

A.    The Use of Questions

B.     Listening

C.     Role Reversal

  1. Special Communication Consideration at the Close      of Negotiations

A.    Avoiding Fatal Mistakes

B.     Achieving Closure

  1. Chapter Summary


I.       Basic Models of Communication

  • Communication      is an activity that occurs between two people: a sender and a receiver.

o   A sender has a thought or meaning in mind.

o   The sender encodes this meaning into a message that is to be transmitted to a receiver.

§  May be encoded into verbal language, nonverbal expression, or both.

o   Once encoded, the message is then transmitted through a channel or medium to the receiver.

o   The person to whom the message is directed receives the transmission and then decodes and interprets it, giving meaning and understanding to the receiver.

·         In one-way communication, this process would constitute a complete transmission.

o   Most communication, particularly in negotiation, involves give-and-take, dialogue and discussion.

o   So, it is more useful to analyze communication by treating the exchange between parties as a two-way process that continuously cycles back and forth between the individuals involved.

o   A “transactional model” (See Figure 7.1) captures the bidirectional nature of two-party communication in conversation – treating communicators as both creators and consumers of messages.

·         In a two-party exchange, a communicator is not a passive recipient of messages – the receiver takes an active role in several ways.

o   First, the recipient receives the message and interprets both its information content and the other party’s motives for transmitting it.

o   The recipient then becomes a sender – encoding a response that may:

§  Convey the message was received – if the negotiator prefers to react.

§  Respond in some way.

§  Effective communicators and negotiators often pause to consider the strategic implications of choices about communication channels rather than simply responding in kind.

·         In negotiation, the feedback provided by the recipient can take various forms:

o   A nonverbal gesture

o   An expressed emotion

o   A question seeking clarification

o   A response to information presented

o   An attempt to build upon the first message, or

o   A rebuttal to an argument, to name just a few.

·         Having sketched this basic, transactional model of the communication process, we next use the elements of this model as a framework for understanding the distortions that can occur in communication.

A.    Distortion in Communication

·         Human communication systems seldom perform optimally – now we look at how distortions occur in communication by looking at some of the individual elements of the communication process presented earlier.

o   Individual communicators (senders or receivers) each have goals and objectives they want to accomplish.

§  The more diverse the goals of the two parties, or the more antagonistic they are in their relationship, the greater the likelihood that distortions and errors in communication will occur.

§  Similarly, if the communicators differ in their individual characteristics, they will have different ways of viewing the world.

o   Messages are the symbolic forms by which information is communicated.

§  The more prone we are to using symbolic communication, the more likely it is that the symbols we choose may not accurately communicate the meaning we intend.

o   Encoding is the process by which messages are put into symbolic form.

§  The encoding process will be affected by varying degrees of skill in encoding (e.g., fluency in language, skill at written and oral expression). 

§  Distortions are likely if the sender encodes the message in a way that impedes understanding or accurate interpretation by the recipient.

o   Channels or media, are the means through which information is sent and received and the choices available exist at a couple of different levels.

§  First, should the message be transmitted verbally, nonverbally, or symbolically?

§  Second, what should be the conduit for its transmission?

§  There are numerous opportunities for communication distortion based on the channels used.

·         A complex message may need to be written so the recipient can consume it at their own pace and review it if needed.

·         In a face-to-face interaction, noise can foster distraction or impede comprehension.

·         Emotional appeals may be distorted in written form.

·         Distortion of meaning results when there is incongruence between multiple channels used at the same time.

o   Reception is the process of comprehension: receiving messages in any form and decoding it into a form that is understandable to the receiver.

§  If the parties speak the same language, the process may be simple, although subject to perceptual and cognitive errors.

§  When people speak different languages, decoding involves higher degrees of error and full translation may not be possible.

o   Interpretation is the process of ascertaining the meaning and significance of decoded messages for the situation going forward.

§  The facts, ideas, feelings, reactions, or thoughts that exist within individuals act as a set of filters for interpreting the decoded messages.

§  Meanings will vary depending on other aspects of the communication sequence and the relationship between the parties.

·         An important way to avoid some of the problems in communication we have mentioned is by giving the other party feedback.

o   Inform the sender the message was received, encoded, and ascribed with the meaning the sender intended.

o   The absence of feedback can contribute to significant distortions in communication, especially when a sender does not know whether the message has been received, much less understood.

o   In negotiation, feedback can distort communication by influencing the offers negotiators make or by leading them to alter their evaluations of possible outcomes.

o   Negotiators need to keep in mind that feedback can be used strategically to induce concessions, changes in strategy, or altered assessments of process and outcome.

II.    What is Communicated During Negotiation?

·         A fundamental question researchers examine is, What is communicated during negotiation?

o   Research usually involves recordings of negotiation role-play and analyzing patterns of communication that occur.

o   More than 70% of verbal tactics used by buyers and sellers were integrative and they tended to behave reciprocally.

·         Here, we discuss five categories of communication that takes place during negotiations – summarized in Table 7.1 – and we then consider the question of whether more communication is always better than less communication.

            1.      Offers, Counteroffers, and Motives

·         A negotiator’s preferences are communicated during a negotiation through the parties’ offers and counteroffers  – they can have a powerful influence on the actions of the other party and on outcomes.

o   A negotiator’s preferences reflect their underlying motivations and priorities.

o   Negotiators with affiliation motives tend to convey “positive” concessions that de-escalate tensions or facilitate agreement.

o   In contrast, negotiators with power motives are more likely to reject concessions and escalate conflict.

·         Communication between negotiators may also convey emotions experienced in relation to the exchange of positions and offers.

·         A communicative framework for negotiation is based on the assumptions that:

o   The communication of offers is a dynamic process;

o   The offer process is interactive;

o   Various internal and external factors drive the interaction and motivate a bargainer to change their offer.

§  This process constantly revises the parameters of the negotiation, eventually narrowing the bargaining range and guiding the discussion toward settlement.

            2.      Information about Alternatives

·         The existence of a BATNA changes several things in a negotiation:

o   Compared to negotiators without attractive BATNAs, negotiators with attractive BATNAs set higher reservation prices for themselves than their counterparts did;

o   Negotiators whose counterparts had attractive BATNAs set lower reservation points for themselves; and

o   When both parties were aware of the attractive BATNA that one of the negotiators had, that negotiator received a more positive negotiation outcome.

o   Findings suggest that negotiators with an attractive BATNA should tell the other party about it if they expect to receive its full benefits – style and tone matter.

            3.      Information about Outcomes

·         Negotiators should be cautious about sharing their outcomes or even their positive reactions to outcomes with the other party, especially if they are going to negotiate with that party again in the future.

·         Negotiators should evaluate their own success before learning about, and being unduly influenced by, the other party’s evaluations of the outcomes.

            4.      Social Accounts

·         At times, communication during negotiation consists of “social accounts,” which are explanations made to the other party, especially when negotiators need to justify bad news.

·         Three types of explanations are important:

o   Explanations of mitigating circumstances, where negotiators suggest that they had no choice in taking the positions they did;

o   Explanations of exonerating circumstances, where negotiators explain their positions from a broader perspective, suggesting that while their current position may appear negative, it derives from positive motives;

o   Reframing explanations, where outcomes can be explained by changing the context.

            5.      Communication about Process

·         Some communication is about the negotiation process itself – how well it is going or what procedures might be adopted to improve the situation.

·         Some communication about process is not just helpful but critical, as when conflict intensifies and negotiators run the risk of letting hostilities overtake progress.

o   During a conflict spiral, one strategy involves calling attention to the other party’s contentious actions and explicitly labeling the process as counterproductive.

o   During such a spiral, a negotiator should resist the natural urge to reciprocate contentious communication from the other party.

·         We conclude this section on what is communicated in negotiation with three key questions.

A.    Are Negotiators Consistent or Adaptive?

·         When it comes to communication patterns, negotiators are more likely to be consistent in their strategies than to vary their approach.

·         Analysis shows that negotiators react to only a small proportion of the available cues communicated by their partner and use only a small proportion of possible responses.

o   Moreover, this proportion becomes smaller as the negotiation proceeds, meaning the longer a negotiation goes on, the less variety in forms of communication we see.

·         When it comes to making choices about communication, many negotiators prefer sticking with the familiar rather than venturing into improvisation.

B.     Does It Matter What Is Said Early in the Negotiation?

·         In negotiation simulation, for high-status negotiators the amount of speaking time during the first five minutes predicted how well that party did in the negotiation.

o   The study also showed the tone matters – controlling “the floor” helps, but avoid dominating the conversation with emotional or hyperbolic communication.

·         Some research indicates that communication during the first five minutes had no effects on the ability of the parties to achieve joint gains.

o   Other research points to what negotiators do in the first half of the process has a significant impact on their ability to generate integrative solutions and with high joint gains.

C.    Is More Information Always Better?

·         Some research suggests that receiving too much information during negotiation may actually be detrimental to negotiators – sometimes called the information-is-weakness effect.

o   Box 7.1 provides a discussion of ways to manage communication during a negotiation.

o   Negotiators who know the complete preferences of both parties may have more difficulty determining fair outcomes than negotiators who do not have this information.

§  A specific type of information – insider information – influences the negotiation process as negotiators paid less, were less likely to make concessions during negotiation, and made more creative offers.

§  This suggests the information-is-weakness effect may be limited to very specific circumstances.

·         Studies suggest that simply exchanging information does not automatically lead to better understanding of the other party’s preferences or to better negotiation outcomes.

o   Nor does it automatically result in the information-is-weakness effect.

o   Rather, the effect of exchanging information during negotiation depends on the type of issues being discussed and the negotiators’ motivation to use the information.

III.  How People Communicate in Negotiation

  • We now address three aspects related to the “how” of      communication: the characteristics of language that communicators use, the      use of nonverbal communication in negotiation, and the selection of a      communication channel for sending and receiving messages.

A.    Characteristics of Language

·         In negotiation, language operates at two levels: the logical level (for proposals or offers) and the pragmatic level (semantics, syntax, and style).

o   The meaning conveyed by a proposition or statement is a combination of one logical, surface message and several pragmatic (i.e., hinted or inferred) messages.

o   By way of illustration, consider threats.

o   Box 7.2 illustrates how threats, which on the surface seem straightforward enough as negotiation gambits, are actually complex and nuanced when analyzed in terms of the specific elements of language used within them.

·         How parties communicate in negotiation would seem to depend on the speaker’s ability to encode thoughts properly, as well as the listener’s ability to understand and decode the intended message.

o   Negotiators’ use of idioms or colloquialisms is often problematic, especially in cross-cultural negotiations.

o   Even if the meaning is clear, the choice of a word or metaphor may convey a lack of sensitivity or create a sense of exclusion, such as when men relate strategic concerns by using sports metaphors.

o   One researcher holds that male-female miscommunication may be more dangerous than cross-cultural miscommunication because it is more pervasive and we are less prepared for it.

·         Finally, a negotiator’s choice of words may not only signal a position but also shape and predict the conversation that ensues.

o   Parties whose statements communicated interests in both the substance of the negotiation (issues) and the relationship with the other party achieved better, more integrative solutions than parties whose statements were concerned solely with either substance or relationship.

o   Linguistic patterns early in the negotiation help define issues in ways that may help the parties discover integrative possibilities later on.

B.     Use of Nonverbal Communication

·         Much of what people communicate is transmitted with nonverbal communication – facial expressions, body language, head movements, and tone of voice, are a few.

o   Some nonverbal acts, called attending behaviors, are particularly important in connecting with another person during a coordinated interaction like negotiation.

§  They let the other know that you are listening and prepare the other party to receive your message.

·         We now discuss three important attending behaviors: eye contact, body position, and encouraging.

Make Eye Contact

o   Making eye contact is one way to show others you are paying attention and listening and that you consider them important.

§  By not making eye contact, you are not providing the other person with an important cue that you are engaged and listening.

o   When making eye contact, people should not keep their eyes continually fixed on the other person – occasionally look away.

§  Generally, breaks in eye contact are fewer and shorter when listening actively than when speaking.

§  Averting the gaze briefly while speaking signals that the speaker is not finished.

o   When persuading someone, it is important to make eye contact when delivering the most important part of the message.

§  Having the verbal and nonverbal systems in parallel emphasizes the importance of the message being sent.

o   Maintain eye contact when receiving communication as well as when speaking.

Adjust Body Position

o   To ensure that others know you are attentive to them, hold your body erect, lean slightly forward, and face the other person directly.

§  If you accept and endorse the others’ message, take care not to show disrespect with body position by slouching, turning away, or placing your feet on the table.

§  In contrast, crossing arms, bowing the head, furrowing the brow, and squeezing eyebrows together all signal strong rejection or disapproval of the message.

Nonverbally Encourage or Discourage What the Other Says

o   You can indicate attention and interest in a variety of simple behaviors.

§  A head nod

§  A simple hand gesture to continue

§  A murmured “uh huh” indicates understanding and asks them to continue.

§  Similarly, a frown, a scowl, a shake of the head, or a grab of the chest in mock pay all signal disapproval of the other’s message.

o   Nonverbal communication – done well – may help achieve better outcomes.

§  Face-to-face interaction stimulated rapport through nonverbal communication, which in turn enhanced coordination and led to higher joint gains.

§  This may be easier said than done – the ability to judge nonverbal behavior varies with social context and gender, among other factors.

o   Lastly, it is worth keeping in mind that nonverbal communication resulting from visual access need not occur in person – videoconferencing is widely used.

§  We turn next to some of the challenges involved with the use of virtual communication channels in negotiation.

C.  Selection of a Communication Channel

·         Communication is experienced differently when it occurs through different channels.

o   People negotiate through a variety of communication media: telephone, writing, e-mail, teleconferencing, and even text messaging.

o   The use of network-mediated information technologies in negotiation is sometimes referred to as virtual negotiation or “e-negotiation.

o   The use of a particular channel shapes both perceptions of the communication task at hand and norms regarding appropriate behavior.

§  Accordingly, channel variations have potentially important effects on negotiation processes and outcomes.

·         For our purposes, the key variation that distinguishes one communication channel from another is social bandwidth – the ability of a channel to carry and convey subtle social and relational cues from sender to receiver that go beyond the literal message.

o   Greater social bandwidth means a channel can convey more cues.

o   In written communication, there are only the words and symbols on paper, although choice of words and the way they are arranged can convey tone, (in)formality, and emotion.

·         Email is just a form of written communication – with some important distinctions.

o   People treat email as informal (complete with emoticons) and feel comfortable sending unpolished messages where they would never send such careless communication on paper.

o   The lack of social cues lowers inhibition and leads to more aggressive communication, such as flaming – hostile or insulting communication.

·         Researchers have examined the effects of channels in general, and email in particular, on negotiation processes and outcomes – with few consistent findings.

o   It is clear that parties can more easily develop personal rapport in face-to-face communication compared to other channels.

o   And that face-to-face negotiators are more inclined to disclose information truthfully, increasing their ability to attain mutual gain.

o   There is evidence that negotiation through written channels is more likely to end in impasse than negotiation that occurs face-to-face or by phone.

·         Developing rapport and sharing information truthfully are aspects of face-to-face communication that promote cooperation, but face-to-face interaction may also enhance toughness in negotiation.

o   With face-to-face access, hard bargainers can communicate their “tough” message unambiguously, which in turn limits the other party’s aspirations and triggers concessions.

·         Using email communication can have the effect of masking or reducing power differences between negotiators.

o   This may “level the playing field” by giving less interpersonally skilled parties improve their performance, especially when the alternative is negotiating spontaneously with a more accomplished other party.

o   While reviewability is an asset, there are a couple of drawbacks.

§  First, negotiating in writing online gives parties an excuse to be less prepared, given time lags in which you can reflect on prior statements and contemplate future strategies.

§  Second, negotiating in writing, as in email, is inevitably challenging for people who don’t like writing or don’t write very well.

·         The typing task may motivate negotiators to move too rapidly toward closure.

·         Some research has explored reasons email negotiations sometimes end in impasse.

o   Not surprisingly, reaching agreements with email becomes more difficult as the number of parties involved increases, with very high impasse rates in a four-party negotiation simulation via email, with participants expressing high levels of dissatisfaction afterward.

·         Negotiators using e-mail need to work harder at building personal rapport with the other party if they are to overcome limitations of the channel that would otherwise inhibit optimal agreements or fuel impasse.

o   What these negotiation channels lack is schmoozing – off-task or relationship-focused conversations often present in face-to-face negotiations.

o   Negotiators who schmoozed on the phone prior to email negotiations reached more negotiated agreements, achieved better outcomes, and perceived greater trust and optimism regarding future working relationships with the other party.

·         Expanding on this notion that using virtual channels effectively is key, researchers coined the term medium management to describe how negotiators may or may not use a virtual channel like email to best effect.

o   Reactive medium managers were less successful than proactive medium managers.

·         Although early research focused on email, text messaging has become so common it merits separate attention as a communication channel in negotiation.

o   Email is considered a “slow-tempo” medium, while IM and texting are a “fast-tempo” medium more closely approximating oral communication.

o   Complex arguments benefit from “quick” mediums but not in the “slow” mediums

·         In summary, negotiations via email and other technology mediated channels create opportunities but also pose crucial challenges that negotiators would do well to understand before selecting a particular medium for an important occasion.

o   The “communication orientation model” suggests the effects of using different communication channels depend on the preexisting cooperative versus competitive mindset of the parties.

·         In Chapter 6, we discussed various cognitive biases that interfere with rational decision making by negotiators.

o   Similarly, there are four biases that can threaten online negotiations. 

Temporal synchrony bias

·         This is the tendency for negotiators to behave as if they were in a synchronous situation when they are not.

·         Face-to-face interactions allow a “volley” of offers but the pace of email may be annoying to one or both parties, negatively affecting both the negotiation relationship and outcomes.

Burned bridge bias

·         The tendency to employ risky behavior during email negotiations that would not be used during a face-to-face encounter.

·         Negotiators may be more willing to challenge the other party, set ultimatums, or react negatively to an offer.

·         Email’s inherent structure makes it more likely that disputes will escalate compared to face-to-face or telephone interaction.

Squeaky wheel bias

·         This is the tendency for email negotiators to use a negative emotional style to achieve their goals

·         If social norms of civility are absent, negotiators may resort to intimidation, rude behavior, and poor etiquette to achieve outcomes.

·         In contrast, when negotiators are part of a cohesive social group, social norms are reinforced, which may moderate the incivility that can result from use of virtual communication channels.

Sinister attribution bias

·         This occurs when negotiators mistakenly assume the other’s behavior is caused by personality flaws, while overlooking the role of situational factors – leading to poorer outcomes.

·         Creating a positive rapport with a negotiation partner, either face-to-face or over the phone, can help to combat these biases.

o   It may not be possible for face-to-face interaction, so it is important to find ways to create a context of accountability for your actions.

§  One option is to schmooze prior to negotiating.

§  Another is involving a neutral third party in the exchange.

§  See Box 7.3 for a list of additional ways to maximize effectiveness when negotiations occur in virtual environments.

IV.  How to Improve Communication in Negotiation

·         Failures and distortions in perception, cognition, and communication are the main contributors to breakdowns and failures in negotiation.

o   Research cannot confirm this as the processes of perception, cognition, and communication are so intertwined with other major factors.

·         Three main techniques are available for improving communication in negotiation: the use of questions, listening, and role reversal.

A.    The Use of Questions

·         The use of questions aids in clarifying communication and eliminating noise and distortion.

o   Asking good questions enables negotiators to secure a great deal of information about the other party’s position, supporting arguments, and needs.

o   As a caution, questions alone cannot overcome negotiators’ information-gathering challenges.

§  Questions can be sidestepped

§  The other can mislead through dishonesty

§  The other party may be unable to provide articulate answers because they are not totally aware of their own biases and emotions.

·         Questions could be divided into two basic categories:

o   Those that are manageable

o   Those that are unmanageable and cause difficulties – See Table 7.2.

§  Manageable questions cause attention or prepare the other person’s thinking for further questions – May I ask you a question?

§  They can get information – How much will this cost?

§  And generate thoughts – Do you have any suggestions for improvement?

§  Unmanageable question cause difficulty

§  They give information – Didn’t you know that we couldn’t afford this?

§  And bring discussion to a false conclusion – Don’t you think we’ve talked about this enough?

o   As you can see in Table 7.2, many unmanageable questions are likely to elicit defensiveness and anger.

·         Negotiators can also use questions to manage difficult or stalled negotiations.

o   Several examples of tough situations and possible specific questions that can be used to deal with them are listed in Table 7.3.

o   Another good way to unblock negotiations is to use “why not” questions instead of “why” questions.

B.     Listening

·         There are three major forms of listening.

o   Passive listening involves receiving the message while providing no feedback to the sender about the accuracy or completeness of reception.

§  A negotiator with a talkative counterparty may find that the best strategy is to sit and listen while the other party eventually works into, or out of, a position on their own.

o   Acknowledgment is slightly more active – when acknowledging the message, receivers occasionally nod their heads, maintain eye contact, or interject responses like “I see,” or “interesting.”

§  A sender may misinterpret the responses as agreement, rather than as simple acknowledgments of receipt of the message.

o   Active listening occurs when receivers restate or paraphrase the sender’s message in their own language. 

§  Successful reflective responding is a critical part of active listening and has these elements:

·         A greater emphasis on listening than on speaking

·         Responding to personal rather than abstract points

·         Following the other rather than leading them into areas the listener thinks should be explored

·         Clarifying what the speaker said about their own thoughts rather than questioning or suggesting what they should be thinking

·         Responding to the feelings the other has expressed

§  The value of active listening in negotiation might not seem obvious as the listener normally has a set position and may feel strongly about the issues.

·         Active listening is a skill that encourages others to speak more fully about their feelings, priorities, frames of reference, and, by extension, the positions they are taking.

C.    Role Reversal

·         Arguing consistently for one position can impede negotiators from recognizing the possible compatibility between both positions.

o   Active listening is a passive process but role-reversal techniques allow a more complete understanding of the other’s positions.

·         There are two implications for negotiators.

o   The party attempting role reversal may come to a greater understanding of the other party’s position, which in turn can lead to convergence between negotiators’ positions.

o   While role reversal can produce these changes when the parties’ positions are fundamentally compatible, the technique may end up sharpening perceptions of differences if the positions are fundamentally incompatible.

·         In sum, role reversal can be a useful tool for improving communication and the accurate understanding of the other party’s position but does not necessarily lead to easy resolution of the conflict.

V.    Special Communication Considerations at the Close of Negotiations

·         As negotiations move toward a close, negotiators must attend to two key aspects of communication and negotiation simultaneously: the avoidance of fatal mistakes and the achievement of satisfactory closure in a constructive manner.

A.    Avoiding Fatal Mistakes

·         Some specific advice about communication near the end of a negotiation:

o   Know when to shut up – to avoid surrendering important information needlessly, and to refrain from making dumb remarks that push the other party away from agreement.

o   The other side is to recognize the other party’s dumb remarks and do not respond or be distracted by them.

o   Watch out for last-minute problems, such as nit-picking or second-guessing by parties not involved in the bargaining process but with the right to review it.

o   Reduce the agreement to written form – the party who writes the contract is in a position to achieve clarity of purpose and conduct for the deal.

B.     Achieving Closure

·         This generally involves making decision to accept offers, to compromise priorities, to trade off across issues with the other party, or to take some combination of these steps.

o   Such decision-making processes can be divided into four key elements: framing, gathering intelligence, coming to conclusions, and learning from feedback.

§  The first three we discussed elsewhere – the last, that of learning, or failing to learn, from feedback is largely a communication issue.

§  This involves keeping track of what you expected would happen, systematically guarding against self-serving expectations, and making sure you review the lessons your feedback has provided the next time a similar decision comes along.

o   Many of the decision traps and biases discussed in Chapter 6 may arise at the end of negotiations, when parties are in a hurry to wrap up loose ends and cement a deal.

Chapter Summary

In this chapter we have considered elements of the art and science of communication that are relevant to understanding negotiations. We began with models that show communication as prone to error and distortion. Such distortions are more likely to occur when communicating parties have conflicting goals and objectives or strong feelings of dislike for one another. Distortion may occur as information is encoded, transmitted, and decoded. During all stages of the communication cycle between two parties, problems of noise, or interference, potentially, affect the accuracy and clarity with which messages and responses are sent and received.

We then moved to a discussion of what is communicated during negotiation. Rather than simply being an exchange of preferences about solutions, negotiations covers a wide-ranging number of topics in an environment where each party is trying to influence the other. This was followed by an exploration of three issues related to how people communicate in negotiation: the use of language, nonverbal communication, and the selection of a communication channel.  We discussed at some length how the decision to negotiate in online environments alters negotiator behavior and outcomes.

In the closing sections of the chapter we considered ways to improve communication in negotiation, including improvement of listening skills and the use of questions; and special communication considerations at the close of negotiation, where we discussed avoiding last-minute mistakes and achieving closure.

 

 




Chapter 8

Finding and Using Negotiation Power

 

 

Chapter Overview

In this chapter, we focus on power in negotiation.

  • By power,      we mean the capabilities negotiators can assemble      to give themselves an advantage or increase the probability of achieving      their objectives.

  • All negotiators want power; they want to know      what they can do to put pressure on the other party, persuade the other to      see it their way, get the other to give them what they want, get one up on      the other, or change the other’s mind.

  • The tactics      of distributive bargaining and integrative negotiation are leverage tactics—tactics used to exert influence over the other party      in the service of achieving the best deal, most commonly only for the self.

In this chapter and the next, we separate the concept of power from the tools of influence. 

  • It is important to be clear about the distinction      between the two. 

  • We treat power      as the potential to alter the      attitudes and behaviors of others that an individual brings to a given      situation.

  •  Influence, on the other hand, can be thought of as power in action – the actual messages and tactics an      individual undertakes in order to change the attitudes and/or behaviors of      others. 

  • We address      power in this chapter and the use of influence in Chapter 9.

We begin by exploring the nature of power, showing why power is important to negotiators, and discussing some of the dynamics of its use in negotiation. 

  • We focus on the power sources that give      negotiators capacity to exert influence.       

  • Of the many sources of power that exist, we      consider three major ones in this chapter: the power of information and      expertise; the power derived from personality and individual differences;      and the benefits of power that may derive from a person’s structural      position in an organization or network, including control over      resources. 

  • We also explore two other sources of power: the      nature of the relationship between the negotiating parties and the power      derived from the specific content of a negotiation – such as the quality      and availability of a negotiator’s BATNA.       

  • We then      explore the ways that negotiations are affected by differences in power      between negotiators and ways that a negotiator can deal with an opponent      who has more power.

Learning Objectives

  1. Understand      different approaches to defining “power”      in negotiations and why power is critical to negotiation.

  2. Explore      different sources or bases of power in negotiation.

  3. Consider different strategic approaches for negotiators who      have more power and for negotiators who have less power and must deal with      others who have more power.


Chapter Outline

  1. Why Is Power Important to Negotiators?

  2. A Definition of Power

  3. Sources of Power – How People Acquire Power

A.    Informational Sources of Power

B.     Power Based on Personality and Individual Differences

C.     Power Based on Position in an Organization (Structural Power)

D.    Power Based on Relationships

E.     Contextual Sources of Power

  1. The Consequences of Unequal Power

  2. Dealing with Others Who Have More Power

  3. Chapter Summary


I.       Why Is Power Important to Negotiators?

·         Most negotiators believe that power is important because it give one negotiator an advantage over the other party.

·         Seeking power in negotiation usually arises from one of two perceptions:

1.      The negotiator believes they currently have less power than the other party.

o   In this situation, they believe the other party already has some advantage that can and will be used, so they seek power to offset or counterbalance the other’s advantage.

2.      The negotiator believes they need more power than the other party to increase the probability of securing a desired outcome.

o   In this context, they believe that added power is necessary to gain or sustain their own advantage in the upcoming negotiation.

·         Embedded in these two beliefs are significant questions of tactics and motives.

o   Tactics may be designed to enhance the negotiator’s own power or to diminish the other’s power, and to create a state of either power equalization or power difference.

o   The motive questions relate to why the negotiator is using the tactics – there are usually two major reasons.

§  First, and perhaps more commonly, negotiators employ tactics designed to create power difference as a way to gain advantage or to block the other party’s power moves.

·         Such tactics enhance the capacity for one side to dominate the relationship, paving the way for a competing or dominating strategy and a distributive agreement.

§  Second, less commonly but equally necessary, negotiators employ tactics designed to create power equalization as a way to level the playing field.

·         The goal is to minimize either side’s ability to dominate the relationship and lays the groundwork for moving discussions toward a compromising or collaborative, integrative agreement.

o   Box 8.1 presents a framework, first introduced in Chapter 4, that evaluates when negotiators might use power as a tactic, as opposed to a focus on interests or an emphasis on “rights” in a dispute.

·         In general, negotiators who are less concerned about their power relative to the other, or who have matched power with other – equally high or low – find that their deliberations proceed with greater ease and simplicity.

o   In contrast, negotiators who do care about their power and seek to match or exceed the other’s power are probably seeking a solution in which they either do not lose the negotiation (a defensive posture) or dominate the negotiation (an offensive posture).

§  Thus, power moves can create temporary advantage but may make negotiations more complex and create more opportunities for danger.

·         Various tools of power are implied in the use of many of the competitive and collaborative negotiation tactics.

o   Much of our discussion of power is drawn from broad studies of how managers influence one another in organizations, and we apply these findings to negotiation situations as appropriate.

o   Finally, as we will note, much of the real power in negotiation is defined by the unique characteristics of a particular problem.

II.    A Definition of Power

·         In a broad sense, people have power when they have the ability to bring about outcomes they desire or the ability to get things done the way they want them to be done.

o   Presumably, a party with power can induce another to do what the latter otherwise would not do – that is, having power over another person.

o   A classic research work on power defined it in terms of how dependent one party is on another.

·         But there is a problem – the definition so far seems to focus on power as absolute and coercive, which is too restrictive for understanding how power is used in negotiation.

o   In fact, there are two perspectives on power:

§  Power used to dominate and control the other – likely in distributive context.

§  Power used to work together – likely in an integrative context.

o   From the power holder’s view, the first perspective fits the power over definition.

o   From the receiver’s view, this use of power implies more powerlessness and more dependence on the other for outcomes.

o   The interpersonal dynamics of this power relationship can range from benign and supportive, as a mentor, to oppressive and abusive, as a dictatorial parent.

·         From the second perspective, the actor’s view of power suggests power with, implying the power holder jointly develops and shares power with the other.

o   The receiver experiences this power as empowering and creating more independence.

·         A noted conflict researcher defines power in this way:

o   A person has power in a given situation – situational power – to the degree they can satisfy their purposes in that situation.

·         The same researcher notes a tendency to view power as an attribute of the actor only.

o   Ignoring those elements of power that are derived from the situation or context in which the actor operates.

·         This researcher suggests, the statement “A is more powerful than B” should be viewed from three distinct yet interrelated perspectives:

o   A is more usually able to favorably influence their overall environment and/or to overcome its resistance than is B – environmental power

o   Or, A is usually more able to influence B favorably and/or to overcome B’s resistance than B is able to do with A – relative power

o   Or A is usually more able to satisfy their desires than is B – personal power.

·         It would be nice to be able to review power sources, the power bases used as influence strategies, and the conditions under which each should be used – but such a task is near impossible, for two principal reasons.

o   First, the effective use of power requires a sensitive and deft touch, and its consequences may vary greatly from one person to the next.

o   Second, not only do the key actors and targets change from situation to situation, but the context in which the tools of power operate changes as well. 

o   This only allows us to identify a few key sources of power.

o   How and when to use these tools, or in what combination, will be expanded more fully in Chapter 9.

o   See Box 8.2 for some observations on power and Box 8.3 for a changing perspective on power in one market – car buying.

III.  Sources of Power – How People Acquire Power

·         There are five identified major types of power:

o   Expert power – derived from having unique, in-depth information about a subject

o   Reward power – derived by being able to reward others for doing what needs to be done

o   Coercive power – derived by being able to punish others for not doing what needs to be done

o   Legitimate power – derived from holding an office or a formal title in some organization and using the powers that are associated with that office

o   Referent power – derived from the respect or admiration a person commands because of attributes like personality, integrity, and interpersonal style

·         In this chapter, we take a broader perspective on power as it relates to negotiation and aggregate the major sources of power into five different groupings – see Table 8.1.

o   Informational sources of power

o   Power based on personality and individual differences

o   Power based on position in an organization (structural power)

o   Relationship-based sources of power

o   Contextual sources of power

A.    Informational Sources of Power

·         Information power is derived from the negotiator’s ability to assemble and organize facts and data to support his or her position, arguments, or desired outcomes.

o   In negotiation, it is likely to be the most important source of power.

o   Negotiators also use information as a tool to challenge the other party’s position or desired outcomes or to undermine the effectiveness of the other’s negotiating arguments.

o   See Box 8.3 on the ways that the power of information, available through the Internet, has changed the ways people buy cars.

·         The exchange of information in negotiation is also at the heart of the concession-making process. 

o   As each side presents information, a common definition of the situation emerges, allowing both parties to derive a realistic picture of the current situation.

·         This common definition serves as a rationale for both sides to modify their positions and, eventually, arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement.

o   Information exchange in negotiation serves as the primary medium for creating a common view of the situation, justifying your own and the other’s perspective, making concessions, and eventually explaining your feelings about the agreement achieved.

·         How information is presented is also a key source of power in negotiation.

o   Information can be present directly, in order to change the other’s mind, or indirectly, through “overheard” communication or techniques that seek to present information without directly confronting the target’s current position or attitudes.

·         Power derived from expertise is a special form of information power. 

o   The power that comes from information is available to anyone who assembles facts and figures to support arguments.

o   But expert power is accorded to those who are seen as having achieved some level of command and mastery of a body of information.

o   A negotiation who would like to take advantage of their own expertise will often need to demonstrate that this expertise, first, actually exists, and second, is relevant to the issues under discussion.

B.     Power Based on Personality and Individual Differences

·         The second way that power can be created is through individual differences and differences in personal orientation to power.

o   These are stable individual differences – personality traits – that affect how individuals acquire and use power.

o   We now discuss five orientations: cognitive, motivational, moral, skills, and mood

Cognitive orientation

o   Individuals differ in their ideological frames of reference central to their approach to power.

§  The unitary frame is characterized by beliefs that society is an integrated whole and that the interests of individuals and society are one.

·         Such that power can be largely ignored or, when needed, be used by benevolent authorities to benefit the good of all.

·         A view common to many “communal” societies and cultures

§  The radical frame is characterized by beliefs that society is in a continual clash of social, political, and class interests and that power is inherently and structurally imbalanced.

·         A view common to Marxist individuals and cultures

§  The pluralist frame, characterized by beliefs that power is distributed relatively equally across various groups, which compete and bargain for a share of the continually evolving balance of power.

·         A view common to many liberal democracies

o   Each ideological perspective operates as a frame, or perspective on the world, shaping expectations.

§  These perspectives have also been shown to affect the way individuals process social information about power and their willingness to share power when they have authority.

§  Having power does not always mean it gets used in a healthy way.

Motivation Orientation

o   A second orientation focuses on differences in “power motive,” or the disposition of some people to have high needs to influence and control others and to seek out positions of power and authority.

o   These orientations are likely to play out in either the “power over” or “powerless” situations of power, depending on the status of the other party.

Dispositions and Related Skills

o   Several researchers have suggested that orientations to power are grounded in individual dispositions to be cooperative or competitive – such as the dual concerns model from Chapter 1.

§  Competitive dispositions and skills may emphasize the “power over” approach and suggest that people with these dispositions

·         Maintain skills such as sustaining energy and stamina

·         Maintain focus

·         Have high expertise, strong self-confidence, and high tolerance for conflict

§  Cooperative dispositions and skills are more allied with the “power with” approach, emphasizing skills such as

·         Sensitivity to others

·         Flexibility

·         Ability to consider and incorporate the views of others into an agreement

Moral Orientation toward Power

o   Individuals differ in their moral views about power and its use.

o   The general belief among negotiation researchers is that every negotiator dominantly acts on the basis of self-interest – doing only what is best for themselves.

o   But recent research shows that there is a strong interrelationship between an individual’s self-interest and their “moral identity” – that is, a broader commitment to act on behalf of the broader common good.

o   Researchers have shown that individuals with a strong moral identity are less likely to act in their own self-interest, even when they have more power than the other.

Moods

o   In addition to the more enduring personality qualities just discussed, a number of more short-term aspects of personality can create power for a negotiator.

§  This can be as simple as a negotiator who has unique and specific needs – making it difficult to satisfy them

§  Or a negotiator who is indecisive and changes their mind frequently, making them hard to predict

o   A negotiator’s mood can also create power, and power enhances the impact of emotional expression.

§  For powerful negotiators, anger is helpful – it tends to focus their attention on what they want and leads to more assertiveness and they claim more value in a competitive negotiation.

§  In contrast, low-power negotiators do not respond to their own emotions, and as a result are more likely to be drawn into the other party’s emotional state, are less focused, and surrender value to the other.

C.    Power Based on Position in an Organization (Structural Power)

·         In contrast to power based on personality characteristics, power is also shaped by the “structural” characteristics of an organization.

o   That is, how a group or an organization is designed so that some individuals have more power or authority than others.

o   This has been identified by several research studies as having a strong influence on negotiating strategies and outcomes.

o   However, negotiators who have more structural power do not necessarily use that power, often because they realize a dictated solution may not be enthusiastically embraced or implemented by the low-power party.

·         Here, we will discuss two approaches to structure that can influence negotiating power.

o   The first way is consistent with more traditional approaches to organizational structure – a hierarchy of jobs and positions that form a traditional organizational chart.

o   The second way is more consistent with a newer approach to organization structure that thinks of these structures as networks, and shows how a negotiator’s location in a network can also contribute to their bargaining power.

Power Derived from Traditional Organization Hierarchy

·         Here, we discuss two major sources of power based on position in traditional organizational hierarchy

o   Legitimate power, which is grounded in the specific title, duties, and responsibilities of a job description and “level” within an organizational hierarchy, and

o   Resource power, based on the control over resources associated with that position.

Legitimate Power

§  Derived from occupying a particular job, office, or position in an organizational hierarchy

§  Legitimate power is at the foundation of our social structure.

·         When groups organize into any social system they almost immediately create some form of structure and hierarchy.

·         Without this social order, groups have difficulty taking any coordinated action or making quick decisions.

§  Social structures are efficient and effective, and this reality creates the basis for legitimate power.

·         The group structure gives one person a power base, and group members generate a willingness within themselves to obey that person’s directives.

§  People can acquire legitimate power in several ways.

·         It may be acquired at birth, such as the Queen of England

·         It may be acquired by election to a designated office, such as the president of the United States

·         It may be derived simply by appointment or promotion to some organizational position, such as a general manager

·         Some legitimate authority comes to an individual who occupies a position for which other people simply show respect

§  The effectiveness of formal authority is derived from the willingness of followers to acknowledge the legitimacy of the organizational structure and the system of rules and regulations that empowers its leaders.

·         In short, legitimate power cannot function without obedience or the consent of the governed.

·         When enough people begin to distrust the authority or discredit its legitimacy, they will begin to defy it and thereby undermine its potential as a power source.

§  Because legitimate power can be undermined, it is not uncommon for power holders to accumulate other power sources – such as resource control or information – to fortify their power base.

·         Legitimate power is often derived from manipulating these other sources of power.

§  It is also possible to apply the notion of legitimacy to certain social norms or conventions that exert strong control over people:

·         The legitimate power of reciprocity, a strong norm that prescribes that if one person does something positive for another, the gesture is expected to be returned.

·         The legitimate power of equity, another strong norm, in which the agent has a right to request compensation from the other if they go out of their way or endure suffering for the other

·         The legitimate power of responsibility or dependence, a third norm that says we have an obligation to help others who cannot help themselves and are dependent on us

Resource Power

§  People who control resources have the capacity to give them to someone who will do what they want and withhold them (or take them away) from someone who doesn’t do what they want. 

§  Important organizational resources include:

·         Money, in its various forms: cash, salary, budget, bonuses, etc

·         Supplies – raw materials, components, pieces, and parts

·         Human capital – available labor – staff or temporary help

·         Time – free time, the ability to meet deadlines, or control a deadline

·         Equipment – machines, tools, technology, vehicles, etc

·         Critical services – repair, maintenance, installation, support

·         Interpersonal support – praise and encouragement, criticism

      • The        ability to control and dispense resources is a major power source in        organizations.

·         Power also comes from creating a resource stockpile in an environment where resources appear to be scarce.

      • Resources        are generally deployed in one of two principal ways: as rewards and as        punishments – considered here as reward        power and coercion power.

·         Each of these can have personal or impersonal forms.

o   Personal forms of power derive from the personal attraction between the actor and recipient.

o   So, personal reward power is derived from the recipient being influenced because the actor liked them or showed them some form of social acceptance.

o   Impersonal reward power comes from the direct use of tangible rewards by the actor, such as pay, benefits, or a promotion.

o   Personal coercive power is in play when the target wants to avoid or minimize the agent’s disliking or social rejection

o   Impersonal coercive power comes from the direct use of coercive punishment by the other.

§  To use resources as a basis for power, negotiators must develop or maintain control over some desirable reward that the other party wants or control over some punishment the other seeks to avoid.

·         Rewards and punishments can be tangible or intangible.

·         Successful control over resources requires that other party deal directly with the power holder.

·         The power holder must be willing to allocate resources depending on the other’s compliance or cooperation with the power holder’s requests.

·         The use of reward and punishment power is most commonly expressed in negotiation as threats to punish and promises to reward.

·         See Box 8.5 for one remarkable account of the power of a third party in allocating rewards.

Power Based on Location in a Network

·         A second major type of structural power comes from location in an organizational structure, but not necessarily a hierarchical one.

o   In this case, power is derived from critical resources (usually information or money) that flow through a particular location in the structure.

o   The job may not have a fancy title, a large staff, or a corner office, but it can confer a significant amount of power, by virtue of the amount of information and resources that pass through it.

·         Understanding power in this way is derived from conceptualizing organizations and their functioning not as a hierarchy but as a network of interrelationships.

o   Network schemas represent key individuals as circles or nodes and relationships between individuals as lines of transaction.

o   See Figure 8.1 for an example of a network as compared with an organizational hierarchy.

·         In a network, the lines (ties) represent flows and connect individuals or group (nodes) who actually interact or need to interact with each other in the organization.

o   Though information and resources are the primary throughput of transactions, personal relationships, tools of power, and “pressure” may also be transacted across network lines.

o   In a formal hierarchy, authority is related to how high the position is in the vertical organization chart – but in networks, power is determined by location within the flows that occur across that node in the network.

·         Three key aspects of networks shape power: tie strength, tie content, and network structure

Tie Strength

o   An indication of the strength or quality of relationships with others.

o   Quality might be measures by how close two nodes are, how much personal information they share with each other, or how much one person is willing to go out of their way for the other.

o   Strength of ties can be determined by how often the parties interact, how long they have known each other, how close their personal relationship is, how many different ways the two parties interact, and how much reciprocity or mutuality there is in the relationship.

o   Stronger ties usually indicate greater power to influence the other.

Tie Content

o   Content is the resource that passes along the tie with the other person. 

o   This can be money, information, emotional support, friendship, etc

o   The more the content, the stronger the relationship, and the more trust and respect created for each other, the stronger the tie will be.

Network Structure

o   Network structure refers to the overall set of relationships within a social system – a workplace, department, or other social environment.

o   See Box 8.6 for some ways of viewing power in a popular network.

o   Here are some aspects of network structure that determine power in a network:

§  Centrality

·         The more central a node, the more power that node’s occupant will have.

·         Centrality may be determined by the number of connections into and through a node, by the total number of transactions that pass through a node, or by the degree to which the node is integral to managing a certain information flow.

·         In Figure 8.1, the star has greater centrality and therefore more power.

·         Research shows that being in the center of information flows is particularly important to being promoted.

§  Criticality and relevance

·         Although a large amount of information or resources may not flow through a particular node, what does flow through it may be essential to the organization’s mission, major task, or key product.

·         In Figure 8.1, liaisons and linking pins perform this role.

·         Being critical – even irreplaceable – is a core part of getting and maintaining power or in a tough economy keeping your job.

§  Flexibility

·         A third source of network power lies in the positions degree to which the key individual can exercise discretion in how certain decisions are made or who gains access.

·         Flexibility is often related to criticality.

·         A classic example of flexibility is the role of gatekeeper in Figure 8.1, the person in a network who controls the access to a key figure or group.

§  Visibility

·         Nodes differ in their degree of visibility – that is, how visible the task performance is to others in the organization.

·         A node with high centrality and criticality may not necessarily be visible, but if it is not, it is much less likely to be recognized and rewarded.

·         Visibility may also be determined simply by where a person’s office is located, such as in the hallway where the president walks to lunch.

§  Membership in a coalition

·         Finally, as a node in a network, you can be a member of one or more subgroups or coalitions.

·         The more coalitions you belong to, the more likely you will be to find “friends” who can help you meet key people, obtain important (often “inside”) information, and accomplish objectives.

·         In this section, we discussed two major kinds of structural arrangements that can affect negotiator power.

o   In the first, power is conveyed to a negotiator because of a formal title, a position, control over resources, or the like that occurs by virtue of membership in some kind of a hierarchical formal organization.

o   In the second, power is conveyed by virtue of participation and location in a network of friendships, communication and information, or flows of resources.

o   The amount and type of power a negotiator derives from the first is not necessarily tied to the amount and type of power a negotiator can derive from the second – a person can derive a lot of power from both sources, from either one, or from neither.

D.    Power Based on Relationships

·         Two types of power are discussed here: goal interdependence and referent power.

Goal Interdependence

o   How the parties view their goals—and how much achievement of their goal depends on the behavior of the other party—has a strong impact on how likely parties will be to constructively use power.

§  Cooperative goals tend to shape the “power with” orientation – those with such goals want others to perform effectively and achieve common objectives.

§  In contrast, competitive goals lead the parties to pursue a “power over” orientation – for example, relationships and goal interdependence are key sources of power in salary negotiations – see Box 8.7.

Referent power

o   As defined earlier, referent power is derived from the respect or admiration a person commands due to attributes like personality, integrity, and style.

o   Referent power is often based on an appeal to common experiences, common past, common fate, or membership in the same groups. 

o   It is made salient when one party identifies the dimension of commonality in an effort to increase their power (usually persuasiveness) over the other.

o   Like expert power, referent power can also have negative forms.

o   Negative referent power is often used when parties seek to create distance or division between themselves and others or to label the other.

E.     Contextual Sources of Power

·         Finally, while power can be located within individuals and their relationships, power is also based in the context, situation, or environment in which negotiations take place.

·         In a negotiation, these short-term sources are just as critical and suggest ways that negotiators who feel powerless can build short-term power bases to enhance their leverage.

BATNAs

o   The availability of a BATNA offers a negotiator significant power because they now have a choice between accepting the other party’s proposal or the alternative deal.

§  Knowledge of the other’s BATNA can also help shape a negotiator’s initial offer.

o   Several studies have reinforced the importance of a strong BATNA as a source of power.

§  First, having a strong BATNA increases the likelihood that you will make the first offer.

§  Second, having a good BATNA increases your own outcomes, compared with not having a BATNA.

§  Third, good BATNAs not only give the negotiator some leverage over the other party but also give a negotiator confidence as they have viable choices.

§  Finally, negotiators with better BATNAs are able to claim a greater share of the resource pie.

o   However, if you are concerned about integrative outcomes, the reverse is true: the smaller the perceived difference in power, the better the integrative outcomes derived from the negotiation.

Culture

o   Culture is a system of basic assumptions, norms, and/or common values that individuals in a group or organization share about how to interact with each other, work together, deal with the external environment, and move the organization into the future.

§  Culture naturally exist within countries, but also exist in different organizations, groups or families.

o   Culture often shapes what kinds of power are seen as legitimate and illegitimate or how people use influence and react to influence.

§  Cultures often contain many implicit “rules” about use of power and whether “power over” or “power with” processes are seen as more or less appropriate.

o   National cultures also differ in the degree to which these “power over” or “power with” orientations are dominant and shape how people relate to each other.

§  “Power distance” is a key dimension that distinguishes national cultures from each other.

§  Cultures high in power distance accept inherent inequality in their social structure – that some people in the culture have “power over” others.

§  In contrast, cultures low in power distance embrace a broad norm of “power with” – that decision-making power is spread through the culture and delegated to those with unique skills

o   Finally, culture—both organizational and national—often translates into deeply embedded structural inequalities in a society.

§  The degree to which women, religious or ethnic groups, certain social classes, or minority interests are treated unjustly in a society reflects longstanding historical evolution of power inequalities in social structures and institutions.

Agents, Constituencies, and External Audiences

o   Negotiations become significantly more complex when negotiators are representing others’ views – acting as an agent representing their group or organization or being represented by another person.

o   When there are multiple parties, the public media, and/or audiences present to observe, critique, and evaluate the negotiations, this increases complexity.

IV. The Consequences of Unequal Power

·         A number of research studies have focused on the impact of power differences on negotiating outcomes. In general, these studies support several sets of findings:

o   Differences in power and in level of interdependence between the parties can lead to significantly different conflict orientations and behaviors.

o   Parties with equal power are more likely to engage in cooperative behavior, while parties with unequal power are more likely to behave contentiously, using threats, punishments, and exploitative behavior.

o   The more powerful party in the relationship has the capacity to determine the negotiation outcome (regardless of source of power), but does not necessarily use that power.

§  Powerful parties may actually decide to withhold the use of that power, knowing that if they use it, the low power party will be less involved in creating the outcome, less satisfied with their role in shaping it, and less committed to implementing and enforcing it without constant oversight and monitoring.

V.     Dealing With Others Who Have More Power

·         Negotiators are often on the receiving end of power.

o   Very little research has focused on how parties deal with others who have significantly more power but we end this chapter with some advice to negotiators who are in a low-power position.

                                    1.      Never do an all-or-nothing deal.

§  Relying on a single opponent makes a low-power party vulnerable.

§  Low-power parties should diversify risk by entering into deals with several other partners so no single player can wipe out the low-power partner.

                                    2.      Make the other party smaller.

§  Attempt to establish multiple relationships and engage in multiple negotiations – you may be able to “divide and conquer” by diversifying.

                                    3.      Make yourself bigger.

§  Low-power players should attempt to build coalitions with other low-power players so as to increase their collective bargaining power.

§  If a low-power player tries to look bigger by becoming aggressive, they achieve poorer outcomes.

                                    4.      Build momentum through doing deals in sequence.

§  Early deals build a relationship.

§  Select high-power targets that have the most to gain, and maximize the visibility of those deals to other parties.

                                    5.      Use the power of competition to leverage power.

§  This is a variation on the power of a BATNA.

§  If you have something to offer, make sure you offer it to more than one high-power party.

§  If you can get them competing against each other for what you want, some may actually do a deal with you simply to keep you from dealing with the competitor.

                                    6.      Constrain yourself.

§  Tie your hands by limiting the ways you can do business or whom you can do business with.

                                    7.      Good information is always a source of power.

§  Seek out information that strengthens your position and case.

§  Anticipate what information would be most compelling to the other side, organize it so you can draw on it quickly and assemble it to be persuasive.

                                    8.      Ask many questions to gain more information.

§  Negotiators with less power asked more diagnostic than leading questions and constantly showed their willingness to cooperate – and they got better outcomes.

                                    9.      Do what you can to manage the process.

§  If the high-power party controls the process, they will do it in a way to assure outcomes are what they want.

§  If the low-power party controls many elements of the process, they are more likely to steer the deal in an advantageous direction.

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, we discussed the nature of power in negotiation.  We suggested that there were two major ways to think about power: “power over,” which suggests that power is fundamentally dominating and coercive in nature, and “power with,” suggesting that power is jointly shared with the other party to collectively develop joint goals and objectives. There is a great tendency to see and define power as the former, but as we have discussed in this chapter and our review of the basic negotiation strategies, “power with” is critical to successful integrative negotiation.

We reviewed five major sources of power: Informational sources of power, personal sources of power, position-based sources of power, relationship-based power, and contextual sources of power.

In closing, we wish to stress two key points. First, while we have presented many vehicles for attaining power in this chapter, it must be remembered that power can be highly elusive and fleeting in negotiation. Almost anything can be a source of power if it gives the negotiator a temporary advantage over the other party (e.g., a BATNA or a piece of critical information). Second, power is only the capacity to influence; using that power and skillfully exerting influence on the other requires a great deal of sophistication and experience.





Chapter 9

Influence

 

Chapter Overview

In Chapter 8, we discussed power as the potential to alter others’ attitudes and behaviors.  In this chapter we turn to power’s complement, influence—the actual strategies and messages that individuals deploy to bring about desired attitudinal or behavioral change.

  • During negotiations, actors frequently need to      convince the other party that they have offered something of value, their      offer is reasonable, and they cannot offer more.

  • Negotiators may also want to alter the other      party’s beliefs about the importance of their own objectives and convince them      that their concessions are not as valuable as believed.

  • Negotiators may portray themselves as likable      people who should be treated decently.

  • All these      efforts are designed to use information, as well as the qualities of the      sender and receiver of that information, to adjust the other party’s      positions, perceptions, and opinions; we call this group of tactics influence.

The pursuit of influence certainly can stem from and capitalize on power in the sense that if you have leverage over someone because of your position of authority or your ability to confer rewards, you can use those things to influence – to get the other person to see or do something your way. 

  • But it is crucial to emphasize at the outset of      this chapter that achieving      successful influence does not necessarily require having power over the      individual(s) you seek to influence.       

  • As we shall      see, there are multiple routes to influencing someone else’s attitudes or      behavior, some of which benefit from having formal or informal power over      the target of influence, but many of which do not.

People differ widely in their ability to use influence effectively. 

  • Some believe the ability to persuade is something      with which people are born – you either have it or you don’t 

  • Although the natural persuasive abilities of      people do differ, persuasion is as much a science as a native ability;      everyone has the opportunity to get better at it. 

  • Our aim in this chapter is to discuss a variety      of influence tools that are available to the savvy negotiator. 

  • To set the      stage, we begin with an organizing framework that defines influence      seeking in two broad categories that correspond to two different social –      psychological avenues for achieving influence.

Learning Objectives

1.          Understand the principles of successful influence that are relevant to negotiation.

2.          Explore the dynamics of the two routes to successful influence.

  1. Consider      the various influence tools and techniques that are available through each      of the routes.

4.          Gain a broader understanding of the variety of influence tools available to any negotiator.


Chapter Outline

  1. Two Routes to Influence: An Organizing Model

  2. The Central Route to Influence: The Message and      Its Deliver

A.    Message Content

B.     Message Structure

C.     Persuasive Style: How to Pitch the Message

  1. Peripheral Routes to Influence

A.    Aspects of Messages That Foster Peripheral Influence

B.     Source Characteristics That Foster Peripheral Influence

C.     Aspects of Context That Foster Peripheral Influence

  1. The Role of Receivers – Targets of Influence

A.    Understanding the Other’s Perspective

B.     Resisting the Other’s Influence

  1. Chapter Summary


I.       Two Routes To Influence: An Organizing Model

·         For a long time, this was the traditional way that psychologists analyzed influence and persuasion:  effective influence occurs when a person is exposed to, pays attention to, comprehends, retains, and acts in accordance with the content of a message.

o   Researchers later came to understand that people can be influenced without their having to understand, learn, or retain the specific information contained in the message.

o   In fact, people can be influenced even when they are not actively thinking about the message itself.

o   It is simplistic to think of influence only in terms of the verbal content of persuasive messages aimed by the influence seeker at an influence target.

·         An alternative way is based on a more nuanced understanding of how influence and persuasion work – and suggests two general paths by which people are persuaded.

o   The first path occurs consciously and involves integrating the influence-seeking message into the individual’s previously existing cognitive structures.

§  This path to persuasion is the central route, which occurs when motivation and ability to scrutinize issue-relevant arguments are relatively high.

o   The second route to persuasion, the peripheral route, is characterized by subtle cues and context, with less cognitive processing of the message.

§  Persuasion via the peripheral route is thought to occur automatically leading to attitude change without argument scrutiny.

§  Because the information is not integrated into existing cognitive structures, persuasion occurring via this route is likely to last a shorter time than persuasion occurring via the central route.

§  A simple example of peripheral-route persuasion is a listener who is convinced by the impressive credentials of the speaker rather than by the arguments of the speaker.

·         For clarity of presentation, elements from both paths are represented in a single diagram – Figure 9.1.

o   Many of the common elements used to increase leverage are part of the central route.

o   However, several influence strategies are designed to persuade through the indirect, or peripheral, route.

o   The remainder of this chapter addresses the approaches to influence presented in Figure 9.1 and the discussion is organized according to the distinction between central and peripheral routes to influence.

·         Effective influence is not just a way for negotiators to claim more value; it can help persuade the other party to see possibilities for joint benefit and to increase the other party’s satisfaction with the deal the does ultimately result.

II.    The Central Route to Influence: The Message and Its Delivery

·         There are three major issues to consider when constructing a message.

o   The content of the message – the facts and topics that should be covered

o   The structure of the message – how the topics and facts should be arranged and organized

o   The delivery style – how the message should be presented

A.    Message Content

·         In this section, we discuss four questions negotiators need to consider when constructing persuasive arguments.

o   How to make offers attractive to the other party

o   How to frame messages so the other party will say yes

o   How to make messages normative

o   How to obtain agreements in principle

Make the Offer Attractive to the Other Party

o   In structuring the message, negotiators should emphasize the advantage the other party gains from accepting the proposal.

§  To do this well, negotiators need to understand the other party’s needs.

§  Understanding the other party’s needs is in part a function of an individual skill known as “perspective-taking ability” – a person’s capacity to consider things from another person’s viewpoint.

o   When negotiators are on the receiving end of a proposal, they highlight why certain features are undesirable.

§  The better a negotiator understands the other’s real needs and concerns, the easier it is to formulate a proposal the other party will find genuinely attractive – even if they do not admit it – and to package the proposal with arguments that anticipate the other’s objections.

Frame the Message So the Other Party Will Say Yes

o   If you can get the other party to agree to something – almost anything – then you have laid the foundation for subsequent agreement.

o   The task is to find something the other party can agree with that puts them in the mindset of saying yes.

Make the Message Normative

o   People are motivated to behave consistently with their values, which become part of their self-image.

§  People will go to considerable lengths to act or say things consistent with their self-image.

o   A powerful argument in negotiation is showing the other person that by following a course of action (your proposal), they will be acting in accordance both with their values and with some higher (more noble, moral, or ethical) code of conduct.

§  At times, the simple statement “This is the right (or proper) thing to do” can carry considerable weight as a normative influence appeal.

§  Especially when a negotiator is trying to induce the other party to act in a way that is contrary to a narrow reading of that party’s self-interest.

Suggest an Agreement in Principle

o   There are times when getting the other party to accept an “agreement in principle” may be a valuable step in a negotiation.

§  Obtaining agreement on a general principle, such as a cease-fire, may be the first “yes” statement to which both parties can subscribe.

§  Although an agreement in principle is desirable when other options are blocked, it still takes a great deal of work to turn such an agreement into one that contains specific details and action proposals.

§  Principles sound good, and most people may agree with what they advocate, but there is usually great uncertainty about how a principle applies to a specific situation.

B.     Message Structure

·         People are influenced not only by what negotiators say but also by how they arrange the words.

·         Here we discuss four aspects of message structure that help to explain when and how persuasion occurs through the central route:

o   One- and two-sided messages

o   Message components

o   Repetition

o   Conclusions

One- and Two-Sided Messages

o   When negotiators try to persuade the other party, it is because they believe the other holds an opinion different from theirs.

§  Many people deal with this problem by ignoring arguments and opinions that support the other party’s position – a one-sided approach.

o   An alternative approach is to mention and describe the opposing point of view, and then show how and why it is less desirable than the presenter’s point of view.

§  A two-sided approach.

o   Adding one-sided arguments sometimes works against you.

§  They may have a “boomerang effect,” if they are easy to refute.

o   In general, two-sided messages are more effective than one-sided messages.

§  More specifically, two-sided messages appear to be most effective:

·         When the other party is well educated

·         When the other party initially disagrees with the position

·         When the other party will be exposed to people who will argue points of view different from the position advocated

·         When the issue discussed is already familiar

§  In addition, two-sided arguments work best when the preferred argument is presented last.

o   But there is a drawback – research shows that a change in someone’s attitude is more likely to produce a corresponding change in behavior when that person has been exposed to a one-sided message rather than a two-sided message.

§  This link between attitude change and behavior change matters because a negotiator is not just trying to persuade the other party to think more favorably about the offer,

§  They want the other party to act on that attitude by making a concession or agreeing to a deal.

o   It is a mistake to ignore the impact of counterarguments – the other party is formulating them as you speak.

§  It is an advantage to refute them by using two-sided messages.

§  There is the possibility that a two-sided argument will do a better job changing a person’s mind – which is sometimes all that is needed – than it will changing actual behavior.

Message Components

o   Big ideas or large propositions are hard to grasp and accept, especially when they are significantly different from your own.

§  Negotiators can help the other party understand and accept their arguments by breaking them into smaller, more understandable pieces – a process known as “fractionating.”

§  It is even better to show component parts containing statements the other party has already accepted or agreed with.

§  In addition, it is possible that breaking down complex arguments into smaller parts will lead the parties to see the possibilities to logroll, bundle, and trade off across issues because the issues will be in sharper focus.

·         To succeed as mechanisms for achieving mutual gains, logrolls, bundles, and trade-offs require that multiple issues be on the table and in play.

·         Integrative agreements are hindered if the parties take up, settle on, and dispense with individual issues one by one.

Repetition

o   Repetition encourages central-route processing

§  Increasing the likelihood that the influence target will scrutinize the message

§  And thus enhances the likelihood that the message will be understood

o   However, repeating a point is effective only for the first few times.

§  After that, additional repetition does not significantly change attitudes

§  And may become annoying and lead people to react against the message

Conclusions

o   Letting others draw their own conclusion (as long as it is the conclusion one wants drawn) can lead to a very effective presentation.

§  Research suggests this effective when dealing with very intelligent people or those who have not made up their minds.

§  In contrast, for people whose ideas are already well formulated and strongly held, leaving the conclusion unstated risks leaving the most important part of the influence attempt undone.

·         It is well established that those with strong views fall prey to “confirmation bias,” leading them to perceive and interpret arguments in ways that reinforce their existing beliefs and discount contrary arguments.

§  On balance, it is usually best not to assume; rather, draw explicit conclusions for listeners to ensure they have understood the argument completely.

C.    Persuasive Style: How to Pitch the Message

·         When negotiators select a delivery style for the message, they set the emotional tone and manner of their presentation.

·         We now consider four major elements of persuasive style and how they affect successful persuasion.

o   Active participation versus passive responding

o   Use of vivid language and metaphors

o   Use of threats to incite fears

o   Violation of the receiver’s expectations

Encourage Active Participation

o   People are more likely to change their attitudes and beliefs for the long term when they are actively involved in the process of learning new material.

§  Negotiators who use active approaches are generally more persuasive then those who do not

§  Because an active approach requires the receiver to exert effort, which leads to involvement, which leads to attitude change

o   It can be helpful to precede negotiations with a friendly and engaging dialogue.

§  Research demonstrates that when a request is preceded by a pleasant dialogue, subjects were more willing to concede to a request.

§  The development of rapport has a number of positive benefits for avoiding impasse and achieving integrative outcomes.

Consider Vividness and Intensity of Language

o   The vividness and intensity of the language negotiators use have a major effect on their persuasiveness.

§  The intensity of language can be increased through the use of colorful metaphors, swear words, or a change in intonation – from quiet to loud or loud to quiet.

o   Language of relatively low intensity is at times more effective.

§  People under stress seem particularly receptive to messages using low-intensity language and more inclined to reject those using high-intensity language.

§  It appears intensity is even more complex as research shows the effect of intense language depends in part on who uses it.

·         Sources with high credibility can use more intense language than those who are not seen as credible.

·         Effective influencers match their emotional fervor to the ability of the target to receive and interpret the message.

·         Bottom line: although there is a strong temptation to use intense language to make a point, it is often wise to moderate this impulse.

o   Metaphors and analogies are a particularly useful way to elevate the vividness of a message in the service of persuasion.

§  Using metaphors to excess may lead the other party to believe that you are filled with hot air, but using them to summarize some facts or to create a visual impression can be valuable in persuasion.

§  An important caution for negotiators:

·         When using metaphors, be careful to choose analogies that are “correct” for the situation.

·         Especially challenging when negotiating across cultures as metaphors do not always translate well and could leave the other party confused, or insulted

Use Threats; Incite Fears

o   Messages that contain threats can be useful when a negotiator needs to underscore the absolute importance of a point being made.

§  Threats are if-then statements with serious negative consequences attached.

§  “If you do X, then I will be forced to do Y.”

o   Threats are probably used less frequently than one might expect.

§  The other person’s reaction to a threat is hard to predict.

§  It is hard to know how menacing the threat appears to the other party.

§  Threats put other parties in a position where they can call the bluff, forcing the negotiator to carry out the threat.

§  Threats may produce compliance, but they do not usually produce commitment.

o   One way to understand the effects of threats is to view them as a variation on the strategic expression of anger in negotiation.

§  Research shows threats elicit more concessions than anger.

§  Anger is often seen as an implied threat – so, actual threats are more effective at extracting concessions than implied threats.

o   How a threat is constructed and delivered can determine its effectiveness.

§  Research suggests that threats can be effective if they increase the fear level of the recipient of the message.

§  The effectiveness of a threat may depend on its timing and form.

·         Threats made early are more effective than made implicitly.

·         Threats made late in the negotiation are more effective if made explicit.

Violate the Receiver’s Expectations

o   People who argue positions that are thought to be counter to their self-interest are generally more persuasive because they violate the receiver’s expectation about what the sender should be advocating.

o   Receivers’ expectations can also be violated when they expect one style of delivery from the speaker and then experience a very different style.

o   More generally, one researcher proposed a model of interpersonal influence that revolves around violating expectations of influence targets as a way to increase your effectiveness as an influencer.

§  The model proposes that violated expectations will alter how the target of influence attends to an influence-seeking message.

§  Conversely, negative arousal created by an unexpectedly direct or assertive request may inhibit influence if the violation of expectations leads the target to scrutinize the message more closely.

o   There are limits to the effects of violated expectations as a way to elicit compliance.

§  Frequent violated expectations may tend to erode trust rather than increase the likelihood that a person will be persuaded by the communicator.

§  Accordingly, communication strategies that violate expectations should be used as a means of influence strategically and sparingly.

Section Summary

o   In summary, negotiators need to take care when they construct a message to persuade another party to their point of view.

o   Aspects of the message content, message structure, and delivery style can all influence the extent to which a message is persuasive.

o   When messages are well crafted and influence does successfully occur through the “central route,” the change in the target’s attitudes is more likely to be long lasting and resistant to counterinfluence.

III.  Peripheral Routes to Influence

·         So far, we have focused on the central route to influence – refer to Figure 9.1.

·         In this section, we consider ways a person can influence others through the peripheral route – the right-hand side of Figure 9.1.

o   In such cases, the receiver attends less to the substance of persuasive arguments and instead is more susceptible to “automatic” influence through subtle cues.

o   This usually occurs when the target is either unmotivated or unable to attend carefully to the substance contained within a persuasive message.

o   As suggested earlier, persuasion occurring through peripheral routes are

§  Less likely to being about real attitude change

§  More likely to last a shorter time

§  And more vulnerable to counterinfluence

·         Our discussion of peripheral routes to influence considers three sets of strategies:

o   Message aspects

o   Attributes of the persuader – the message source

o   And elements of the influence context

A.    Aspects of Messages That Foster Peripheral Influence

·         When targets of influence are unmotivated or unable to pay close attention to the message, they are susceptible to being influenced by message elements that exist apart from the actual arguments involved.

·         We discuss three such elements here:

o   The way the influence seeker chooses to order those arguments

o   The format through which arguments are conveyed

o   And the use of distraction to interfere with the target’s ability to think with effort about the arguments in play

Message Order

o   In preparing a persuasive argument, negotiators usually have one major point, piece of information, or illustration that is particularly compelling.

§  Research clearly shows – do not place the important point in the middle.

o   When topics are familiar, interesting, or controversial, the important points should be made early, exposing the receiver to the primacy effect.

§  The first item in a long list of items is the one most likely to be remembered.

o   In contrast, when the topic is uninteresting, unfamiliar, or not very important to the receiver, the most critical point should be placed at the end of the message to take advantage of the recency effect.

§  The tendency for the last item presented to be the best remembered.

Format

o   Certain arguments or appeals may be more or less effective depending on the channel in use or the format of the presentation.

o   One way choice of message format can induce peripheral influence is by triggering a snap judgment regarding the legitimacy of the argument.

§  Written rules tend to carry more weight than verbal ones, for example.

Distractions

o   People start to defend themselves against being influenced as soon as they suspect that someone is trying to persuade them.

§  As they listen, part of their attention is devoted to what is being said, but a large portion is also devoted to developing counterarguments.

§  Persuasion efforts are more effective if you can reduce the other party’s efforts to develop counterarguments.

§  One way is to have a distraction occur at the same time the message is sent.

·         Distractions absorb the effort the other party would put into building counterarguments and leave them vulnerable to the message appeals.

·         Distractions seem to inhibit the receiver’s subvocalization – what they say to themselves as they hear the message.

·         Sometimes subvocalizations are counterarguments, but they can supportive as well.

B.     Source Characteristics That Foster Peripheral Influence

·         Someone who is not paying close attention to the message may be unduly influenced by the characteristics of the person or organization delivering the message.

·         A wide variety of source effects can have an effect on the recipient of a persuasive message.

·         We group them here into three broad categories: credibility, attractiveness, and authority.

Source Credibility

o   During negotiation, both parties exchange information, opinions, and interpretations – What, and how much, should be believed?

§  On one hand, there are strong incentives for negotiators to mislead each other.

§  On the other hands, negotiators must accept and believe at least some of the information they are given, or successful negotiation is impossible.

o   Many factors contribute to source credibility.

§  Here, we discuss several that negotiators can control, beginning with the most important ones: qualifications, trustworthiness, and self-presentation.

                                                            1.      Qualifications and Expertise

·         The stronger the person’s perceived qualifications and expertise, the higher the credibility.

·         Judgments about qualifications can substitute for judgments about the quality of the arguments

o   That is what makes source credibility a peripheral route to influence.

·         Expertise can be established in a number of ways, such as your occupation, education, or past experiences.

o   In situations where you are unknown or apt to be viewed stereotypically, it is worth the extra effort to establish qualifications and expertise.

                                                            2.      Reputation for Trustworthiness and Integrity

·         Integrity is character – the personal values and ethics grounding your behavior in high moral principles.

o   Your integrity assures people you can be trusted, honest, and abide by an agreement’s terms and follow through with it.

·         Conversely, people with a reputation for being dishonest or insincere have a difficult time in negotiations – they are not believed, even when being truthful.

o   A poor reputation overshadows expertise.

o   A reputation for being dishonest is very difficult to overcome.

·         It is critical for negotiators to consider the long-term consequences of their behavior if they are to be trusted by others.

                                                            3.      Self-Presentation

·         People appear more or less credible because of their presence—the way they present themselves to others.

·         Communicators can create a favorable presence in several ways.

o   How you dress, speak, and behave influence credibility.

o   It is best to be “normal,” meaning to act appropriately, naturally, and without affectation.

                                                            4.      Status Differences

·         Status is signaled by a variety of criteria: occupation, age, education, where you live, dress, type of car, and the like.

·         Status confers credibility, which in turn can make someone influential by giving them visibility and prestige.

·         A status difference may increase resistance so a persuader must decide whether to enforce a status difference or minimize the difference.

                                                            5.      Intention to Persuade

·         The more a person detects a negotiator’s mission is to influence their views, the more suspicious and resistant they may become.

·         Many skillful negotiators may assume a mild-mannered demeanor to minimize the negative impact of a hard persuasive style.

                                                            6.      Associates

·         Whom you associate with also can influence how you are perceived, in terms of both status and expertise.

                                                            7.      Persistence and Tenacity

·         The effective use of persistence doesn’t mean pursuing your goals blindly and rigidly because you can be effectively rebuffed

o   Instead, it means displaying creativity in finding new ways to pursue the objective.

o   Persistence can help enhance a source’s credibility to the extent that the target of the message isn’t annoyed by that persistence.

o   But rather sees it as a sign that the communicator is dedicated and tenacious.

o   Box 9.1 presents an intriguing example of how hearing something repeatedly leads people to assume it must come from a credible source.

Source Attractiveness

o   People are more likely to respond positively to persuaders they like than to those they don’t.

o   Personal attractiveness may increase persuasiveness for a number of reasons.

§  People may let their guard down and trust attractive people more readily.

§  Attractive people may receive attention, or they may cause others to imitate them.

o   Personal attractiveness increases liking.

o   An individual can enhance their personal attractiveness to a target of influence or a negotiating opponent in several ways.

                                                1.      Friendliness

§  Warmth, empathy, and personal interest in others all help to soften the harder edges of some of other influence tactics.

§  Successful negotiators use friendliness to make the other party feel comfortable and at ease.

§  Requests are more favorably received when preceded by informal dialogue.

                                                2.      Ingratiation

§  Ingratiation involves enhancing the other’s self-image or reputation through statements or actions, and thus enhancing your own image.

§  Compliments work as an influence tactic as people like to receive them but also the norm of reciprocity leaves the other party obligated to return something for the compliment.

§  Ingratiation is often used, but if used poorly, it can backfire.

§  Excessive or incorrect compliments make the receiver wary.

                                                3.      Likability

§  If you like the communicator, you are more likely to be persuaded by them and less likely to protest a weak argument.

·         However, research shows that likeability is less important than other credibility factors, such as expertise.

§  The effects of liking principle are insidious and occur through many approaches – defending against them all is impossible.

§  Separating liking the other party from an evaluation of the deal should be enough to moderate the influence of the liking principle in your negotiation.

                                                4.      Helping the Other Party

§  There are many ways one party can help the other party in a negotiation:

·         By doing a favor, allowing extra time, providing confidential information, complying with a request, or helping with a constituency.

·         Negotiators can help the other party avoid being caught by surprise.

                                                5.      Perceived Similarity

§  The more similarities people find between one another, the more bonds they establish, the better both parties feel, and the more receptive they will be to each other’s messages and efforts at persuasion.

§  A useful negotiating tactic is to identify and discuss experiences, characteristics, and opinions you hold in common with the other party.

                                                6.      Emotion

§  Emotion combined with persistence leads to assertiveness and determination.

§  Used effectively, emotion may enhance a message source’s attractiveness by instilling in listeners the belief that the speaker holds appealing deep-seated values. 

§  An important aspect of the role of emotion in influence and negotiation is being aware of the other party’s emotions.

§  Be careful not to assume that your arguments will be better received if your target is in a good mood.

Authority

o   The principle of authority is quite simple: People with authority have more influence than those without authority.

o   In negotiation, the principle of authority can be used in many ways.

§  The use of a title, such as doctor or professor, gives the user more authority and thus more influence.

§  Authority is more than position; it can further lead to attributions of expertise.

o   Researchers have distinguished between two broad uses of authority in influence-seeking.

§  Authority based on one’s personal expertise or credibility.

§  Authority based on a person’s legitimate position in an existing social hierarchy.

·         The first form – expertise – has been labeled a “soft” influence tactic, and the second form – position – is a “harsh” tactic.

o   The following is offered as advice for dealing with authority figures who may have influence over you.

§  Ask two questions: “Is this authority truly an expert?” and “How truthful can I expect this expert to be?”

·         The first question invites you to verify the person really does have expertise in the situation and not just the appearance of expertise.

·         The second brings into focus the motive of the alleged authority.

C.    Aspects of Context That Foster Peripheral Influence

·         Finally, we explore aspects of the situation beyond the message itself and the sender of the message that create opportunities to pursue the peripheral route to influence.

·         Five strategies are discussed: reciprocity, commitment, social proof, scarcity, and reward and punishment.

Reciprocity

o   The norm of reciprocity suggests that when you receive something from another person, you should respond in the future with a favor in return.

§  The reciprocity norm is thought to be pan-cultural in that groups around the world appear to respect it.

o   The norm of reciprocity plays an important role in negotiations.

§  Negotiators give concessions and expect concessions in return.

o   A negotiator can counter the effects of the norm of reciprocity by refusing all favors in a negotiation setting, though it may cause more problems than it resolves.

o   So how should the negotiator respond?

§  Respond politely to a favor and accept what is offered if it is something you want.

§  If it is apparent the favor is an attempt at manipulation, then you should redefine the event as a trick rather than a favor.

§  This removes the obligation of the rule of reciprocity.

Commitment

o   Once people have decided something, they can be remarkably persistent in their beliefs.

§  This process has been labeled commitment to a position, and it relies heavily on the common need that people have to appear consistent, both to themselves and to others.

§  See Box 9.2 for a cautionary tale involving commitment to the purchase of a car.

o   Commitment strategies are very powerful devices for making people comply.

§  One way to increase commitment is to write things down.

§  Researchers call this the foot-in-the-door technique

o   Commitment in a negotiation is usually incremental. 

§  Agreement to innocuous statements early in the negotiation may be used as a foundation for further and further concessions.

o   Commitment strategies are difficult to combat.

§  Your body will send two types of warning signals when these techniques are in use.

§  Either you will feel uncomfortable when subtle commitments are being made

§  Or something in the deal will just not seem quite right.

Social Proof

o   The principle of social proof suggests that people look to others to determine the correct response in many situations.

§  This principle suggests that people often behave in certain ways because everyone else is doing so.

o   The principle of social proof can act as a powerful influence strategy.

§  Sweepstakes advertisements highlight previous winners and feature celebrities.

o   The principle of social proof works because questionable information (“everyone thinks this product is good”) is given weight in decisions.

§  Dilute its effectiveness by identifying the false information and giving it the weight it deserves.

§  In negotiation, this means careful preparation and being aware of “facts” about the others’ views that do not seem to match your preparation.

Scarcity

o   The principle of scarcity suggests that when things are less available, they will become more desirable.

o   In negotiation situations, the scarcity tactic may be operating whenever there appears to be a great demand for the thing being negotiated.

§  Anytime negotiators talk about “exclusive opportunities” and “time-limited offers,” they are using the scarcity principle.

o   The scarcity principle is difficult to combat when used effectively.

§  It creates in the victim an activity trap focused on obtaining the item and effectively suspends cognitive evaluation of the broader situation.

§  People need to be aware of the emotional trappings this principle arouses.

§  When confronted with a strong emotional response, carefully evaluate your reasons for wanting the item in the first place.

Reward and Punishment.

o   Resources can be used as tools of influence in two major ways:

§  By offering exchanges that will reward the other party to gain their compliance

§  Or by pressuring the other party with threats of punishment

o   Exchange relies on resources available to the influence seeker as the power base, particularly resources that can be translated into rewards for the other – favors, benefits, incentives, treats, perks, and the like.

§  Thus, exchange frequently invokes the use of promises and commitments as persuasive tools.

§  Exchange-based transactions are often negotiated so that the other party completes their obligation now but chooses not to ask you to complete your obligation until some point in the future.

o   Pressure, on the other hand, is the use of power through threat of punishment.

§  Pressure need not involve an actual denial or removal of resources; coercion or punishment can be as effective in verbal form.

o   The conditions for the use of pressure are similar to those for the use of exchange and praise.

§  Praise and rewards are better if the goal is to maintain the target’s goodwill

§  Criticism and sanctions are more appropriate when changing behavior is more important than maintaining goodwill.

§  Pressure tactics may elicit resistance from the other party and frequent use of pressure tactics may alienate the influence target.

o   There is evidence that differences in the nature of situations affect the tendency of negotiators to use pressure tactics.

§  Parties with high power tend to use more pressure tactics, such as threats, and make fewer concessions.

§  A low power person can seek to delay the interaction, stall for time, engage in passive resistance, or comply only minimally with the threat maker’s demands.

o   Lastly, there is evidence that the use of pressure tactics varies cross-culturally.

§  Negotiators from cultures that place a higher value on social hierarchy (Japan) were more likely to use pressure tactics than negotiators from egalitarian societies (Germany and the U.S.).

§  Persuasive arguments rather than pressure tactics were preferred in individualistic cultures (the U.S.), with pressure tactics more likely in collectivist societies.

Section Summary

o   In this section, we examined several ways that persuaders can use the peripheral route to achieve influence.

o   We discussed factors related to the message itself, characteristics of the message source, and aspects of the influence context that can result in influence.

§  Context is especially important as it complicates the influence situation.

§  See Box 9.3.

o   Influence targets are particularly susceptible to peripheral forms of influence to the extent that they are unmotivated and/or unable to pay careful attention to the argumentative substance of the message.

§  Effective negotiators realize that a big part of their task is persuading the other party to view the situation as they do.

§  Strategies that underlie peripheral routes to influence are an important part of a negotiator’s arsenal for doing just that.

IV.  The Role of Receivers – Targets of Influence

·         We close this chapter with a discussion of the person who is the target of influence.

o   These are not passive recipients and there are two prominent aspects to the influence target’s role and options.

§  First, targets should avoid becoming defensive and direct their energy toward understanding the goals and interests driving the other party’s influence attempts.

§  Second, there are ways negotiators can resist the attempts at influence

§  We will now discuss each of these two aspects of the target’s role in turn.

A.    Understanding the Other’s Perspective

·         Negotiators on the receiving end of influence-seeking gambits are better equipped to decide whether or not to be persuaded if they have a nuanced understanding of where the other party is coming from.

·         We present here three suggestions for achieving that kind of understanding.

Explore the Other’s Point of View

o   It is very much to your advantage to understand what the other party really wants, how things look to him, and how he developed his position.

§  Explore the other’s perspective with well-crafted questions designed to reveal their needs and interests.

·         Why are those important objectives for you?

·         What would happen if you did not get everything you have asked for?

·         Have your needs changed since the last time we talked?

o   Exploring the other person’s outlook not only provides more information, which can lead you to design solutions to meet both sides’ needs, but also helps you understand why the other party is trying to persuade you to think or act in a particular way.

§  Be careful of questions that attack rather than explore.

·         How in the world can you say that?

·         Who in their right mind would believe that?

Selectively Paraphrase 

o   Paraphrasing ensures that both parties have understood each other accurately.

§  If you haven’t understood the other party, then they have the opportunity to correct you. 

§  Restate your understanding after being corrected, to make sure you have gotten it right.

§  Once your paraphrasing indicates you understand, the other person will usually stop repeating a point and move on – so paraphrasing moves the discussion forward.

o   You can also ask the other party to restate or paraphrase what you have said. 

§  This process accomplishes several things:

·         It asks the other party to listen closely and recall what you have said.

·         It gives you the opportunity to check out the accuracy of his or her understanding.

·         It emphasizes the most important points of your presentation.

Reinforce Points You Like in the Other Party’s Proposals

o   Negotiators are frequently ineffective as they respond only to what they dislike in the other’s proposal and ignore the things they like.

§  People are more likely to repeat behavior that is rewarded than behavior that is not rewarded.

o   The simplest way to reward people for what they say during a negotiation is to acknowledge and support a point they have made.

§  Nonverbal signals work as well.

§  You can also compliment speakers when they make points you want emphasized, and express appreciation to them for considering your interests and needs.

§  A third approach is to separate parts of a statement you like and encourage the other party to develop favorable points.

B.     Resisting the Other’s Influence

·         There are three major things listeners can do to resist the other’s influence efforts: have good alternatives, make a public commitment, and inoculate yourself against the other’s persuasive message.

Have a BATNA and Know How to Use It

o   Having a good BATNA enables a negotiator to walk away from a given negotiation and still get their needs met.

o   A BATNA is a source of leverage only if the other party is aware of it.

o   To use a BATNA effectively, a negotiator must assess the other party’s awareness that it exists and, if necessary, share that fact. 

o   BATNAs should be improved before and during a negotiation to enhance leverage.

Make a Public Commitment

o   One of the most effective ways to get someone to stand firm on a position is to have him make a public commitment to that position.

o   Sometimes negotiators want the other party to make a public commitment, but not always.

§  It should be something you support.

o   Even better than eliciting statements of commitment is enticing the other party to make a behavioral commitment.

§  At times, negotiators will want to prevent the other party from making public commitments to positions that might interfere with reaching an agreement.

§  A savvy negotiator will realize it may be in their interest to help the other party escape an ill-advised commitment in a face-saving way.

Inoculate Yourself against the Other Party’s Arguments

o   Negotiators may want to inoculate themselves against the other party’s arguments.

o   There are three approaches for inoculating against the arguments of other parties:

§  Prepare supporting arguments for your position only.

§  Develop arguments against your position only and then develop counterarguments – find ways to refute them in the points you make.

§  Develop arguments both for your original position and against your position, and then develop counterarguments to refute both (a combination approach).

o   Research reveals that the best way to inoculate against being influenced is to use the combination approach—developing arguments both for and against your position, and counterarguments to refute them.

§  Research on inoculation also suggests that:

·         The best way to inoculate people against attacks on their position is to involve them in developing a defense.

·         The larger the number of arguments in any defense, the more effective it becomes.

·         Asking people to make public statements supporting their original position increases their resistance to counterarguments.

Section Summary

o   Negotiators in the role of listener or target can do many things to help blunt the persuasive force of a message.

§  By exploring the influence seeker’s point of view

§  Challenging the arguments set forth

§  Taking steps to actively resist the influence attempt

§  Negotiators can minimize the chance of being swayed by weak arguments.

o   Some key elements of resistance include:

§  Making wise decision about how and when to use your BATNA

§  Knowing when to make public commitments

§  And inoculating yourself against anticipated arguments.

o   The key is approaching influence attempts with a focused and critical mind so you are persuaded only when the arguments merit it.

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, we discussed a large number of mechanisms of influence that one could use in negotiation. These tools were considered in two broad categories: influence that occurs through the “central route” to persuasion and influence that occurs through the “peripheral route” to persuasion. With respect to the central route, we addressed the content of the message, how messages are structured, and the style with which a persuasive message is delivered. Influence that occurs through the central route is likely to be relatively enduring and resistant to counterinfluence. With respect to the peripheral route, we considered tactics related to the construction of the message itself, as well as characteristics of the message source and elements of the influence context. When influence occurs through the peripheral route, the target may comply but will not necessarily make a corresponding attitudinal commitment; moreover, that compliance may be short-lived, and the target is generally more susceptible to counterinfluence.

In the last major section we considered how the receiver—the target of influence—can avoid being unduly persuaded by exploring the needs and interests of the other party, or by resisting the persuasive effects of the message. Effective negotiators are skilled not only at crafting persuasive messages, but also at playing the role of skilled “consumers” of the messages that others direct their way.

This chapter has only touched on some of the more important and well-documented aspects of influence-seeking communication that can be used in bargaining. Negotiators usually spend a great deal of time devising ways to support and document their positions; they devote less time to considering how the information is presented or how to use qualities of the source and receiver to increase the likelihood that persuasion will be successful. Careful attention to source, target, and context factors, rather than just to message factors, is likely to have a positive impact on negotiator effectiveness.





Chapter 10

Relationships in Negotiation

 

 

Chapter Overview

 

Up to this point, we have described the negotiation process as though it occurred between two parties who had no prior relationship or knowledge of each other, came together to do a deal, and maintained no relationship once the deal was done.  This is clearly not the way many actual negotiations unfold.

In this chapter, we will focus on the ways these past and future relationships impact present negotiations. Our treatment of relationships will come in two major sections.

  • First, we examine how a past, ongoing, or future      relationship between negotiators affects the negotiation process.

  • This discussion considers general assumptions      that have been made about the theory and practice of      negotiation—assumptions that have not taken into account any relationship      between the parties—and provides a critical evaluation of the adequacy of      negotiation theory for understanding and managing negotiations within      relationships.

  • We present a taxonomy of different kinds of      relationships and the negotiations that are likely to occur within them.

  • We also broadly describe research studies that      have examined negotiation processes within existing relationships.

  • Finally, we      look at three major themes—reputations, trust, and justice—that are      particularly critical to effective negotiations within a relationship.

We continue our discussion of other relevant social context factors in subsequent chapters. 

  • In Chapter 11, we examine how negotiations are      affected when negotiators represent others’ interests at the table – that      is, negotiating on behalf of others.       

  • In Chapter 12, we discuss the dynamics of      coalitions – the ways negotiators can band together to exert a more      powerful collective influence and how they divide the “spoils” once the      coalition has achieved its goal. 

  • Finally, in Chapter 13, we examine how      negotiation changes when there are multiple parties at the table – that      is, groups and teams working together to negotiate complex decisions and      agreements.

 

Learning Objectives

 

  1. Understand      how negotiation within an existing relationship changes the nature of      negotiation dynamics.

  2. Explore      the different forms of relationships in which negotiation can occur.

  3. Consider      the critical roles played by reputations, trust, and fairness in any      negotiating relationship.

4.          Gain insight into how to rebuild trust and repair damaged relationships.

 


Chapter Outline

  1. Challenging How Relationships in Negotiation Have      Been Studied

  2. Forms of Relationships

A.    Four Fundamental Relationship Forms

  1. Key Elements in Managing Negotiations within      Relationships

A.    Reputation

B.     Trust

C.     Justice

D.    Relationships among Reputation, Trust, and Justice

  1. Repairing a Relationship

  2. Chapter Summary


 I.      Challenging How Relationships in Negotiation Have Been Studied

 

  • Traditionally, researchers have studied the      negotiation process in two ways.

o   On the one hand, they have studied actual negotiations in “live” field situations as labor relations and international relations.

o   On the other hand, researchers have simulated complex negotiations by simplifying the complexity in a research laboratory.

  • Laboratory experimentation has dominated      research for the past 50 years, for several reasons.

o   First, this type of research is far easier to do than studying live negotiations.

o   Second, some research questions are best answered under controlled laboratory conditions because it would be impossible to repeatedly encounter or consistently simulate the same conditions in actual negotiations.

o   Finally, compared with field situations, the laboratory setting allows researchers to:

§  Collect data efficiently

§  Control extraneous factors in the environment

§  Be far more confident about the reliability and validity of the results

  • However, there are also serious problems      with this strong laboratory research tradition.

o   Conclusions about effective practices in complex negotiations are drawn from studies using the same limited set of simple bargaining games and classroom simulations.

o   Most research is conducted with parties who have no existing relationship.

o   Parties in actual negotiations may have a past, and future, history.

  • One group of researchers critical of the      dominance of laboratory-based approaches to studying negotiation argue      that researchers have been too quick to generalize from simple research      studies (“transactional negotiations”) to negotiating in complex relationships.      

o   There are several ways that an existing relationship changes negotiation dynamics.

                                    1.      Negotiating within relationships takes place over time.

§  Time becomes an important variable in negotiating within relationships;

§  Understanding how parties package or trade off issues over time may be a critical tool for managing difficult one-off situations.

                                    2.      Beyond discussion of issues, negotiation is a way to learn more about the other party and increase interdependence.

§  In a transactional negotiation, the most important issue is usually the deal; in a relationship negotiation, the most important issue is preserving or enhancing the relationship.

                                    3.      Resolution of simple distributive issues has implications for the future.

§  The settlement of any one negotiation issue can create undesired or unintended precedents for the future.

                                    4.      Distributive issues within relationship negotiations can be emotionally hot.

§  Many failed negotiations that end up in the courts share a common history of bad feeling, failed communication, or a complete breakdown in the ability of the parties to solve their problems, because the emotional baggage completely overshadows the negotiation issues.

                                    5.      Negotiating within relationships may never end.

§  Parties are constantly renegotiating issues, having several consequences:

·         Parties may defer negotiations over tough issues in order to start on the right foot.

o   If a married couple thought their relationship would be over in two years, they would get what they wanted while they were married, or have a pre-nup.

·         Attempting to anticipate the future and negotiate everything up front is often impossible.

o   Two young entrepreneurs in business together cannot possibly anticipate all the possible outcomes of their shared business.

o   Who knows now how successful they will be or whose contributions will be more valuable?

·         Issues on which parties truly disagree may never go away.

o   Two roommates, one neat, the other messy, may never settle the definition of cleanliness.

                                    6.      In many negotiations, the other person is the focal problem.

§  While the parties may try to “separate the person from the problem” and find viable solutions, the very fact that one party’s existence irritates the other can create an intractable negotiation problem.

                                    7.      In some negotiations, relationship preservation is the negotiation goal, and parties may make concessions on substantive issues to preserve or enhance the relationship.

§  Accommodation is far more likely as a strategy in relationship negotiations than it is in market transactions.

·         In summary, we have identified several issues that make negotiating in relationships different from and more challenging than conducting either distributive or integrative negotiations between parties who have no past or intended future relationship.

·         We now turn to defining some of the parameters of relationships that make negotiations within them complex and challenging.

II.    Forms of Relationships

·         A characteristic of most relationships is that each party’s actions are a major influential cause of the other party’s behavior.

o   How people react to that influence depends on what type of relationship they have.

·         Here, the word relationship is defined as a pairing of entities that has meaning to the parties, in which the understood form of present and future interactions influences their behavior today.

o   Two key assumptions:

§  The parties have a history and an expected future with each other that shapes the present interaction, and

§  The link between the parties themselves has meaning – the relationship itself has identity, beyond what each individual brings to it – who we are and what we do.

A.    Four Fundamental Relationship Forms

·         An influential approach, relational models theory, identifies four fundamental types of relationships: communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, and market pricing.

                                    1.      Communal sharing

§  Collective identity takes precedence over individual identity – the group is the most salient thing.

§  Such relationships are found in families, clubs, fraternal organizations, ethnic groups, and neighborhoods.

                                    2.      Authority ranking

§  People follow the principles of organizational hierarchy; higher ranks dominate lower ranks.

§  An authority-ranking relationship is one of inequality.

§  Control in such relationships is not accomplished by coercion (force) but by acknowledging legitimate authority, in which those of lower rank submit willingly to those of higher rank.

§  Examples include subordinates to bosses, soldiers to commanders, and negotiators to their constituents.

                                    3.      Equality matching

§  People in such relationships see each other as equal and separate, but often interchangeable.

§  Each party is expected to both contribute equally to others and receive equally from others.

§  These relationships occur within certain teams or groups whose members have to work together to coordinate their actions.

                                    4.      Market pricing

§  The values that govern this kind of relationship are determined by a market system.

§  People see others as interchangeable because the deal is more important than the relationship – parties will deal with anyone who can provide the same goods and services for a good price.

§  In market-pricing relationships, parties can attempt to maximize their utility, or they can seek what may be defined as a fair price.

§  Much of what we have described about negotiation dynamics in this text is drawn from research dominated by market-pricing relationships.

·         It is important to understand that any given two parties may enact more than one form in their relationship.

o   For an interesting application of negotiation across relationship forms, see Box 10.1.

·         There has been somewhat more research on negotiation in communal-sharing relationships and parties in a communal-sharing relationship:

o   Are more cooperative and empathetic.

o   Perform better on both decision making and performance-coordination tasks.

o   Focus their attention on the other party’s outcomes as well as their own.

o   Are more likely to share information with the other and less likely to use coercive tactics.

o   May be more likely to use compromise or problem solving as strategies for resolving conflicts.

·         Some research emphasizes the uniqueness of communal negotiations and developed the relational identity theory.

o   This argues that groups often function as a “tribe,” drawn together by a strong common identity that creates rigid boundaries, defying traditional negotiation techniques.

·         It is unclear whether parties in close relationships produce better solutions.

o   Some studies show that parties who did not have a close relationship were more likely to arrive at integrative solutions.

o   It may be due to accommodation on the part of one party in a relationship.

·         Finally, some studies have explored how parties in a relationship enact different relationship forms, and the consequences of those differences.

o   Studies of divorce mediation exemplifies how parties might interpret a dissolving relationship in terms of the “appropriate” ways of resolving conflict.

o   They also reveal gender differences in the approach to such relationships.

o   For deeper insight into conflict management in relationships, see Box 10.2.

III.  Key Elements in Managing Negotiations within Relationships

·         Given the complexity of most close personal relationships, it is difficult to know which dimensions might be most relevant to negotiation.

·         In this section, we discuss the effects of three important relationship components.

o   Reputations – past experience both direct and indirect

o   Justice plays an important role in shaping relationship development.

o   Trust was the most common and most important dimension.

A.    Reputation

·         Your reputation is how other people remember their past experience with you – it is the legacy that negotiators leave behind after a negotiation encounter.

·         There are several things that need said about the importance of reputations.

o   Reputations are perceptual and highly subjective in nature.

§  It is not how we would like to be known by others, or how we think we are known – it is what they actually think of us, and their judgment, that counts.

§  Once formed, a reputation acts as a lens by which people form their expectations for future behavior.

o   An individual can have a number of different, even conflicting, reputations because they may act quite differently in different situations.

§  A person may distributively bargain at a yard sale and use integrative negotiation with their computer repair shop.

§  While individuals can elicit different reputations – in most cases, there is generally shared agreement on who we are and how we are seen.

o   Reputations are shaped by past behavior.

§  “Direct” reputations (from your own experience) may be different from “hearsay” reputations (based on others’ experience).

§  Individuals trust, and rely more on, experiential reputations than hearsay.

o   Reputations are also influenced by an individual’s personal characteristics and accomplishments.

§  Age, rage, and gender

§  Education and past experience

§  Personality traits, skills, and behaviors

§  In a negotiation context, research shows that gender, satisfaction with the process and outcome, and whether an agreement was reached or not had a significant impact on the ratings of the other negotiator’s skill and ethical reputation.

o   Reputations develop over time; once developed, they are hard to change. 

§  Early experiences with another shape our views, which we bring to new situations in the form of expectations. 

§  These expectations are then confirmed or disconfirmed by the next set of experiences.

§  Once shaped, expectations become difficult to change.

o   Other's reputations can shape emotional states as well as their expectations.

§  Good hearsay reputations create positive emotional responses and bad hearsay reputations elicit negative emotional responses.

§  A “harsh” (distributive, competitive) reputation can undermine your ability to be successful in a negotiation, as your reputation has negatively shaped the other’s expectations of you.

§  Similarly, a “constructive” (integrative, cooperative) reputation can enhance your success as your reputation creates positive expectations.

o   Finally, negative reputations are difficult to repair.

§  The more long-standing the negative reputation, the harder it is to change to a positive reputation.

§  Reputations need to be actively defended and renewed in others’ eyes.

§  More on this later in the chapter.

B.     Trust

·         One definition of trust is an individual’s belief in and willingness to act on the words, actions and decisions of another.

·         Three factors contribute to the level of trust one negotiator has in another.

o   The negotiator’s chronic disposition toward trust – a trusting personality

o   Situation factors – adequate opportunity to communicate

o   The history of the relationship between the parties

·         Early studies of trust envisioned it as a single entity but recent studies show there are several types of trust.

o   Relationships of different depths (closeness) are characterized by two types of trust: calculus-based trust and identification-based trust.

Calculus-Based Trust

o   Calculus-based trust is concerned with assuring consistent behavior and holds that individuals will do what they say because:

§  they are rewarded for keeping their word and preserving the relationship with others, or

§  they fear the consequences of not doing what they say.

§  Threat of punishment is likely a larger motivator than promise of a reward.

o   This form of trust is most consistent with the market-pricing form of relationships, or with early stages of other types of relationships.

§  The trustor basically calculates the value of creating and developing trust in the relationship relative to the costs of sustaining or severing the relationship.

Identification-Based Trust 

o   The second type of trust is based on identification with the other’s desires and intentions.

o   At this level, trust exists because the parties effectively understand and appreciate each other’s wants.

§  This mutual understanding is developed to the point that each can effectively act for the other.

§  This is the type of trust you might expect in communal-sharing relationships.

§  High levels of identification-based trust are common in team relationships.

Trust is Different from Distrust 

o   If trust is considered to be confident positive expectations of another’s conduct, distrust is confident negative expectations of another’s conduct.

§  Early research treated trust as a single dimension on a continuum, but trust in complex personal relationships suggests that trust and distrust can coexist.

§  Distrust is high in today’s work environment as sluggish economies, corporate scandals, and salary inequalities proliferate – See Box 10.3.

o   Combining the two types of trust with this distinction between trust and distrust leads us to be able to describe four types of trust:

§  Calculus-based trust (CBT)

·         This is a confident, positive expectation regarding another’s conduct.

·         It is grounded in impersonal transactions, and the benefits from the relationship are assumed to outweigh any costs.

§  Calculus-based distrust (CBD)

·         This is confident, negative expectations regarding another’s conduct.

·         Also grounded in impersonal transactions and the anticipated costs of the relationship are assumed to outweigh the benefits.

§  Identification-based trust (IBT)

·         This is confident, positive expectations regarding another’s conduct.

·         It is grounded in perceived compatibility of values, common goals, and positive emotional attachment to the other.

§  Identification-based distrust (IBD)

·         This is confident, negative expectations regarding another’s conduct.

·         It is grounded in perceived incompatibility of values, dissimilar goals, and negative emotional attachment to the other.

Trust Building and Negotiations

o   The four forms of trust suggest clear action strategies for negotiators who wish to build trust with another party.

§  Table 10.1 summarizes these 26 actions with strategies for increasing calculus-based or identification-based trust and strategies for managing calculus-based or identification-based distrust.

§  For example, one suggestion for increasing calculus-based trust is to keep promises. 

·         The strategy is to make a commitment and then follow through on it.

o   Note that if a negotiator is beginning a relationship, or expect no future relationship with the other party, they need only be concerned with calculus-based trust, while managing calculus-based distrust.

o   However, if the relationship is perceived to evolve into a communal relationship, the negotiator should establish calculus-based trust and work to build identification-based trust.

§  This process cannot be rushed, nor can it be one-sided.

o   Finally, if the negotiator senses that identification-based distrust is building, then they should work both to carefully manage the boundaries of the relationship and to minimize contact with the other.

o   For suggestions on building trust at the negotiating table, see Box 10.4.

Recent Research on Trust and Negotiation

o   Early research was limited but showed that higher levels of trust make negotiation easier, while lower levels of trust make negotiation more difficult.

§  Similarly, integrative processes tend to increase trust, while more distributive processes are likely to decrease trust.

o   A considerable amount of new research has been conducted in the last decade – see also Box 10.4.

o   First, as noted in Chapter 1, trust and honesty are at the root of the two fundamental dilemmas for all negotiators.

§   The level of trust and honesty is absolutely central to how a negotiation starts, evolves, and finishes.                

o   Second, research has shown that trustors (those initiating trust) and trustees (those being trusted) may focus on different things as trust is being built.

§  The process might be greatly facilitated if parties could communicate more clearly and directly about the vulnerabilities to be felt or the benefits to be received from the upcoming discussion—and how to manage these risks and benefits more effectively.

o   Third, research on trust in other relationship contexts has shown that trust judgments are also governed by characteristics of the trustee.

§  Trustors tend to make judgments about trustees based on three dimensions of perceived trustworthiness.

·         Perceived ability is that group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that enable a party to have influence within some specific domain.

·         Perceived benevolence is the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor, aside from an egocentric profit motive.

·         Perceived integrity is the trustor’s perception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable.

o   While benevolence is defined by how nicely the opponent treats you, integrity gets at the fundamental ethical character of the other party.

o   Finally, a large number of factors contribute to trust in a negotiation – and that result from trust.

o   In the midst of a negotiation, trust tends to work together with previous expectations and motives to define how the parties share information and communicate with each other.

o   Thus, as a result, trust enhances cooperative behavior, changes the way parties communicate, and influences whether the processes evolve toward a claiming-value process (distributive bargaining) or a creating-value process (integrative negotiation).

o   These various research findings are summarized in Table 10.2.

Bilateral Trust and Negotiation

o   Several studies were interested in how bilateral trust influences and is influenced by, dyadic negotiation processes.

o   One study built a framework of factors that might influence trust development during negotiation: attributes of the trustor, attributes of the trustee, and attributes the parties shared.

§  Trustor attributes showed the expression of positive affect led to trust development, while the expression of negative affect decreased trust.

·         Trust developed when a negotiator had a pro-social orientation compared to a pro-self orientation.

·         Power differences had no impact on trust development.

§  With regard to joint attributes, the existence of a previous relationship had a positive impact, and the presence of “small talk” contributed to trust.

·         Face-to-face negotiations were more likely to lead to trust development.

·         Gift giving early in a negotiation can be an initial trust builder.

§  There were insufficient studies on trustee attributes on negotiator trust to examine the impact.

o   Another study gathered empirical evidence of trust development during a simulated negotiation.

§  The more each party had a propensity to trust the other, the more likely this lead to trust development.

§  Those with higher trust tended to use more questions and answers about possible common interests – integrative tactics

§  While those with lower trust propensity used arguments justifying their position on issues one at a time, rather than collectively searching for areas to find mutual gains.

o   While these studies have provided some insights, significant work remains to be done – in the context of multiparty negotiations, with a consistent definition of trust and more rigorous methods for exploring the interactive dynamics.

Trust Repair

o   Since trust and positive negotiation processes and outcomes appear to be so critical, we should comment on ways that broken trust can be repaired in order to return negotiations toward a more productive direction.

o   Recent research has shown that there are three major strategies that a trust violator can use to repair trust.

§  Verbal accounts – use of words or emotional expressions in an effort to repair the violation.

§  Reparations – payment of compensation to the victims for the consequences suffered from the violator.

§  Structural solutions – make the effort to create rules, regulations, and procedures to minimize the likelihood of violations in the future.

o   The first approach to repairing trust is to make some form of verbal statement, such as an explanation, apology, or expression of regret.

§  Apologies are the most common and usually contain six major elements.

·         An expression of regret for the offense

·         An explanation of why the violation occurred

·         An acknowledgment of responsibility for causing the action

·         A declaration of repentance

·         An offer to repair the impact of the violation

·         A request for forgiveness

§  When one or more of the elements is missing, the apology is less effective.

§  Research shows apologies can be a very effective way of repairing trust – a summary of research is presented in Table 10.3.

§  It should be noted that apologies are not always effective at rebuilding trust.

o   A second way to repair trust is through reparations.

§  One study showed that while apologies enhanced trust repair, making a financial offer of penance was essential to any trust repair effort.

§  The amount of money was less critical than the offer itself.

§  Reparations can also take the form of symbolic gestures of peacemaking and goodwill.

§  While these gestures may appear to be given in good faith, even the most apparently benign gesture may backfire – see Box 10.5.

o   The third approach to trust repair is structural solutions, or an effort to create rules, regulations, and procedures to minimize future trust violations.

§  Strengthen these with fines and penalties for rule violations.

§  One form of structural solution is called “hostage posting,” in which the parties post a “security deposit,” or resource that is lost to the other party if trust is violated.

C.    Justice

·         The third major issue in relationships is the question of what is fair, or just.

·         Justice can take several forms:

o   Distributive justice is about the distribution of outcomes.

§  Parties may be concerned that one party is receiving more than they deserve, that outcomes should be distributed equally, or that outcomes should be distributed based on needs.

o   Procedural justice is about the process of determining outcomes.

§  Because negotiation is an environment in which parties are offered an opportunity to shape the outcome they receive, procedural fairness is generally high in most negotiations.

§  Concerns about procedural fairness are more likely to arise when negotiators are judging the behavior of third parties.

o   Interactional justice is about how parties treat each other in one-to-one relationships.

§  Interactional justice may be further divided into two components:

·         Interpersonal justice, which reflects how much respect and propriety authority figures use in treating others

·         Informational justice, which reflects how much truthfulness and honesty are offered during that treatment

o   Systemic justice is about how organizations appear to treat groups of individuals and the norms that develop for how they should be treated.

·         The issue of fairness has received some systematic investigation on negotiation dynamics – the following conclusions can be drawn from key studies.

o   The familiar “procedural justice effect” holds, in that parties involved in the process of shaping a decision are more committed to that decision.

o   The observation of procedural justice was strongly related to using problem-solving processes and achieving integrative outcomes.

§  On the other hand, the durability of the negotiated agreement was strongly related to adherence to principles of distributive justice.

o   Negotiators who were encouraged to think about fairness were more cooperative in distributive negotiations.

§  However, if the other party did not reciprocate, the negotiator actively retaliated and punished the other’s competitive behavior.

o   Parties who receive offers they perceive as unfair may reject them out of hand, even though the amount may be better than receiving nothing at all.

§  Here, we see the role of intangibles – the less-than-fair offer creates feelings of anger and wounded pride, and the negotiator may act spitefully.

o   Establishment of some objective standard of fairness has a positive impact on negotiations and satisfaction with the outcome.

§  Knowledge of an opponent’s BATNA, as well as information about estimated market prices for the negotiated object, most strongly determines negotiators’ judgments of fairness.

o   Judgments about fairness are subject to the type of cognitive biases described in Chapter 6.

§  For example, most negotiators have an egocentric bias, which is the tendency to regard a larger share for themselves, regardless of the fairness rule of an equal split.

§  This egocentric bias can be diminished by strong interactional justice.

o   Egocentric biases vary across cultures – stronger in individualistic cultures like the United States, compared to collectivist cultures, like Japan.

·         Justice issues are also raised when individuals negotiate inside their organizations, such as to create a unique or specialized set of job duties and responsibilities.

o   These idiosyncratic deals have to be managed effectively to make sure they continue to exist without disrupting others’ sense of fairness about equal treatment.

o   And they may not always be as fair as they seemed at the outset.

o   Rather than making things more fair, negotiated exchanges may serve to emphasize the conflict between actors who are blind to their own biases and inclined to see the other party’s motives and characteristics in an unfavorable light

·         Finally, although we have identified these forms of justice as separate entities, they are often intertwined.

o   For example, the relationship between procedural and distributive justice.

o   Parties who feel an outcome is unfair are likely to see that outcome as coming from an unfair procedure, and vice versa.

D.    Relationships among Reputation, Trust and Justice

·         Not only are various forms of justice interrelated, but reputations, trust, and justice all interact in shaping expectations of the other’s behavior.

o   For example, when one party feels the other has acted fairly in the past or will act fairly in the future, they are more likely to trust the other.

o   Research studying relationships over time show that interactional justice was the most significant predictor of subsequent trust.

o   Procedural and interpersonal justice were significant predictors of how trustworthily the other would behave in the future.

o   Conversely, unfair treatment is likely to lead to distrust and a bad reputation.

Section Summary

o   In this section, we examined three core elements common to many negotiations within relationships – reputations, trust, and justice.

o   Not only are these elements essential, but they also feed each other.

o   Not only are these elements critical to relationships, but building a relationship may be an essential critical component of being successful in negotiations.

o   For one company’s approach to building relationships in order to enhance sales, see Box 10.6.

IV. Repairing a Relationship

·         There are many steps to repairing a relationship – but here are offered some diagnostic questions you can ask in seeking to improve a relationship.

o   What might be causing any present misunderstanding, and what can I do to understand it better?

§  If the relationship is in difficulty, what might have caused it, and how can I gather information or perspective to improve the situation?

o   What might be causing a lack of trust, and what can I do to begin to repair trust that might have been broken?

§  Trust repair is a long, slow process requiring adequate explanations for past behavior, apologies, and perhaps even reparations.

o   What might be causing one or both of us to feel coerced, and what can I do to put the focus on persuasion rather than coercion?

§  How can we take the pressure off each other so that we can give each other the freedom of choice to talk about what has happened and what is necessary to fix it?

o   What might be causing one or both of us to feel disrespected, and what can I do to demonstrate acceptance and respect?

§  How can we restore that respect and value each other’s contributions? See one example in Box 10.6

o   What might be causing one or both of us to get upset, and what can I do to balance emotion and reason?

§  If the problem has persisted for a time, or the breakdown creates serious costs for one or both sides, third parties will probably have to intervene.

§  See Box 10.7 for an example.

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, we explored the way that existing relationships shape negotiation.

Much of negotiation theory and research reported in this volume is based on studies of negotiators in simulated market transactions—that is, simplified decision situations in which negotiators who have no past or future relationship with each other focus on key issues such as price and terms. But much actual negotiation occurs within established relationships, in which the past history and future expectations of the parties with each other significantly affects how they negotiate in the present. In this chapter we indicated why negotiation within relationships is likely to be different from market transactions, discussed different forms that relationships could take, and reviewed what research has informed us about how a relationship context might shape negotiation behavior.

Many negotiations concern how to work (and live) together more effectively over time, how to coordinate actions and share responsibilities, or how to manage problems that have arisen in the relationship. In this chapter, we evaluated the status of previous negotiation research—which has focused almost exclusively on market-exchange relationships—and evaluated its status for different types of relationships, particularly communal-sharing and authority-ranking relationships.

We have examined three core elements common to many negotiations within relationships: reputations, trust, and justice. Trust issues are central to relationships. While some amount of trust exists in market-transaction negotiations, trust is more critical to communal-sharing relationships in which the parties have some history, an anticipated future, and an attachment to each other. In addition, justice concerns are absolutely central to negotiation in relationships.





Chapter 11

Agents, Constituencies, and Audiences

 

 

Chapter Overview

In this chapter, we explore how negotiation changes when:

  • We move beyond simple one-to-one negotiations and      add other parties to the process.

  • Negotiators act as agents in the process—that is,      they are not necessarily presenting their own issues and interests, but      are also representing the views of others who may or may not be at the      table.

  • This      situation is called an agency relationship.

We examine the ways that negotiations change when negotiators are representing the interests of others rather than arguing for their own interests.

  • Within this larger context, individuals and      groups attempt to exert both direct and indirect pressures on negotiators      to advocate their interests.

  • A second      dimension of complexity, therefore, is the type of influence strategies      that negotiators use, and the different types of influence attempts that      occur as the number of parties increases.

Learning Objectives

  1. Understand      how negotiation dynamics change when additional parties are added to a      two-person negotiation.

  2. Explore      how negotiation changes when a negotiator has to represent someone else’s      interests (i.e., act as an agent) rather than his or her own.

  3. Consider      the critical actions and influence exerted by constituencies and audiences      to a negotiation.

  4. Gain      specific advice on how constituencies should manage their agents and how      agents manage their constituencies.


Chapter Outline

  1. The Number of Parties in a Negotiation

  2. How Agents, Constituents, and Audiences Change      Negotiations

    1. Audiences:       Team Members, Constituents, Bystanders, and Others

    2. Tactical       Implications of Social Structure Dynamics: The Negotiator’s Dilemma

  3. Advice to Agents on Managing Constituencies and      Audiences

    1. Clarify       the Role Expectations and Performance Contract

    2. Clarify       Authority to Make Agreements

    3. Manage       Constituency Visibility and Communication

    4. Communicate       Indirectly with Audiences and Constituents

    5. Communicate       Directly to the Other Party’s Constituency

    6. Communicate       Directly to Bystanders

    7. Build       Relationships with Audiences, Constituents, and Other Agents

  4. When to Use an Agent

  5. Managing Agents

  6. Chapter Summary

 


I.       The Number of Parties in a Negotiation

·         An important aspect in negotiation is how the number of parties – either at the table, influencing the table, or affected by what happens at the table – affects the dynamics.

o   The simplest negotiation form is a negotiating dyad.

o   This structure occurs when two isolated individuals—negotiators—negotiate for their own needs and interests.

o   Each has the full power to decide on an acceptable outcome and finalize the deal.

·         Negotiations become more complex when there are more than two negotiators.

o   Each is responsible for expressing their own positions and needs and the agreement has to reflect the views of all parties.

·         Negotiation can also occur within or between teams of negotiators.

o   A team is two or more parties on the same side who are collectively advocating the same positions and interests.

o   The intrateam dynamics (e.g., whether some members have more power or status than others) will affect the interteam negotiation process.

·         Negotiation also increases in complexity with the addition of agents and constituencies.

o   Negotiators may act as agents, acting not only for themselves but also for others.

o   The individuals they represent are the constituent – also called a principal.

o   A constituent is a party who has designated someone else (the agent) to represent their positions and interests in a negotiation.

§  Two common examples of an agent and constituent (principal) are an attorney and a client or a salesperson and their boss or manager.

§  Constituents usually do not participate in the negotiations, though they may be present.

·         Finally, negotiation becomes more complex when bystanders, audiences, and third parties are also active in the negotiation.

o   Bystanders are those who may have some stake in a negotiation and who care about the substantive issues or the process by which a resolution is reached, but are not formally represented at the table.

§  They frequently follow the negotiation, express public or private views to the negotiators about the potential outcomes or the process, and in some way are affected by what happens.

o   An audience is any individual or group of people who are not directly involved in or affected by a negotiation but who have a chance to observe and react to the ongoing events and who may at times offer input, advice or criticism.

§  Bystanders and constituents can also serve as audiences.

§  So, too, can members of negotiating teams who are not actively engaged in dialogue with the other party.

o   Third parties are bystanders who may be drawn into the negotiation specifically for the purpose of helping to resolve it.

§  They can often reshape a polarized situation into a constructive agreement.

§  Bystanders can be effective third parties if they have the necessary skills and are seen as neutral.

·         It is important to understand that although we have distinguished these different roles, negotiating parties may, in fact, assume more than one role during the life of a negotiation.

II.     How Agents, Constituents, and Audiences Change Negotiations

·         There are often parties to a negotiation who are not active participants as others are negotiating on their behalf.

o   They are affected by the outcome and/or they may observe the agent’s behavior.

§  They may offer comments, critiques, or evaluations of the process or outcome.

§  When this occurs, the negotiator must redirect some of their attention away from the other negotiator and toward these other parties.

§  We broadly describe the attention paid to these additional parties – regardless of who they are – as audience effects.

·         In this section, we first examine the different types of audiences and the consequences that audiences have on a negotiator’s behavior.

o   We then examine the ways in which negotiators can manage their audiences so as to be more effective in dealing with the audience and with the other negotiator.

A.    Audiences: Team Members, Constituents, Bystanders, and Others

·         There are many different kinds of audiences and audience effects.

·         One form of audience is the additional team members present with the negotiator at the deliberations.

o   Members of a negotiating team may take on one or more important roles:

§  Spokesperson, expert, advocate, legal or financial counsel, analyst, secretary, or observer

·         Team members can play multiple roles.

o   Figure 11.1 represents a simple negotiation between two pairs of negotiators – on each side

§  Within each side, negotiators may change roles at any time.

§  The example in the text uses the rock singer, Athena, and her manager, negotiating a performance contract with the president and general manager of Glitzy Productions Inc., a media company organizing the halftime show at the next Super Bowl – see Figure 11.2

·         Another type of audience is a constituency – one or more parties whose interests, demands, or priorities are being represented by the focal negotiator at the table.

o   The social structure of this negotiation is represented in Figures 11.3, 11.4, and 11.5.

o   In Figure 11.3, the negotiator has a constituent who is also a team member and is present during the negotiation.

o   In Figure 11.4, the negotiator represents a constituent who is outside the negotiating setting.

o   In Figure 11.5, the negotiator represents a group of constituents.

·         As these groupings suggest, negotiators who have constituents are usually involved in two distinctly different relationships – and often in two separate and distinctly different negotiations.

o   The first negotiating relationship is between the agent and constituent – sometimes called “negotiating at the back table.”

§  Sometimes the agent is simply told what to do.

§  Sometimes, the agent has preferences which may differ from the constituent’s.

§  The two sides must collectively decide on what they want and the strategy and tactics of how to get it.

§  This can be a tense negotiation itself if the two parties widely differ.

§  Once the two agree on their goals, the constituent delegates some power to the agent to achieve the goals with the other negotiator.

o   The second negotiating relationship maintained by the agent is with the other agent – the opposing negotiator – as they attempt to reach an effective agreement.

§  These negotiations take place at the “front table.”

§  Reaching agreement may require compromising at the front table on the goals set at the back table and then explaining and justifying to the constituents.

§  Because agents may be unable to both completely satisfy their constituent and achieve agreement with the other party, representing a constituent creates unique pressures and conflicts for agents.

·         A third type of audience is composed of external bystanders and observers.

o   Figure 11.6 represents the socially complex environment for a negotiation.

o   The public nature of this negotiation offers a context in which many parties are evaluating the negotiation, but it also offers many ways for the negotiator to use these audiences to bring indirect leverage to bear on the other negotiator.

Characteristics of Audiences

o   First, audiences vary according to whether they are physically present at or absent from the negotiation.

§  Whether an audience is present or absent affects how a negotiator behaves, and when audiences are absent, agent’s report may not be accurate.

o   Second, audiences may or may not be dependent on the negotiators for the outcomes derived from the negotiation process.

§  Audiences who are outcome-dependent derive their payoffs as a direct result of the negotiator’s behavior and effectiveness.

§  In contrast, a nondependent audience will not be directly affected by the results.

o   A third major way audiences may affect negotiations is by the degree of their involvement in the process.

§  Audiences may become directly involved in the negotiation process – increasing complexity in a number of ways.

o   Audiences also give periodic feedback to the negotiators, evaluating their effectiveness and letting them know how they are doing.

§  Can be verbal or nonverbal.

§  Feedback may be directed toward the positions taken, concessions made, agreements reached, or behavior during deliberations.

§  See Box 11.1 on how a principal can better manage an agent.

o   Audiences may also be indirectly involved in the negotiation.

§  Indirect involvement occurs when audiences make their own wishes and desires known through the communication of their ideas but do not directly try to influence the course of an ongoing negotiation.

§  Indirect communication also provides feedback to the other party, indicating the degree the audience approves or disapproves of words or actions.

o   Audiences may vary in several other ways:

§  Identity – who they are and what they stand for

§  Composition – the number and type of different points of view represented

§  Size – which may affect their level of power

§  Relationship to the negotiator – emotional ties, amount of informal control

§  Role in the negotiation situation – readiness to directly influence the negotiator’s behavior, style, or content of communication.

o   As soon as the negotiation setting is expanded to three or more parties, the nature and complexity of the interaction increases.

§  As the type of relationship changes from market transaction to some other form, the issues, strategies, and process changes as well.

§  For an example of the roles that can be played by one kind of audience – advisors – see Box 11.2.

o   Before discussing audiences in more detail, we summarize the most important principles about audiences and the significant ways they influence an agent’s behavior.

Audiences Make Negotiators “Try Harder” and “Act Tougher”

o   Research shows the presence of an audience increases negotiator aspirations—that is, negotiators “try harder” when they know they are being watched.

§  Merely being aware they are under surveillance can motivate negotiators to act tough – use a distributive bargaining manner, threats, commitment tactics, and put-downs of their opponents to gain advantage.

o   Recent research shows that when there are multiple parties in a constituency, and even a few are more “hawkish,” or militant, it can make an agent act more competitively.

§  Only when the constituency was 100% cooperative did the agent become more cooperative toward the negotiating partner.

o   A number of studies suggest that inflexibility in public negotiations is largely due to pressures on group representatives to adopt tough postures.

§  Time pressures can significantly affect this inflexibility when negotiating for a constituency – resulting in more competitive interaction and more impasses.

Negotiators Seek a Positive Reaction from an Audience

o   An audience increases aspirations because negotiators try to impress them in order to receive a beneficial evaluation.

o   When there is a trade-off between a positive self-image and an agreement with the other party, a favorable self-image for the negotiator may dominate.

Pressures from Audiences Can Push Negotiators into “Irrational” Behavior

o   The presence of a salient audience – one valued for its opinions and supportive comments – affects a negotiator even more dramatically.

§  A classic study reveals the power of feedback from a salient audience on a negotiator’s subsequent behavior.

·         The research highlights the classic face-saving dilemma for negotiators: to preserve one’s image to an audience, often at high costs not known to the audience, or to lose face but conserve resources.

·         The research also shows that negotiators are most aggressive when there is a high need to regain a positive image with an audience that does not know the amount it costs the negotiator to do so.

o   This study has several important implications for understanding the power of an audience over a negotiator.

§  First, the subjects did not know the specific identity of anyone in the audience.

§  A second finding was that some students retaliated against the other party even when there was no audience present.

·         This suggests that the opposing negotiator may act as an audience as well.

§  See Box 11.3, which represents a simple negotiation between two pairs of negotiators.

o   The study also shows how important face saving is to negotiators whose behavior is highly public, visible, and subject to feedback from audiences.

§  It found that agents who felt their reputation was at stake were more likely to take higher risks, set higher walkaway points, and have higher impasse rates.

§  For a somewhat different view, see Box 11.4.

o   Finally, tragic twists to face-saving dynamics can also occur when audiences are only indirectly involved.

§  During a prison riot where prisoners were holding guards as hostages, the press asked the prison spokesperson about the prisoner’s threats of killing the hostages.

§  The prison representative said “prisoners threaten to kill hostages all the time.”

§  Soon after the comments, the prisoners killed a guard – perhaps just to prove their threat was a credible one and to save face with their own constituents inside and outside the prison.

Audiences Hold the Negotiator Accountable

o   Audiences maintain control over negotiators by holding them accountable for their performance and by administering rewards or punishments based on that performance.

§  This accountability occurs under two dominant conditions:

·         when a negotiator’s performance is visible to the audience so that the audience is able to judge how well the negotiator performs, and

·         when the audience is dependent on the negotiator for their outcomes.

o   Continued characterizations of a negotiator as weak or soft, or as someone who sells out, may lead to unfortunate but predictable outcomes.

§  First, the negotiator may become increasingly inflexible or retaliatory to demonstrate to the constituency that they are capable of defending their interests.

§  Second, the negotiator may try to be a more loyal, committed, and dedicated advocate of the constituency’s preferred outcomes to regain their good favor and evaluation.

§  Finally, the negotiator may resign, judging themselves incapable of representing the constituency’s best interests.

o   The effects of accountability to constituents do not have to be all bad.

§  Constituents can keep negotiators from making extreme or outrageous commitments that might get them in trouble later.

§  Constituents can develop at least two different kinds of contracts with their agents.

·         The first is a behavior-contingent contract, in which the agent is primarily paid based on how they behave in the role

·         Versus an outcome-contingent contract, in which the agent is primarily paid based on the type of results they achieve.

·         “Combined” contracts specify both behaviors and outcomes.

o   Some clear ways for holding a negotiator accountable are offered in Box 11.5.

B.     Tactical Implications of Social Structure Dynamics: The Negotiator’s Dilemma

·         The presence of an audience – especially an outcome-dependent audience – creates a paradox for negotiators because of two sets of pressures.

o   One set comes from the constituency and team, leading the agent to be tough, firm, unyielding, and supportive of the constituency’s demands.

o   The other set comes from the opposing negotiator and calls upon the negotiator to be flexible, conciliatory, and willing to engage in give-and-take.

o   See Figure 11.6, which depicts these pressures simultaneously pushing the negotiator from opposite directions.

o   These dynamics create a dilemma of trust.

o   The dilemma is the more trust constituents put in a representative, the more autonomy and freedom the representative will feel to “create value” with other negotiators

o   The more they are involved in creating value, the more difficult it may be to go back and persuade constituents the “new” solution truly represents the original interests.

o   Note how the type of contract an agent has with constituents – outcome versus behavioral – might help resolve some of this tension.

·         The basic dilemma, then, is to determine how negotiators can satisfy both the constituency’s demands for firmness and the other party’s demand for concessions.

o   The answer is that negotiators must build relationships with both the constituency and the other party.

o   And in a way that allows them some flexibility to shape deals that will be acceptable to both groups.

§  On the one hand, the relationship with the constituency must be cultivated on the basis of complete support for their demands and willingness to advocate these demands in negotiation.

§  On the other hand, the relationship with the other party must be developed through stressing the similarity of the parties’ collective goals or fate.

§  However, each relationship must be developed privately, outside the visibility of the other group – which may require duplicitous negotiations.

·         Typically, negotiators first meet with the constituency to define their collective interests and objectives – the back table.

o   They then meet with opposing negotiators at the front table in private to candidly state expectations but also to make necessary concessions without looking weak to the constituents.

o   Finally, a negotiator returns to the back table to sell the agreement.

·         Successful management of a constituency therefore requires negotiators to control the visibility of their negotiating behavior.

o   Managing constituencies is a very important but quite delicate process.

o   In the following sections, we summarize this process by offering two forms of prescriptive advice.

§  First, to negotiators who have constituencies to manage

§  And second, to those constituencies who must manage an agent

III.  Advice to Agents on Managing Constituencies and Audiences

A.    Clarify the Role Expectations and Performance Contract

·         If the constituents do not specify how the agent is being evaluated or rewarded, the agent should ask directly so that they know what to do and to eliminate misunderstandings.

·         Agent roles can be complex and they can function in various roles, depending on their contract.

·         In some cases, agents become more like third parties than advocates.

B.     Clarify Authority to Make Agreements

·         Agents should also clarify how much authority they have to accept the opposing negotiator’s offer without consulting the constituents.

·         Negotiators should understand this in advance so as to not violate their constituent’s expectations and to not bind them into a deal later deemed unacceptable.

C.    Manage Constituency Visibility and Communication

·         Agents can control both the visibility of their behavior and the communication process by employing tactics that appear to enhance their commitment to their bargaining position.

·         A few of the more common tactics are described here.

Limit One’s Own Concessions by Making Negotiations Visible to the Constituency

o   Because negotiators who negotiate in full view of their constituencies are less likely to make concessions, negotiators strengthen their position by enhancing their visibility with their constituency.

o   Negotiators typically go public when they want to remain firm.

o   Observable negotiations will limit the agent’s search for solutions are likely to increase the frequency of impasse.

Use the Constituency to Show Militancy

o   A second way a constituency can be used tactically is to make them visible and let them demonstrate they are more extreme, radical, committed, and inflexible than the agent.

o   Allowing militants to speak shows the other party that concessions will not come easily and agreement is possible if the other party makes major concessions.

o   Intimidation is one benefit, but this tactic can also allow the agent to be seen as a nice, pleasant, reasonable person in contrast.

o   The negotiator is likely to gain significant ground with the other party.

o   This is a variation of the good cop/bad cop negotiating tactic.

Use the Constituency to Limit One’s Own Authority

o   A third way a negotiator can use a constituency tactically is to show the other party that the constituency has limited the negotiator’s authority to make certain concessions.

§  May be used as a bluff or due to a genuine limit on authority.

§  As a bluff, the negotiator leads the other to believe all concessions must be cleared with the constituency.

§  As a genuine tactic, the constituency has defined limits to what the negotiator can decide on their own.

o   Negotiators must be careful about revealing how much authority they have.

§  On the one hand, it might seem that limiting authority would give a party a distinct advantage.

·         This would be time-consuming, and if the other party is in a hurry, they may choose to make concessions to avoid the delay.

§  On the other hand, the tactic may backfire.

·         The other party may become angry and they may demand the constituency send a representative who has the power to negotiate an agreement.

Use Great Caution in Exceeding One’s Authority

o   Negotiators who overextend their authority may be unable to persuade the constituency the achieved settlement is a good one.

§  Sometimes negotiator in this position resign; at other times they return to negotiate with heightened belligerence to prove their toughness.

§  In the extreme, negotiators may be willing to endure high personal costs to restore their image with the constituency.

Increase the Possibility of Concession to the Other Negotiator by Reducing Visibility to Constituencies

o   A negotiator who wishes to be more flexible and conciliatory would want negotiations to be less visible – here are three approaches to accomplishing this objective.

§  Establish “privacy” prior to the beginning of negotiations.

·         Establish negotiating ground rules before the process begins.

·         One rule for consideration is whether negotiations at the front table will be conducted in private, or allow audience visibility.

·         Finding and maintaining true privacy in a negotiation can be a challenge, but it can be done.

§  Screen visibility during negotiations.

·         One way to screen out unwanted observers from sensitive discussions is to have some discussions with other agent occur informally, on an unofficial basis – during coffee breaks, on walks, or even in the hotel bar.

·         Here, parties can speak more candidly off the record, or hint about their bottom-line position or signal a willingness to make certain concessions.

·         In some cases, the meeting may be planned but very secretive.

·         Other kinds of information can be exchanged in these informal venues – either directly or indirectly.

§  Be aware of time pressure.

·         Time pressure may increase competitive behavior and impasse, particularly when the negotiator is accountable to a constituency.

Establish a Reputation for Cooperation

o   Finally, agents can establish a strong reputation for being cooperative, both with those they represent and with the other agent – an example is lawyers.

o   However, agents who feel their reputations are at stake may be more likely to take risks toward toughness, display more contentious behavior, set higher walkaway prices, and have higher impasse rates than agents who do not feel their reputations are at stake.

D.    Communicate Indirectly with Audiences and Constituents

·         Negotiators can often create the observability/accountability dynamics by communicating indirectly.

o   Indirect communications are efforts by the negotiator to bring the opinions of audiences and constituents to bear on the other party.

o   Informal communication takes place in several ways.

Communicate through Superiors

o   This technique is used most frequently when negotiators are representatives of two hierarchically structured organizations

§  And when one or both negotiators are dissatisfied with the progress of negotiations or the behavior of the other party.

§  To manage their frustration and dissatisfaction, they may go to their own superiors and ask them to contact their counterpart in the opposing organization.

·         The situation is represented in Figure 11.7.

o   Such indirect processes work under several conditions.

§  First, the tactic’s effectiveness depends on a social structure, of both parties, being some formal hierarchy of power.

§  Second, the chief negotiator should not be the person with the most authority.

·         This allows the organization to limit its concessions by limiting negotiator power and authority.

·         Senior executives should become involved only when negotiations are extremely delicate, critical, symbolically significant, or necessary to close the deal.

o   Effectiveness of this tactic depends on indirect communication originating from someone the other party either trusts or is less well-defended against.

§  It may be even more effective when coming from superiors due to their status, reputation, and visibility.

Communicate through Intermediaries

o   Negotiate through intermediaries when you need to make informal contact with the other party, an opposing negotiator, or a constituency – see Figure 11.8.

o   Intermediaries are chosen for valid reasons.

§  Past experience in working together

§  A personal friendship or relationship

§  A personal reputation for credibility, trustworthiness, impartiality, and integrity

o   The tactic is most often used under two circumstances:

§  When a negotiator wants to feel out the opposing group to attempt to gain information about what the other party really wants, or

§  When deliberations are deadlocked and need to be unfrozen.

o   Researchers proposed a branching-chain model of interorganizational negotiation which employs the concept of influence networks.

§  The model suggests that negotiations between organizations take place between organizational members and interested intermediaries across and within organizational boundaries.

§  At the ends of the chains are major stakeholders, while all other members of the chain are intermediaries, trying to reconcile the needs and values of different stakeholders.

o   Political scientists have dubbed this process “back-channel diplomacy.”

§  In the short term, this may help manage uncertainties by achieving early breakthroughs where front channels often fail.

§  However, due to its secrecy and exclusion, the factors making it successful in the short term may turn sour in the long term as spoilers work to corrupt the agreement – and sabotage from those not involved in the agreement.

o   Similar to the tactic of communicating through superiors, the effectiveness of informal contact depends on engaging the right individuals.

§  Those who are not subject to the same accountability pressure

§  So they can use informal communication channels to clear blockages in the formal talks

E.     Communicate Directly to the Other Party’s Constituency

·         In a third form of indirect communication – see Figure 11.9 – one agent seeks to bypass the other party and communicate directly with that agent’s constituency to persuade those involved to change their position or the instructions they are giving their representative.

o   The agent may initiate this tactic when they believe:

§  That negotiations are deadlocked

§  That the other negotiator is not communicating effectively with their constituency

§  Or that the other agent is not representing their constituency’s interests clearly.

§  Thus, the agent attempts to eliminate the other agent and communicate directly with the other’s supporters. 

§  The tactic may also be initiated by the other negotiator if they feel their credibility is being questioned and wants the agent to hear the message from their own constituency.

o   Bypassing the other agent may be necessary when you

§  are not sure the other agent is well informed about the issues or

§  when you don’t believe they have authority to make commitments and solidify an agreement

o   It should be clear that direct communication with the other party’s constituency will likely be viewed as an inflammatory tactic.

§  Negotiators undermined by their opponents are likely to be defensive and rigid.

F.     Communicate Directly to Bystanders

·         An agent may try to manipulate the opinion of bystanders and mobilize their support, either to enhance their own position or undermine the other party’s position – see Figure 11.10.

·         Communication through bystanders may occur:

o   As an explicit and conscious tactic to exert influence on the other party, but through circuitous channels

o   As an effort to build alliances and support for your own position; or

o   As a result of the natural tendency for conflict to proliferate and envelop innocent bystanders

§  In all cases, agents are public about their demands.

§  Their hope is that unaligned parties will openly side with them, lending strength to their arguments and undermining the strength of the other party’s arguments.

·         Communication through audiences—particularly the media—is extremely common in major community, environmental, and intergovernmental, negotiations.

o   Media relations and image management often become ends in themselves

o   Strong negotiators stage their performance in order to win public opinion

o   Which then puts pressure on the other side to concede

·         Communication through the media can also be used to reach one’s own constituency.

o   This is the quickest and most efficient way of letting your constituency know the elements of the commitment – if the media gets it correct.

o   This approach is likely used when an agent wants to communicate firmness and not as likely when the agent wants to communicate concession making or flexibility.

·         Communication may also be designed to activate and win over interested audiences who will communicate directly with the other party.

o   The effectiveness of communicating through audiences is determined by several factors.

§  First, the success of the tactic depends on the degree to which an audience’s outcome hinges directly on the negotiator’s effectiveness and how severe the consequences are likely to be.

§  Second, is the degree to which the audience is organized as a coherent unit – the internet has become a vehicle for airing public opinion.

§  Finally, appeals to audiences will be effective to the degree that the negotiator is sophisticated in the use of media relations – the content of the message is less important than the visual presentation and the performance.

G.    Build Relationships with Audiences, Constituents, and Other Agents

·         At the start of this chapter, it was suggested that negotiators intent on building or strengthening a relationship with the other party should negotiate differently than if the negotiation is a simple, one-time market transaction.

o   The same is true for how negotiators should manage relations with constituents, audiences, and opposing agents.

o   Negotiators should try to develop personal relationships with the other party.

o   The underlying assumption is that it is easier to work with and persuade a friendly counterpart than an unfriendly one.

o   The better the relationship between an agent and other agents, the more the final agreement will represent long-term interests rather than short-term gains.

·         Informal meetings between negotiators can have several benefits.

o   When parties drop their formal negotiator roles and meet as individual people, they can discover their commonality and develop their liking for each other.

o   Agents may also stress their common fate—namely, the accountability pressures put on them by their constituencies.

o   Informal meetings permit each party to get a sense of the other’s objectives – usually done for two reasons:

§  To sense what the other side’s major demands will be.

§  To develop a relationship and an open channel of communication that can be used regardless of how tense the negotiations become.

o   Finally, a strong relationship between agents should allow the negotiators to do a better job of coordinating their actions in presenting their settlements back to their constituents.

IV. When to Use an Agent

·         This chapter has contained a great deal of advice to negotiators on the ways that negotiations change when more people become involved.

·         Table 11.1 summarizes the conditions under which a negotiator might wish to employ an agent, and when to negotiate on your own.

o   The table offers eight instances when you should consider using an agent, one of which is: When the agent has distinct or unique knowledge or skills in the issues or the negotiation context essential to achieving an agreement.

o   One example of when you might want to negotiate for yourself is when your negotiation skills are better than those of any available agent

V.    Managing Agents

·         While most of the prescriptive advice has been to the negotiator in managing their audience and constituents, we should spend some time describing how a constituency can effectively manage their agent, particularly those attempting an integrative outcome.

o   Check out the agent’s credentials and qualifications. 

§  Interview them, find out their experience, check references, and decide whether you and the agent are compatible.

o   Spend time getting to know the agent. 

§  Make sure that your “contract” with the agent and your expectations are clear.

o   At the outset, the agent should have no authority to make a binding commitment any substantive issues.

§  Until you are familiar with the agent’s negotiation skill and understanding of the key issues.

o   At the outset, the agent should have discretion to design and develop an effective overall negotiation process – with your ongoing consultation.

o   You should focus most of your communication to the agent on interests, priorities, and alternatives, rather than specific settlement points.

§  Unless there are some absolutely hard-and-fast non-negotiables.

o   You should establish clear expectations about the frequency and quality of reporting back to you.

o   You should instruct the agent on exactly what they can disclose in negotiation

§  Interests, ranges of acceptable settlement, key facts, the principal's identity, etc.

o   The agent’s authority should expand as you and the agent gain insight into and comfort with each other through the negotiation process.

o   Specific and direct instructions to the agent should be put in and be available to show to the other side when necessary.

o   You should craft a behavior or outcome contract that both of you are clear about and should be ready to clarify if it appears that there has been miscommunication or misunderstanding.

Chapter Summary

 

Sometimes negotiation is a private affair between two parties. At other times, however, there are audiences to a negotiation, and the presence of an audience has both a subtle and a direct impact on negotiations.

Three types of audiences may be encountered. First, when teams of people (rather than individuals) negotiate, the chief negotiators provide much of the actual dialogue. Although these two usually speak directly to one another, they also use their own and opposing team members as an audience.

A second type of audience is the constituency the negotiator represents. A husband or wife negotiating for a new house represents a family, division heads on a companywide budget committee negotiate what portion of capital resources their departments will have for the coming year, sales or purchasing people negotiate for their companies, and diplomats negotiate for their countries.  The audiences in each case have a stake in the outcome of the negotiation and benefit or suffer according to the skills of their representatives.

The third type of audience is bystanders. Bystanders see or hear about the negotiations and form favorable or unfavorable opinions of the settlement and the parties involved. Bystanders may or may not be indirectly affected by the course and outcome of the negotiations.

Audiences influence negotiators through two different routes. One is that negotiators desire positive evaluations from those who are in a position to observe what they have done. The other is that audiences hold negotiators responsible for the outcomes of negotiations. They can reward negotiators by publicly praising them and punish negotiators by firing them. They can intrude and change the course of negotiations—as when the public requires mandatory arbitration or fact-finding in some disputes. They make their preferences known—for example, by talking to the press—thereby putting pressure on one or both negotiators through the impact of public opinion and support.

Audiences can have both favorable and unfavorable effects on negotiations. Sometimes negotiators try to use an audience to their advantage, as when they try to pressure the other party into taking a more flexible or desirable position; they may also try to prevent an audience from having influence when they think it might be undesirable for their position. Although there are many different ways of influencing an audience, all involve controlling the visibility or communication with that audience.

We also offered several suggestions for constituents that they can use to manage their agents in negotiation. These include processes for managing agent authority, helping the agent understand the constituent’s primary interests and alternatives, giving the agent discretion to manage the process, and establishing the process for frequent reporting between agents and constituents.

When negotiations move from a private to a public context, they become more complex and more formal. In setting strategy, a negotiator needs to consider whether negotiations should be held privately or involve audiences in various ways. To ignore this social context is to ignore a potent factor in determining negotiation outcomes.

 

 





Chapter 12

Coalitions

 

 

Chapter Overview

In this chapter and the one that follows, we extend the analysis to three situations that involve multiple parties.

  • Our focus now is on situations where multiple      (more than two) parties are negotiating with one another, with the parties      each striving to achieve their own individual objectives.

  • In this chapter we will examine how parties ally      into coalitions to achieve these objectives.

  • In Chapter      13, we look at negotiation involving multiple parties and negotiations in      which multiple individuals constitute each party.

In this chapter, we will present an overview of what a coalition is and describe the different forms that coalitions take.

  • We then analyze how and why coalitions form and      develop, the nature of coalition decision making, and the role of power      and leverage in coalitions.

  • The chapter      concludes with some practical advice for building and maintaining      coalitions.

Learning Objectives

1.          Understand what coalitions are and why they are important in negotiation.

2.          Explore how coalitions form and develop and what makes them strong or weak.

3.          Consider how coalitions and their members make decisions about negotiation issues.

4.          Gain practical advice on how to build and maintain coalitions.

 


Chapter Outline

  1. A Situation with More Than Two Parties

  2. What Is a Coalition?

A.    Types of Coalitions

  1. How and Why Coalitions Form and Develop

A.    When Do Coalitions Form?

B.     How Do Coalitions Develop?

  1. Standards for Coalition Decision Making

A.    Power and Leverage in Coalitions

B.     How to Build Coalitions: Some Practical Advice

  1. Chapter Summary

 


I.       A Situation with More Than Two Parties

·         A negotiation situation becomes more complex when more negotiators are added – see Figure 12.1.

·         In this chapter we are focusing on what happens when the parties form coalitions or subgroups in order to strengthen their bargaining position through collective action.

II.    What Is a Coalition?

·         A coalition, simply defined, is a collection of two or more parties within a larger social setting who work together to pursue mutually desirable goals.

·         Coalitions have these attributes.

o   Coalitions are interacting groups of individuals.

§  Members communicate with each other about pertinent issues.

§  Usually, most people in a coalition are aware of those who belong and those who do not belong.

o   Coalitions are deliberately constructed and issue orientated.

§  The parties intentionally join to accomplish some specific purpose that serves their interests.

§  Once interaction over these issues ceases to occur, the coalition is no longer active, although it may continue to exist in a dormant state with potential to reactivate when a new issue arises.

o   Coalitions exist independent of formal structure.

§  A coalition is not necessarily a formal group, such as a team, or task force, although they could informally band together around a common objective.

§  The origins of a coalition are informal, based on the interests of the parties rather than created by formal organizational designation.

o   Coalitions lack formal structure.

§  Because they lack formal legitimacy, they also lack any internal hierarchy or formal authority.

§  Informal leadership and roles may evolve as the coalition persists and grows.

o   Coalitions focus on goals external to the coalition.

§  For the most part, coalitions form to exert influence on a person or body external to the coalition.

o   Coalitions require concerted member action.

§  They require commitment of its members to focus their action collectively on an intended target.

§  They may act in concert or may focus on refraining from action, but the objective is to achieve collectively what they cannot accomplish individually.

·         As essential aspect of a coalition is that its members are trying to achieve outcomes that satisfy the interests of the coalition, not those of the larger group within which the coalition is formed: at times, though, the two may be compatible.

A.    Types of Coalitions  

·         Coalitions take many forms.

o   A potential coalition is an emergent interest group.

§  It has the potential to become a coalition by taking collective action but has not yet done so.

§  Two forms can be identified.

·         A latent coalition is an emergent interest group that has not yet formed into an operating coalition.

·         A dormant coalition is an interest group that previously formed but is currently inactive.

§  Awareness of potential coalitions is valuable both to coalition members and to those they oppose.

o   An operating coalition is one that is currently operating, active, and in place.

§  Two forms are common.

·         An established coalition is relatively stable and ongoing across an indefinite time span.

o   It may continue because its members represent a broad range of interests

o   Because the issues are never fully resolved

o   Or because they are in constant opposition to another established coalition that is taking action

·         A temporary coalition operates for a short time and is usually focused on a single issue or problem.

o   These form for purpose of exerting collective action, when their objectives are met, they disband.

o   Due to common interests, temporary coalitions often transform into established ones.

o   A recurring coalition is one that may have started as temporary but then determined the issue or problem does not remain resolved; hence the members need to remobilize themselves every time the presenting issue requires collective attention in the future.

III.  How and Why Coalitions Form and Develop

A.    When Do Coalitions Form?

Coalitions Form All the Time

o   Coalitions form all the time in families, political organizations, and within and between business organizations

§  The fundamental dynamic is the same – parties come together to pool their efforts and resources in pursuit of common or overlapping goals.

o   Coalitions can have the added benefit of making a difficult conflict situation more tractable.

§  Complexity increases as the number of parties grows.

§  Forming coalitions has a simplifying effect of reducing the number of actors at the table, creating a more manageable situation for participants.

Coalition Formation Can Be Analyzed in Different Ways

o   Coalitions have been studied within a variety of social science disciplines, including economics, sociology, psychology, and political science.

§  Sociologist tend to look at real-life collectivities as ripe for coalition building.

§  In contrast, psychologists and economists explore coalition dynamics through laboratory “games” where individuals possess resources that may be pooled to realize some desirable outcome.

o   Control over resources is the basis for two critical pieces of the coalition formation process:

§  What each member brings to the coalition

§  And what each member should receive if the coalition forms

A Classic Coalition Game

o   To understand when and why coalitions form, we examine a classic coalition problem: the 4–3–2 game.

§  In this game, three players are given an unequal number of votes in order to collect a prize.

§  Player A has four votes, B has three votes, and C has two votes.

§  To collect the prize, they must assemble at least five votes, so no player can claim the prize alone, and each player must use all votes at once.

§  Players can communicate with each other and their job is to determine whom to ally with and then how they will split the prize.

§  Not surprisingly, the most important factor determining who aligns with whom is how they decide to split the money.

·         The 3 – 2 coalition is the most common.

o   Usually because the four vote argues they should receive the largest share of the outcome.

o   Either because their demands are excessive, or because 3 and 2 feel badly treated, or because 3 and 2 recognize they can pool the fewest votes to get the whole pot.

·         Once the 3 – 2 coalition arises, it appears to be stable with the consistent exclusion of 4.

o   The most common distribution of the pool is 50 – 50 or a small advantage to the 3 vote.

·         Occasionally, stable coalitions are broken.

o   Likely if 4 makes a very attractive offer and lures either 3 or 2 away from the 3 – 2 pattern.

o   When successful, 4 is more likely to get 3 to defect than 2.

o   If a deflection occurs, what happens next?

§  The defector, who probably got a big incentive to defect, now may insist they continue to receive the bonus.

§  The 4 usually views this as greedy and they may reject 3 in future deals.

§  Moreover, 2 is still mad at 3 for defecting, so 3 may be rejected by both sides, who then ally for a 4 – 2 coalition until 3 can put a highly tempting offer on the table to break the 4 – 2 coalition.

A “Real-World” Example

o   There are a number of real-world parallels to the coalition dynamics found in the 4-3-2 game.

o   For example, the first formulation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, included members who were large and powerful, such as Germany, and weaker countries such as Belgium

§  Originally, each country had voting power proportional to its economic and physical size

§  Some decisions required unanimous votes, while other required only a majority vote – producing a tremendous amount of coalition behavior.

§  When the votes needed to be unanimous, even the smallest country could exert strong control over the decision or block the deal.

§  The smaller countries may be excluded when the vote was a majority, if the larger countries got together.

The Nature of Coalition Inputs

o   In general, people form coalitions to preserve or increase their resources

§  Such as money, information, natural resources, discretion (the ability to make decisions without consulting others), and so on

o   The resources that serve as coalition inputs take many other forms, depending on the specific context involved.

§  In organizations, coalitions form around key resources such as information, money, or control over the future direction of the group or organization.

§  Coalitions inputs may also include other kinds of resources:

·         The amount of effort exerted

·         The ability or skill contributed to the task or problem

·         The level of expertise obtained

§  Effort, ability, and skill may be as critical to the coalition as control over specific resources, such as when forming a new business.

o   Coalitions can also form around a shared sense of social identity when two or more parties see themselves as part of a common social category – gender, race, nationality, etc.

§  Or they can form around categories emerging as individuals become acquainted – such as strong vs. weak contributors, or individuals in common task roles.

§  When coalitions form purely around social identities, they are not really “rational” and will not help achieve the negotiation objectives.

o   For an interesting example involving somewhat unusual inputs into coalition formation, see Box 12.1 on the role of coalitions in string quartets.

The “Tragedy of the Commons”

o   Coalitions also form in order to avoid a poor outcome that will occur if individuals act alone in a self-interested manner.

§  An anecdote drawn from 17th century village life in England relates the story of a common area that everyone in town could use.

§  There were no rules, but people shared the area for picnics, weddings, and fairs.

§  A herdsman began grazing his cows there in order to get the most of his own farmland, others followed until the commons was a barren field of mud.

o   The concept of a social dilemma applies to a number of contemporary issues – air and water pollution, use of natural resources, voting, and more.

§  If a large enough number of people reason their behavior or vote will not make a difference, then a major social problem ensues.

§  Common dilemmas can be avoided only if a large number of people accept responsibility for taking advantage of a limited good.

o   Common dilemmas often become an unending downward spiral but there are ways to increase pro-social responses, including

§  Expanding communication between the individuals involved

§  Educating those involved about the resource in question

§  Asking individuals to commit publicly to conserve resources

B.     How Do Coalitions Develop?

·         The following steps and activities seem to be the most critical.

Coalitions Start with a Founder

o   The founder is the person who initiates the coalition. 

§  They usually recognize they cannot get what they want through existing channels by themselves.

o   Discussions with others often take the form of a negotiation.

§  Persuasion efforts alone may be successful, or the founder may have to offer tangible rewards or benefits to get others to join the coalition.

§  This is where the negotiation process takes place.

§  Early in the process, founders may have to offer a disproportionate share of profits to potential partners as they may be unwilling to join otherwise.

§  One paradox of being a founder – early in the coalition the founder may have to give away a lot in order to gain a little.

§  As the coalition grows, other partners will join on their own, and the founder’s power position shifts from weakness to strength.

o   There are two key factors that define the founder’s ability to build a coalition.

§  Successful founders have extensive networks.

§  Founders’ benefits from early coalitions are likely to be small.

o   Box 12.2 describes a study of coalition success seen through the eyes of coalition leaders in social change settings.

Coalitions Build by Adding One Member at a Time

o   Coalitions rarely come together in a single event; instead, coalitions are typically built by adding individuals one at a time.

§  The founder is instrumental in driving this process.

§  Proximity and convenience influence who is approached, but neither may be enough, which is where negotiation principles come in.

·         The founder can benefit in coalition building if they understand the others’ interests and move toward making offers to potential coalition partners, based on one or more of several criteria

o   The other has something important to bring to the coalition that will enhance its strength.

o   The other wants less than other people to be a member of the coalition.

o   The founder can make some form of promise or commitment to the other about future rewards or benefits to be derived.

Coalitions Need Opportunities to Form and Grow

o   Motivation to form a coalition may not be enough if the parties involved don’t also have the right opportunity to explore their mutual interests.

§  In a multiparty negotiation, for instance, some of those involved may find it hard to form an alliance unless they have opportunities for side conversations apart from the main negotiation table.

§  Opportunities for side conversations in small groups gives greater voice to minority points of view.

§  Smart leaders will think carefully about whether they want to allow or encourage side conversations.

Coalitions Need to Achieve Critical Mass

o   Coalitions continue to grow through pairwise discussions and matching processes.

§  At some point, they reach a “joining threshold” – a level in which a minimum number of people are on board – and others begin to join on their own.

§  There is a point when a coalition reaches critical mass and finds that further growth is easier but at the same time less necessary.

Coalitions Exclude

o   Coalitions don’t just add members; they also exclude members – those left out may be worse off as a result, or they may be better off.

o   The exclusion of parties may depend on the communication channels through which coalition politics plays out.

§  Groups that interacted face-to-face were less likely to exclude a party than those interacting through a text-based online communication system.

§  Exclusion is less likely when side conversations are not allowed and communication is publicly shared.

Weak Ties Can Be Strong

o   Coalition founders will often seek out the weakest as they may need to be in the coalition the most and will demand the least payoff for joining.

§  A related dynamic is that founders who have a large, diverse network of weak ties are often in a better position to form a coalition than those who have a small, uniform network of strong ties.

o   In organizational settings, there are “veto players” – senior managers or others in formal authority positions.

§  They are not likely to be coalition founders as they are unwilling to give much away and have difficulty selling others on membership.

§  Instead, they are likely to wait until others approach them with attractive offers.

Many Successful Coalitions Form Quietly and Disband Quickly

o   Coalitions do not have to permanent to be effective.

§  In fact, members of permanent coalitions may be seen as the opposition.

o   Successful coalitions are focused – they are often drawn together quickly and mobilized for the purpose of endorsing or blocking a particular course of action.

§  They seldom meet formally; instead pairs or subgroups meet informally.

§  When critical action is needed, they mobilize to work together, then go back to their own individual activities when the moment passes.

§  Note that communication channels may play a role in the ability of coalitions for form and disband efficiently.

o   There are several reasons why it is risky for a coalition to remain intact after the successful resolution of an issue:

§  Revenge of the vanquished

·         Revenge can pit coalitions against each other so that each one’s sole objective is to keep the other side from succeeding – politics everywhere.

§  Turmoil within

·         Public acknowledgment of the coalition may lead to internal turmoil which not only threatens the coalition’s stability but may also compromise its future effectiveness.

§  Desire for anonymity

·         Many members do not want to be known as being political or publicly associated with other coalition members, and they want to be able to keep their options open to form other associations as their interests change in the future.

IV. Standards for Coalition Decision Making

·         Coalition decision rules define the criteria that parties will use to determine who receives what from the results of the coalition’s efforts.

o   Decision rules tend to parallel three standards of fairness: equity, equality, and need.

§  Those advocating an equity standard argue that anyone who contributed more should receive more, in proportion to the magnitude of the contribution.

§  Those advocating an equality standard argue that everyone should receive the same.

§  Those advocating a need standard argue that parties should receive more in proportion to some demonstrated need for the resource.

o   In general, parties tend to argue for the standard that is most likely to serve their individual needs.

A.    Power and Leverage in Coalitions

·         Chapters 8 and 9 addressed the general nature of power and leverage in negotiations.

o   The dynamics of power and influence are central aspects of the formation and maintenance of coalitions.

o   Leverage issues in coalitions are discussed from two perspectives:

§  The issue of strength versus weakness in coalitions and

§  The types of power that underlie coalition formation

Where is the Strength in Coalitions? 

o   The more resources a party holds or controls, the more likely that party is to be a critical coalition member.

§  Such a person will be a central figure to pulling the coalition together, dictating its strategy, and influencing the distribution of the resource pool.

§  This is known as the strength-is-strength argument.

§  Note that this centrality directly parallels the discussion in Chapter 8: formal and informal power that comes from a person’s position in a hierarchy and in a network structure.

o   Sometimes, the goal is to form the smallest possible winning coalition.

§  In these circumstances, those parties with relatively fewer resources may be stronger.

§  Their weaker resource position leads them to ask for less from the winning pool, and therefore, they are more desirable coalition partners.

§  This result is often referred to as the strength-is-weakness argument.

§  A word of caution, a coalition based on weak members may, with its lack of dedicated support, undermine the implementation of its strategy.

How is Power Related to Coalition Formation?

o   Three key types of power in multiparty negotiations: strategic, normative, and relational – also summarizes the coalition-formation process.

§  Strategic power emerges from the availability of alternative coalition partners.

·         The more resources a potential partner brings to a coalition, the more power they will have in dictating what the coalition should look like.

§  Normative power derives from what parties consider fair distribution of the outcomes.

·         The party whose arguments ultimately shape the allocation rule used by the group has the most normative power.

§  Relationship-based power is shaped by the compatibility of preferences between two or more parties.

·         As noted in Chapter 10, parties who see each other as having common or compatible interests are more likely to preserve a relationship with each other.

o   Research indicates that relationship power from compatibility of interests is an overriding source of power.

o   Relationship dynamics can significantly affect the formation and stability of coalitions.

§  Parties tend to see themselves aligned in the future and so work together.

§  They see themselves as having compatible preferences and common interests.

§  They develop trust, and confidence in each other to work together.

B.     How to Build Coalitions: Some Practical Advice

·         A practical approach to coalitions proposes a strategy of empowerment and positive politics in organizations – the pursuit of enlightened self-interest.

·         Enlightened self-interest occurs when people:

o   Pursue activities that have meaning to themselves and to others.

o   Are needed.

o   Genuinely contribute to the organization and its purpose.

o   Act with integrity and tell the truth about what they see happening.

o   Treat others well and have a positive impact on them.

o   Strive to be as good and productive as they can at what they do.

·         Parties who pursue enlightened self-interest are likely to use authentic tactics with others – which requires parties to do the following:

o   Say no when they mean no – rather than refusing to commit, or fence sitting

o   Share as much information as possible.

o   Use language that describes reality.

o   Avoid repositioning for the sake of acceptance.

·         The dominant driving force of a coalition is vision so think about potential coalition partners along two dimensions:

o   Do they agree with your objectives?

o   Do they generate from you high or low levels of trust?

o   Combining the two dimensions of agreement and trust (each of which can be high or low) reveals five possible roles for coalition partners:

§  Allies, opponents, bedfellows, fence sitters, and adversaries.

Allies

o   Allies are parties in agreement with a negotiator’s goals and vision, and whom the negotiator trusts.

o   The preferred strategy with allies is to treat them as friends – let them know the vision and plans, vulnerabilities and doubts.

o   Because there is trust, expect that person will tell the truth and act in your best interests.

Opponents

o   Opponents are people with whom a negotiator has conflicting goals and objectives, but who can be trusted to be principled and candid in their opposition.

o   They push the negotiator to be better and stronger at advocating a course of action.

o   Negotiators expect opponents to play by the rules and play to win.

Bedfellows

o   Bedfellows are parties with whom a negotiator has high agreement on the vision or objectives, but low to moderate levels of trust.

o   Low trust arises when one or both sides don’t share information, don’t tell the whole truth, play it cagey, and say what they think you want to hear.

o   They can be created either by the other party’s actions or by a negotiator’s actions.

Fence sitters

o   Fence sitters are parties who will not take a stand on a given issue.

o   They may fear taking a position that could lock them into something.

o   They also may truly not know what they want to do.

o   The negotiator can have little trust in fence sitters as it is not clear where they stand, and they may actively maintain that ambiguity.

Adversaries

o   Adversaries are low in agreement, but unlike opponents, adversaries cannot be trusted.

o   Many people become preoccupied with adversaries as they feel the failure to negotiate with them reveals weaknesses in their ability to manage relationships.

o   In addition, adversaries often behave in ways parties find unacceptable, so the goal is either to win over the adversary or to destroy the adversary.

o   Note that the more you focus on trying to convert other people, the more they adhere to their own beliefs.

o   A long-term focus on adversaries can lead to paranoia and dysfunctional behavior in organizations.

·         It is possible to build a coalition with each of these five types, but different strategies are appropriate in each case – prescriptive advice is summarized in Box 12.3.

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, we have addressed the nature of coalitions and explored the processes by which they are formed, led, maintained, and ultimately disbanded. We suggested that coalition formation occurs when there are more than two negotiating parties and is most likely when parties need to add the resources or support of others to enhance the likelihood of achieving their own individual outcomes. We discussed when, why, and how coalitions form; addressed how they work (and don’t work) once formed; and considered the role of power and leverage in coalition politics. Finally, we offered some advice to those who are building a coalition, particularly regarding how one can think about potential partners, and what should be the agenda in conducting negotiations with those partners.

We conclude with a cautionary note about the importance of underlying relationships among the parties to a dispute that may involve the formation of coalitions.  One researcher observed that early work on coalitions overlooked the key question of whether the people who might unite in a coalition can actually work together.  After all, the payoffs in a successful coalition involve more than just the negotiated outcome; there also may be interpersonal benefits resulting from interactions with coalition partners.  These issues of relationships between the parties – past, present, and future – clearly have an impact on how the parties select their coalition partners and whether those partnerships are likely to endure or to shift as economic incentives change.

 

 


Chapter 13

 Multiple Parties, Groups, and Teams in Negotiation

 

 

Overview

 

In this chapter, we extend the analysis to two situations that involve multiple parties:

  • Multiple parties are present at the negotiating      table and represent multiple interests – defined as a multiparty      negotiation.

  • Multiple      individuals are present on each “side” of the negotiation, organized into      groups or teams – defined as a multi-team or team-on-team negotiation.

Learning Objectives

 

  1. To      understand the ways negotiations become more complex when there are more      than two negotiators at the bargaining table.

  2. To apply      an understanding of effective group processes to the dynamics of a      multiparty negotiation.

3.          To spell out the key stages for managing an effective multiparty negotiation.

4.          To understand the challenges of team-on-team negotiations.

Chapter Outline

  1. The Nature of Multiparty Negotiations

    1. Differences       between Two-Party Negotiations and Multiparty Negotiations

    2. What       Dynamics Can Make a Multiparty Negotiation Effective?

  2. Managing Multiparty Negotiations

    1. The       Prenegotiattion Stage

    2. The       Formal Negotiation Stage – Managing the Group Process and Outcome

    3. The       Agreement Stage

  3. Interteam Negotiations

  4. Chapter Summary


I.       The Nature of Multiparty Negotiations

  • Multiparty negotiation is defined as one where more than two interested parties are working together to achieve a collective objective.

  • The general      model for a multiparty negotiation is represented in Figure 13.1.

o   Each of the parties is representing their own interests.

o   In a different situation, they could be representing the interests of others – see Figure 13.2.

o   Complexities increase as more parties, constituencies, and audiences are added.

  • In this      chapter, we note the factors that make multiparty negotiations more      difficult to manage than one-on-one negotiations.

o   We comment on some of the key stages and phases of multiparty deliberations.

o   For each phase, we consider a variety of strategies that can be used to manage multiparty negotiations effectively.

o   We show the ways that multiparty negotiations are complex and highly susceptible to breakdown

o   And we show that managing them effectively requires a conscious commitment from the parties and a facilitator as they work toward an effective multiparty agreement.

A.    Differences between Two-Party Negotiations and Multiparty Negotiations  

·         Multiparty negotiations differ from two-party deliberations in several ways – making them more complex, challenging, and difficult to manage.

Number of Parties

o   Multiparty negotiations have more negotiators at the table, obviously, and negotiations simply become larger.

o   Each party may be acting as a principal (Figure 13.1), or an agent (Figure 13.2), and each party may have different social roles outside the negotiation leading to either equal or unequal levels of power and status in the negotiation.

Informational and Computational Complexity

o   With multiparty negotiations there are more issues, more perspectives on issues and more total information introduced.

o   Keeping track of all this information becomes a major challenge for the negotiators.

o   It is even more critical that negotiators spend time in more thorough preparation prior to the multiparty negotiation, rather than trying to keep track of issues and trade-offs as the negotiation is evolving.

Social Complexity

o   A third difference is that as the number of parties increases, the social environment changes from a one-on-one dialogue to a small-group discussion.

o   As a result, all the dynamics of small groups begin to affect the way the negotiators behave.

§  First, how the process evolves may depend on the motivational orientation of the parties toward each other.

§  Second, social pressures may develop for the group to act cohesively, yet the members are in conflict with each other and cannot be cohesive unless they can find an acceptable solution.

·         Strong pressures for conformity develop as members pressure other members to adopt a common perspective.

·         In addition, the parties can develop dysfunctional dynamics.

Procedural Complexity

o   A fourth way in which multiparty negotiations are more complex than two-party ones is that the process they have to follow is more complicated – and procedural rules become far less clear.

o   There are several consequences of this procedural complexity.

§  First, negotiations will take longer, so allow more time.

§  Second, the greater the number of parties, the more complex and out of control the process can become – particularly if some parties adopt a strategy of tough positional bargaining, dominating conversations to railroad their viewpoints.

§  Third, as a result of the first two elements, negotiators will probably have to devote explicit discussion time on how they will manage the process to arrive at the type of solution or agreement they want – often tense discussions.

§  Finally, the parties must decide how they want to approach multiple issues on the table – considering all the issues simultaneously achieved higher outcomes.

Logistical Complexity

o   A fifth way in which multiparty negotiations may be more complex has to do with the physical distance between the parties as they attempt to resolve differences and reach agreement.

o   Physical distance can affect how much the parties trust each other, the ways they interpret unclear or ambiguous behavior of the other parties, and the willingness to continue negotiation with each other as a conflict resolution strategy.

o   This distance—whether physical or psychological—seems to affect how parties make sense of and interpret what others are doing and whether “signals” are interpreted as indications of cooperative or competitive behavior.

Strategic Complexity

o   Finally, multiparty negotiations are more strategically complex than two-party ones.

o   In a group negotiation, complexity increases significantly. 

§  The negotiator must consider the strategies of all the other parties at the table and decide whether to deal with each of them separately or as a group.

o   The actual process of dealing with each of them usually evolves into a series of one-on-one negotiations, which can have several consequences.

§  First, these exchanges are subject to surveillance and audience dynamics

·         The short-term result is that negotiations may become positional unless competitive escalation is avoided.

·         This is particularly true in the situation shown in Figure 13.2, when negotiators have constituencies.

§  Second, negotiators who have some way to control the number of parties at the table may begin to act strategically, using this control to serve their objectives.

·         The tactic used will be determined by the strategic interests to be served by adding other parties.

·         Negotiators can strategically add parties to enhance their perceived power through sheer numbers, to impress the other with prestigious supporters, or to present some threat of consequences if they do not get their way.

§  Third, negotiators can explicitly engage in coalition building as a way to marshal support.

·         Coalitions may be explicitly formed prior to negotiations or during negotiation recesses and breaks, or emerge during negotiations.

o   Members of coalitions can exert their strength in multiparty negotiations in a number of ways:

§  By expressing solidarity with each other

§  By agreeing to help each other achieve their common or individual objectives

§  By dominating discussion time

§  By agreeing to support each other as solutions and agreements emerge

o   A “snowballing coalition” may emerge when a few people with a common perspective agree to support each other’s views

§  Other individuals then negotiate with the emerging coalition to incorporate their own views

§  Those unwilling to negotiate or modify their views are left out of the collective decision.

o   The risk for those on the outside of an influential coalition is that they will not be as active participant in the discussions, some occurring away from the table.

§  Simply being present for key discussions is important, especially in the later stages as the parties hone in on a final settlement.

o   What the parties have done for each other in the past, and/or what they think they can do for each other in the future, has a strong impact on the current discussions.

B.     What Dynamics Can Make a Multiparty Negotiation Effective?  

·         Multiparty negotiation looks a lot like group decision making because it involves a group of parties trying to reach a common solution from divergent interests.

·         So, understanding multiparty negotiation means, in part, understanding the attributes of an effective group.

·         Effective groups and their members do the following things:

1.      Test assumptions and inferences.

§  Unchecked assumptions and inferences can lead to unfounded conclusions.

2.      Share as much relevant information as possible.

§  Parties should discuss their interests, but not disclose their walkway or BATNA.

3.      Focus on interests, not positions.

§  Use procedures that surface underlying interests, rather than just stated positions: sharing information, asking questions, and probing for underlying needs.

4.      Explain the reasons behind your statements, questions, and answers.

§  Disclosing interests requires you be clear about what is most important and indicate why those things are important.

5.      Be specific—use examples.

§  Talk in specific terms about directly observable behaviors, people, places and events.

§  Generalities can lead to misunderstandings or ambiguity and send problem solving off the track.

6.      Agree on the meaning of important words.

§  Be careful to fully explain and define key words or language that may be part of the agreement.

7.      Disagree openly with any member of the group.

§  If parties withhold disagreement, conflict is forced underground, and the absence of conflict may ultimately lead to an inability to reach consensus or implement a plan.

§  Disagreement can be productive without being offensive.

8.      Make statements, then invite questions and comments.

§  Diversity of viewpoints should not be reserved for disagreeing with someone but should also be invited from others.

§  Encourage others to clarify their own understanding of your interests and needs.

9.      Jointly design ways to test disagreements and solutions.

§  Develop a process for confirming facts, verifying interpretations of events, and surfacing the reasons for disagreements.

§  This process can be facilitated by anyone not directly involved in the debate.

10.  Discuss undiscussable issues.

§  Groups often have issues they consider undiscussable such as an underperforming group member.

§  Getting these issues on the table may be critical for a productive group.

11.  Keep the discussion focused.

§  Develop an agenda, and have the chair manage the process to ensure that discussions do not wander.

12.  Do not take cheap shots or create irrelevant sidetracks or otherwise distract the group.

§  Although some of this is inevitable, often to relieve tension, effective discussions should try to keep distractions to a minimum.

13.  Expect to have all members participate in all phases of the process.

§  All parties must be willing to contribute to all phases of the process – sharing relevant information, working to help arrive at a solution, or helping manage the process.

14.  Exchange relevant information with parties not at the table.

§  Fully brief outsiders on the rules of participation and ask them to comply.

15.  Make decisions by consensus.

§  Although unanimous decisions may not always be possible, strive for consensus whenever possible.

16.  Conduct a self-critique.

§  Finally, if future negotiations are expected, parties should spend time evaluating their process and effectiveness.

§  Not discussing the dysfunctional aspects usually makes it worse.

·         In summary, many of the principles of an effective decision-making group can be readily applied to multiparty negotiation.

·         We now turn to exploring techniques that can be used to manage multiparty negotiations more effectively.

II.    Managing Multiparty Negotiations

·         Multiparty negotiations may have four core elements:

o   Preferences – what the parties want – issues and interests

o   People – the characteristics of the individuals who participate in the negotiation

o   Processes – what negotiators do at the negotiation

o   Places – the characteristics of the context, or setting, in which negotiation occurs

·         One researcher approached multiparty negotiations from the perspective of developmental stages, suggesting they evolve through three key stages:

o   The prenegotiation stage

o   Managing the actual negotiations

o   Managing the agreement stage

·         We follow that model here, in addressing these three stages, we also identify what a single negotiator can do when:

o   The individual is simply one of the parties in a multiparty negotiation and wants to ensure that their issues and interests are clearly incorporated into the final agreement.

o   The individual wants to ensure that the group reaches the highest-quality and best possible final agreement.

o   The individual is responsible for overseeing a multiparty negotiation process to ensure that many of the strategic and procedural complexities are effectively managed.

A.    The Prenegotiation Stage 

·         This stage is characterized by a great deal of informal contact among the parties.

o   During this stage, the parties tend to work on a number of important issues:

§  Who is at the table

§  Doing your own planning

§  Whether coalitions can be formed

§  What member roles different parties will take

§  Understanding the consequences of no agreement

§  Constructing an agenda

Identify Participants

o   The parties must agree on who is going to be invited to the talks.

o   Issues about participants can be decided on the basis of the following:

§  Who must be included if a deal is to be reached? – key coalition members

§  Who could spoil the deal if they were excluded? – possible veto players

§  Whose presence is likely to help other parties achieve their objectives? – desirable coalition members

§  Whose presence is likely to keep other parties from achieving their objectives? – key coalition blockers

§  Whose status will be enhanced simply by being at the table? – this was a key issue in the North Korea nuclear disarmament talks, when President Kim Jong Un’s status was considerably enhanced by meeting directly with President Donald Trump.

Do Your Own Planning

o   As described in Chapter 4, develop a clear statement of your opening offer.

o   Indicate your preferences for the negotiation process.

o   Be ready to signal that you are willing to both trade on issues and trade smaller substantive concerns for your preferences on process.

o   Finally, make sure your point of view is heard by others.

Form Coalitions

o   It is not uncommon for coalitions to exist before negotiations begin or for coalitions to organized in anticipation of the meeting of all the parties.

o   These may form either to promote or block a particular agenda item.

Define Member Roles

o   Drawing from classic research on group dynamics, Table 13.1 describes three types of roles that members can play.

§  Task roles, which move the group along toward a decision or conclusion

·         From the table: initiating/offering, information seeking, opinion seeking, elaborating, evaluating, coordinating, and energizing

§  Relationship roles, which manage and sustain good relationships between group members

·         From the table: encouraging, harmonizing, compromising, gatekeeping, and standard setting.

§  Self-oriented roles, which bring attention to the individual group member, often at the expense of group effectiveness

·         From the table: blocking, recognition seeking, dominating, and avoiding.

Understand the Costs and Consequences of No Agreement

o   In multiparty negotiations, a negotiator’s perceptual biases are likely to affect them by inflating their sense of power and ability to win—leading them to believe that the no-agreement alternative is much better than it really is.

o   Reality checking with others is important in keeping these biases under control.

Learn the Issues and Construct an Agenda

o   Finally, parties spend a time constructing an agenda and there are many reasons why an agenda can be an effective decision aid:

§  It establishes the issues that will be discussed

§  Depending on how the issues are worded, it can define how each issue is positioned and framed

§  It can define the order in which issues are discussed

§  It can be used to introduce process issues as well as substantive issues, simply by including them

§  It can assign time limits to various items, thereby indicating the importance of the different issues

o   In addition to creating an agenda, parties in the process might also agree to abide by a set of ground rules – ways to conduct themselves during the negotiation.

o   One proposed method is the Connect Model as an approach to building effective group relationships.

o   Table 13.2 overviews the four key requirements and steps in this process model.

B.     The Formal Negotiation Stage – Managing the Process and Outcome

·         The second critical stage of multiparty negotiations is what happens when the parties actually negotiate with each other.

o   Much of the multiparty negotiation process is a combination of the group discussion processes, bilateral negotiation dynamics, and coalition-building activities described in earlier chapters.

o   The following approaches are likely to ensure a high-quality decision.

Appoint an Appropriate Chair

o   Multiparty negotiations can be greatly facilitated by the presence of a neutral chairperson who can implement many of the tactics described here.

o   As a practical matter, it is frequently the case that the chair will be drawn from within the circle of interested parties.

o   Keep in mind that if a chairperson is also advocating a particular position, it will be most difficult for that person to be seen as neutral.

o   See Box 13.1 for an inventory of ten constructive approaches to acting as a chair in multiparty negotiations.

Use and Restructure the Agenda

o   Agendas add a high degree of structure, organization, and coordination to a discussion.

§  They provide low-power groups a vehicle for getting their issues heard.

§  How an agenda is build and who builds it will impact the flow of the negotiation.

§  Make sure that possible modifications to the agenda are part of the agenda.

o   Though it may add needed structure, a drawback to an agenda is that it may artificially partition interrelated issues

§  As a result, issues may be discussed separately rather than coupled to exploit integrative potential – be willing to challenge and restructure if needed

Ensure a Diversity of Information and Perspectives

o   A third way to facilitate the negotiation is to ensure the parties receive a wide variety of perspectives about the task and sources of information.

§  Because the nature of the information changes depending on the task, it is difficult to prescribe what information is critical and how to ensure that it is addressed.

§  This can simply be a matter of making sure that the voices of all participants are heard.

§  See Box 13.2 for insight into why some members become silent in a multiparty deliberation.

o   One study found that the effect of disagreement on task performance in a group depended on:

§  How the task disagreement was being communicated – collaboratively or contentiously

§  How free group members felt to express task-related doubts

§  How effective the group’s leader was assumed to be

o   Some research suggests four group-member roles that may be useful during this information management phase: scouts, ambassadors, coordinators, and guards.

§  Scouts patrol the environment and bring in relevant external information

§  Ambassadors represent a formal link to some important constituency

§  Coordinators provide a formal link between group members and the constituencies they represent

§  Guards are designed to keep some information inside the group and ensure that there are no leaks or premature disclosures of key information.

·         Clearly, parties can play more than one role and can rotate roles.

o   One study suggests key process steps that a chair can implement to assure having an effective, amicable disagreement among the parties:

§  Collect your thoughts and composure before speaking.

§  Try to understand the other person’s position.

§  Try to think of ways that you both can win.

§  Consider how important this issue is to you.

§  Remember that you will probably have to work together with these people in the future – so don’t say anything that make you regret it tomorrow.

Ensure Consideration of All the Available Information 

o   One way to ensure the parties discuss all available information is to monitor discussion norms which reflect the way the parties engage in sharing and evaluating the information introduced.

o   Parties seldom consider in advance what discussion norms they are going to follow.

o   Research on group norms show there are several that can undermine an effective discussion.

§  Unwillingness to tolerate conflicting points of view and perspectives

·         There may be many reasons for this but, as noted earlier, the absence of conflict can also lead to disastrous decisions.

§  Side conversations

·         These can sometimes be beneficial and sometimes detrimental.

·         When a decision can benefit from unique perspectives and creative input, side conversations can be beneficial.

·         However, when parties must remain unified and collectively embrace the outcome, side conversations create distraction from the task, disrupt the flow of arguments, and reduce the likelihood of achieving unity.

§  No means for defusing an emotionally charged discussion

·         The more the parties care about a particular issue and are invested in it, the more likely it is that emotions will creep into the dialogue.

·         Vehicles must exist to allow the parties to vent their emotions productively.

§  Coming to a meeting unprepared

·         Preparation consists not only of preparing your own position, but attention to the other’s positions requires thorough preparation.

o   Several strategies help manage each of these four potentially destructive discussion norms.

§  Here, we review three decision-making and brainstorming techniques frequently used to achieve this objective.

·         The Delphi Technique

o   A moderator structures an initial questionnaire and sends it out to all parties, asking for input, which is summarized.

o   After several rounds, the parties can exchange a great deal of information and share different perspectives.

o   The advantages are that the parties have little face-to-face interaction, do not get bogged down in inefficient communications, and can proceed through several rounds before agreement is reached.

o   Limitations include the real priorities and preferences of individual parties may not be expressed, and the way the problem is defined and shaped early can greatly determine the outcome.

o   The parties may miss opportunities to expand the pie, redefine the problem, or evaluate important trade-offs.

o   Thus, the Delphi technique may tend to generate compromise settlements rather than truly creative, integrative solutions.

·         Brainstorming

o   In brainstorming, the parties are instructed to define a problem and then to generate as many solutions as possible without criticizing any of them – discussed in Chapter 3

o   Box 13.3 offers a list of critical rules to be used in brainstorming.

·         Nominal Group Technique

o   This typically follows brainstorming.

o   Once the brainstormed list of solution options is created, the parties can rank, rate, or evaluate the alternatives in terms of the degree to which each alternative solves the problem.

o   The leader collects, posts, and records these ratings so all parties have an opportunity to formally evaluate the options and vote on the ones they consider to be the most effective.

Manage Conflict Effectively  

o   The parties must generate many ideas and approaches to a problem—which usually creates conflict—while not allowing that conflict to either disrupt the information flow or create personal animosity.

§  One study looked at conflict over time in high-performance task groups, examining three kinds of typical conflict.

·         Relationship conflict

·         Task conflict

·         Process conflict

·         High-performing groups were characterized by low, but increasing levels of process conflict, low levels of relationship conflict with a rise near deadline, and moderate levels of task conflict at the midpoint

o   A related study looked at conflict resolution procedures in effective and ineffective teams.

§  Groups that maintained or improved their top performance over time share three common conflict resolution strategies.

·         They focus on the content of the interactions with the other party rather than the other party’s delivery style

·         They explicitly discuss the reasons behind any decisions reached in accepting and distributing work assignments

·         They assign work to members who have relevant task experience rather than assigning them based on convenience or volunteering.

§  Note that conflicts are more difficult to resolve when personal values, rather than interests, are at stake.

Review and Manage the Decision Rules

o   In addition to monitoring the discussion norms and managing the conflict effectively, the parties also need to manage the decision rulesthat is, the way the group will decide what to do.

§  Research shows that groups can make decisions by dictatorship, oligarchy, simple majority, two-thirds majority, quasi-consensus, and true unanimity, or consensus.

§  Determining the collective’s decision rule before deliberations begin also significantly affects the process.

o   Table 13.3 summarizes the three negotiating strategies – maximizing individual gain, entering into a coalition, and pursuing mutual gain – along with the tactics, decision rules, goal orientations, and decision aids that accompany them.

Strive for a First Agreement

o   If the objective is consensus or the best quality solution, negotiators should not strive to achieve it all at once.

o   Rather, they should strive for a first agreement that can be revised, upgraded, and improved.

o   The drawback is that many parties may be satisfied with the first solution as they typically reflect the position of a powerful, vocal minority or the views of a small number of powerful members not open to dissenting views.

o   This resistance to further deliberations by parties happy with the first agreement may be overcome by taking a break, encouraging the parties to evaluate the first agreement, and plan to come back with a commitment to try second-agreement negotiations (renegotiations).

Manage Problematic Behaviors among Some Parties

o   Finally, the behaviors of individual parties may create difficulty in achieving an effective group process – showing up late, failing to prepare, distracting, etc.

o   Here are some suggested broad tactics for dealing with problematic behavior.

§  Be specific about the problem behavior—offer clear, specific examples.

§  Phrase the problem as one that is affecting the entire team, rather than just you – use “we” instead of “you.”

§  Focus on behaviors the other can control.

§  Wait to give constructive criticism until the individual can truly hear and accept it – consult in private.

§  Keep feedback professional – use a civil tone and describe the offending behavior and its impact specifically.

§  Make sure the other has heard and understood your comments.

C.    The Agreement Stage

·         The third and final stage in managing multiparty negotiations is the agreement stage.

o   Here, the parties must select among the alternatives on the table.

o   Four key problem-solving steps occur during this stage.

§  Select the best solution.

·         The fairness of the solution should be one of the primary criteria for selecting the solution.

§  Develop an action plan.

·         This increases the likelihood that the solution will be implemented completely, effectively, and on time.

·         Working on the plan can surface ambiguities, preventing greater conflict once implementation has begun.

§  Implement the action plan.

·         This occurs outside the scope of the group, but it needs to follow the guidelines established by the group.

§  Evaluate outcomes and the process.

·         This evaluation need not occur at the same time or place as the decision meeting, but it should not be deferred or omitted.

What the Chair Can Do to Help

o   In addition to the list of responsibilities outlined in Box 13.1, here are some things a group facilitator can do to keep the group moving toward a successful completion.

§  Move the group toward selecting one or more of the options.

·         Use the process rules discussed earlier, and listen for the emergence of the “snowballing coalition” among key members.

·         Permit and encourage packaging and trade-offs.

§  Shape and draft the tentative agreement.

·         Write it down and work on language.

§  Discuss whatever implementation and follow-up or next steps need to occur.

·         Make assignments to individuals to ensure that key action steps are designed and executed.

§  Thank people for their participation, their hard work, and their efforts.

·         Have dinner or a party to celebrate all the hard work.

§  Organize and facilitate the postmortem.

·         This ensures learning for both the parties and the chair.

·         Also, you will need to be ready in case a deal unravels – see Box 13.5.

III.  Interteam Negotiations

·         In this final section of the chapter, we examine negotiations between two or more groups or teams and use the term interteam negotiation to describe these situations:

o   Two or more negotiators

o   Acting as representatives of the interests of two or more organized groups or teams

o   Sharing interests and priorities with two or more representatives from other groups or teams with their own interests and priorities

·         Only a small number of research studies have investigated interteam negotiations issues and the authors summarized the findings in five broad areas.

Intergroup Negotiations Produce Better Outcomes than Negotiations between Individuals

o   One study compared negotiations between individuals, teams, and mixed parties where a team negotiates against an individual.

o   The study found that joint profits for the two parties were greater when at least one of the parties was a team.

o   These benefits might depend on negotiator experience.

At the Same Time, Team-on-Team Negotiations Are Sometimes More Competitive and Better at Claiming-Value Dynamics

o   Game theory holds that when groups are dealing with other groups, they tend to be highly competitive.

§  Research efforts to explore if the same is true for negotiation produced mixed results.

o   Competitiveness aside, are teams better than individuals at the distributive component of negotiation?

§  Research to date points to an advantage for teams with one study showing teams claimed more value than solo negotiators.

o   Finally, the dynamics within a team can affect how negotiators behave in representing the team.

§  If the team is low-key and cooperative, the representative reaches more integrative agreements than is the constituency is militant and competitive.

§  When constituencies are less aggressive and militant, the negotiator trusts their constituency more and has more confidence they will accept the agreement reached at the negotiating table.

§  If there are disputing subgroups within a team, it undermines the team’s performance.

o   These studies point to two implications for an individual facing a negotiating team on the other side:

§  Be attentive to the possibility that the team will be aggressive in pursuing its interests and claiming value

§  Avoid the trap of assuming that the other party has disproportionate power merely because it elected to send a team to negotiate.

Accountability Pressures Are Different for Negotiators Representing Teams Compared to Individuals

o   Individual negotiators are more likely to behave in a more competitive manner when they are accountable to constituents than when accountability pressures do not exist.

o   A study found that teams of negotiators do not respond in the same way to constituent surveillance.

o   In a team, the pressures created by accountability are distributed and diffused among the team members, leading individual team members to perceive less responsibility for the outcomes than if they were acting alone.

When Negotiating as a Team, Negotiators Must also Manage Within-Team Dynamics

o   Researchers suggest the biggest challenge in a team-on-team negotiation may be managing your own negotiating team.

o   This entails two major challenges:

§  Aligning the multiple and often conflicting interests of members within the team

§  Implementing discipline among team members to follow the strategy once the negotiation begins.

o   Here are suggestions for each of these challenges.

Aligning Your Team’s Interests

§  Plot out the possible conflicting interests.

·         Draw a “map” of each team member’s interests and share it with the team.

§  Work with team members’ constituents.

·         For instance, if team members are representing various constituents, then it may be necessary to obtain their input directly and caution them about not overly raising their expectations of what their team can achieve.

§  Make data widely available.

·         Team members need to see data that only some team members currently hold and need to understand the impact of specific team decisions on various departments.

Implementing Team Discipline

§  Before encountering the other team, role play the parts of the negotiation with the other team expected to be emotional and adversarial.

§  Assign team members specific roles so that everyone has a job to do and knows how they can contribute.

§  Establish nonverbal signals for communicating with other team members – much like those by sports coaches from the bench.

o   While team leaders must work to discipline their own team, they may have responsibilities for managing the other team(s), particularly at the agreement stage.

§  Suggestions for ways a negotiator can help the other negotiator achieve agreement within their own team are listed in Box 13.6.

The Relationship and Attitude among Team Members Affects Negotiation Process and Outcomes

o   A study examined what happens when teams comprised of friends negotiate against teams of strangers.

§  Teams of friends were more cohesive and more focused on maintaining their relationship.

§  When teams of strangers were accountable for their negotiating performance, they did better than did teams of friends.

o   These findings indicate that relationships among team members complicate the ways that teams use information and tactics to work toward a negotiated settlement.

§  When team members have a preexisting friendly relationship with members of the other team, they need to be especially vigilant about not allowing those friendships to interfere with the pursuit of optimal outcomes.

§  Teams of strangers may be able to improve their performance by taking the time to become a more cohesive operating unit before entering negotiations.

Chapter Summary

Most negotiation theory has been developed under the assumption that negotiation is a bilateral process—that there are only two focal negotiators or teams of negotiators opposing each other. Yet many negotiations are multilateral or group deliberations—more than two negotiators are involved, each with his or her interests and positions, and the group must arrive at a collective agreement regarding a plan, decision, or course of action.

In this chapter, we explored the dynamics of two forms of multiparty negotiations: when multiple parties must work together to achieve a collective decision or consensus and when two or more teams are opposing each other in a negotiation.

One theme that runs through all forms of multiparty negotiation is the need to actively monitor and manage the negotiation process situations that are significantly more complex than two-party negotiations.  Following is a brief set of questions that any participant in negotiations involving coalitions, multiple parties, or teams should keep in mind.

  • What are the      consequences of the parties failing to agree due to the increased      complexities of such negotiations?       What happens if there is no agreement?

  • How will the      parties involved actually make a decision?       That is, what decision rules will be used?  Why are these the best possible rules?

  • How can the      parties use iterations – multiple round of discussion – to achieve their      objectives?  This may be      particularly appropriate when the decision rule is consensus as consensus      may not be achievable in a single iteration.

  • Do we need a      designated chair or facilitator?       Should it be a neutral outsider, or can one of the parties fill      this role?  What tactics can a      facilitator use to manage the process in order to ensure that the best      decision is reached?  These tactics      might include ensuring that the parties are exposed to a variety of      information sources, managing the process to make sure that the group      considers and discusses all available information, and structuring the      group’s agenda.

  • How will      negotiations change if we have two or more organized teams negotiating      against each other, each represented by agents?  What happens to both within-team and      between-team dynamics?

If these issues are raised and thoughtfully considered, the parties involved are considerably more likely to feel better about the process and to arrive at an effective outcome than if these factors are left to chance.

 

 

Chapter 14

Individual Differences I:

Gender and Negotiation

 

 

Chapter Overview

In this chapter we will focus exclusively on the individual difference that has received more attention from negotiation researchers than any other: gender differences. 

  • Our examination of gender differences, which some      might prefer to call sex differences, will begin by distinguishing between      the terms sex and gender.

  • We will then examine research on gender      differences in negotiation. This will involve, first, a review of      theoretical perspectives on why one might expect differences.

  • We then look      at the empirical research evidence. There have been some exciting new      research developments in this area in the last few years, giving us a      clearer picture of the underlying psychology of gender in negotiation.

Learning Objectives

1.          Understand the distinction between sex and gender.

2.          Explore alternative conceptual approaches to gender and social interaction.

  1. Consider      differences in how men and women negotiate and how they are treated by      others in negotiation.

  2. Gain      ways to overcome negotiation disadvantages that result from gender      differences and stereotypes.

 

Chapter Outline

  1. Defining Sex and Gender

  2. Research on Gender Differences in Negotiation

    1. Male       and Female Negotiators: Theoretical Perspectives

    2. Empirical       Findings on Gender Differences in Negotiation

  3. Overcoming Gender Differences

    1. Motivational       Interventions

    2. Cognitive       Interventions

    3. Situational       Interventions

  4. Do Gender Differences Really Exist?

  5. Chapter Summary


I.       Defining Sex and Gender

·         The terms sex and gender in common usage is treated as synonymous.

o   However, the distinction is important, and we make the distinction clear and to justify the usage we adopt for this chapter.

·         Sex refers to the biological categories of male and female.

o   Gender refers to cultural and psychological markers of the sexes

§  The aspects of role or identity (rather than biology) that differentiate men from women in a given culture or society.

·         Most of the empirical research on male/female differences in negotiation has examined sex differences, but has posited theoretical aspects of gender to account for differences found.

·         Consistent with this pattern, negotiation researchers rely predominantly on the term gender.

II.    Research on Gender Differences in Negotiation

·         The search for gender differences is the most researched individual difference topic in negotiation – until recently, research findings were contradictory.

·         Large-scale reviews of the research on gender differences in negotiation concludes that:

o   Women behave less competitively and more cooperatively in negotiation than men

o   Men tend to negotiate better outcomes than women.

§  For each of these conclusions, the differences, while statistically significant, are small.

·         There may be no simple answer to the question of how gender influences negotiation, but recent research studies are shedding light on differences that do exist and on why it can be hard to find them in male/female negotiator comparisons.

o   In a nutshell, the situation matters.

o   As the authors of a recent comprehensive meta-analysis of dozens of studies concluded,

§  “men achieved better economic outcomes than women on average, but gender differences strongly depended on the context.”

§  To pursue this, our discussion begins with theoretical critiques of early approaches to sex and gender in negotiation and then reviews empirical work that has yielded some interesting findings.

A.    Male and Female Negotiators: Theoretical Perspectives

·         If the prevailing view is that male and female negotiators differ, then what are the differences that are theoretically presumed to exist?

·         Scholars writing on this subject argued that several important factors affect how women and men approach negotiations.

Relational View of Others

o   Women are more aware of the complete relationship among the parties who are negotiating

§  And more likely to perceive negotiation as part of the larger context within which it takes place than to focus only on the content of the issues being discussed.

§  Consequently, women may place a greater emphasis on interaction goals, whereas men are driven by task-specific goals.

§  This could have important implications for how male versus female negotiators attend to the other party versus the issues on the table.

Embedded View of Agency

o   Women tend not to draw strict boundaries between negotiating and other aspects of their relationships but instead see negotiation as a behavior that occurs within relationships without large divisions marking when it begins and ends.

o   In contrast, men tend to separate negotiating from other behaviors occurring in the relationship and to signal the beginning and end of the negotiations behaviorally.

o   Women may be less likely to recognize that negotiations are occurring unless specifically separated from the background against which they occur.

Beliefs about Ability and Worth

o   An individual’s expectations and perceived self-worth affect how they approach the negotiation table

§  One possible explanation for gender differences in salary negotiation outcomes is that women are more likely to see their worth as determined by what the employer will pay.

§  Women may feel less comfortable about negotiation in general, undermining self-confidence that good outcomes are achievable.

Control through Empowerment

o   Women and men perceive and use power in different ways.

§  Women are more likely to seek empowerment where there is interaction among all parties in the relationship to build connection and enhance everyone’s power.

§  Men can be characterized as using power to achieve their own goals or to force the other party to capitulate to their point of view.

o   It is also the case that gender is a market of status in negotiation settings.

§  The higher status accorded men may legitimize in the minds of others the right to engage in assertive negotiation tactics, and they are more accepted from men than from women.

Problem Solving through Dialogue

o   Women and men use dialogue in different ways.

§  Women seek to engage the other in a joint exploration of ideas where understanding is progressively clarified through interaction.

§  They also alternatively listen and contribute.

§  Contrast this with men, who use dialogue to convince the other party their position is the correct one and to support various tactics and ploys used to win points during the discussion.

Perceptions and Stereotypes

o   How the negotiator perceives and “frames” the process of negotiation may have important effects on negotiation behavior.

§  Negotiation situations activates stereotypes regarding how men and women do act or should act.

§  Men have an advantage in negotiations as a dominant cultural stereotype.

§  For the female negotiator, this may mean a reputation that precedes her.

§  Negative stereotypes about female bargainers shape expectations and behaviors by both men and women at the negotiating table.

B.     Empirical Findings on Gender Differences in Negotiation

·         A more compelling and useful perspective on gender differences emerges when the focus is on specific cognitive and behavioral processes.

·         In this section, we present research on five of those processes:

o    How men and women think about negotiation

o    How they communicate in negotiation

o    How they are treated within negotiation

o    How they respond to tactics

o    How they are influenced by sterotypes

Men and Women Conceive of Negotiations in Different Ways

o    There is a growing body of evidence that male and female negotiators have very different views of what it means to negotiate and what the process of negotiation is about.

o    Here, we discuss a few ways this can occur.

How Conflict Is Framed: Relationship versus Task Orientation

§  One study found that disputants use three dimensions to interpret conflicts:

·         Relationship versus task

·         Emotional versus intellectual

·         Compromise versus win

§  Women were more likely to perceive conflict episodes in relationship terms, whereas males were more likely to perceive the task characteristics of conflict episodes.

§  There were no differences between male and female perceptions of conflict on the other two dimensions.

How Conflict Is Framed: Competition versus Collaboration

§  Some researchers contend that from birth, men are taught to uphold the masculine norms of competition and superiority.

·         Women learn, quite early, that competing and winning against a man can threaten his socially defined masculinity.

·         Similarly, women are groomed to maintain social harmony and often punished for self-promotion or competitive behavior as a violation of femininity.

·         There is also evidence that men and women differ in their willingness to compete.

§  Reviewing research on gender in negotiation, gender differences are most evident when negotiation is portrayed as a competition rather than a collaborative effort.

·         Men are more likely to intentionally use information that helps their own position but harms another’s position in a competitive negotiation.

·         Women achieved poorer outcomes when negotiating on their own behalf but outperformed men when advocating on behalf of another individual.

·         These results suggest that women suffer in situations where they are expected to fill the social role of a deferential, cooperative female but thrive when these pressures are lifted.

Is the Situation Perceived as a Negotiation Opportunity? 

§  Research evidence suggests a significant difference between men and women in their propensity to negotiate.

·         The results of one study showed that women view negotiating for things more negatively than asking for things.

§  A different study explored the phenomenon of whether women are less apt to initiate negotiations.

·         Findings showed that women with a greater propensity to negotiate receive job promotions more frequently than those less inclined to initiate negotiations.

§  Yet another study suggests the aversion to negotiation may be a function of the fit between gender and the subject of the negotiation, rather than just gender alone.

·         Women are more likely to avoid negotiation on a prototypically masculine topic, while men were more likely to avoid negotiation on a prototypically feminine topic.

Outcome Expectations 

§  Evidence suggests that women expect lower outcomes from a negotiation.

·         An experiment in which participants played the part of a manufacturer negotiating the price of supplies, indicated that when expectations were ambiguous male buyers paid less.

·         On the other hand, when ambiguity was low, the information provided about expected outcomes was enough to overcome these gender differences.

Men and Women Communicate Differently in Negotiation

o   The important implication here is that the same behavior may elicit significantly different perceptions and reactions depending on the gender of the other party who is the target/ perceiver of the behavior.

§  Aggressive and competitive tactics are viewed differently when employed by women rather than men.

o   Differences in perceptions of communication may translate into differences in behavioral style and strategy when negotiating.

§  Men are more likely to discuss positions than women, whereas women were more likely to reveal personal information and feelings than men.

§  In addition, men and women chose different examples to buttress their arguments during the negotiation.

o   Recent research suggests men and women differ when it comes to the use of tactics that might cross ethical lines.

§  In negotiation, women are more likely than men to be morally uncomfortable compromising their ethical values for financial or status gains.

§  Moreover, women regard ethically questionable tactics as less appropriate than men do.

o   Gender differences in communication vary with contextual aspects of the negotiation situation – we mention two here.

§  First, evidence points to differences between men and women depending on the communication channel in use for negotiation.

·         Women are more likely to be contentious or hostile in virtual negotiations than in face-to-face negotiation, with no difference for men.

·         A study on integrative negotiations found that female negotiators communicating with visual contact, rather than without, reached higher-quality agreements.

·         For men, visual contact increases discomfort, and men reached better agreements when there was no visual contact between negotiators.

§  A second situational factor involving communication that appears to bring out gender differences is surveillance.

·         Research on surveillance points to gender effects, but without clarity

·         One study found that men made more dominating and demanding when observed by women, while another found negotiators acting this way when the observers were men.

Men and Women Are Treated Differently in Negotiation

o   Not only do women and men perceive negotiations in different ways, but there is evidence that women in negotiations are often treated worse than men during negotiations.

§  One study of simulated negotiation crafted to tempt the parties into deceptive behavior, found that female negotiators were perceived as easier to mislead than male negotiators

§  And male negotiators lied more frequently to female opponents than they did to male opponents.

o   We consider research findings from two different domains: negotiating the purchase of a new car and salary negotiations.

§  See Box 14.1 for an interesting experimental example.

Automobile Negotiations

§  There is an intriguing experiment documenting how men and women are treated during negotiations for a new car. 

·         They assigned different pairs of negotiators (black female/white male, black male/white male, white female/white male) to shop for a new car at 153 Chicago-are car dealerships.

·         A white male negotiator participated in all pairs.

§  They found that the offers negotiators received from the car dealers differed significantly depending on the negotiators’ gender and race – see Table 14.1.

·         The gender and race of the salesperson had no effect on the results.

§  The results of this study suggest that people are treated differently when they bargain for new cars—women and blacks may start negotiations at a less favorable position than white males.

·         Further and more recent research finds that men receive more favorable leasing terms than women.

·         Like the car buying experiment, the differences in the final deals obtained were present in the opening offers and carried through to the final offers.

·         All groups follow the same negotiation process and feel they received a good deal but when the results are compared across the groups, differences based on gender and race become clear.

Salary Negotiations

§  Research on salary negotiations documents how men and women may receive different treatment and outcomes during negotiations.

·         Some differences may result from different degrees of willingness to even try to obtain a better salary.

·         These differences matter because of their potential to perpetuate a gender pay gap – which remains persistent in the United States.

§  As mentioned earlier, there is a gender difference in propensity to initiate negotiations, and this difference can play out with dramatic effects in the arena of job and salary negotiation.

·         One study found that only 7% of female graduates asked for a higher salary rather than accepting the employer’s first offer

·         In contrast, 57% of male graduates asked for more money.

·         Neglecting to initiate even a single salary negotiation can cascade over the length of a career into a significant financial loss.

§  Even when both men and women do initiate negotiations over salaries, there is evidence that women fare worse.

·         In a study of MBA graduates, males received a higher monetary payoff for negotiating their salary than did females, even when both negotiated.

·         Another study found that, compared with men, women anticipating a salary negotiation reported lower pay expectations and set lower targets and resistance points.

Similar Tactics Have Different Effects When Used by Men versus Women

o   One of the most compelling gender differences in negotiation is how the same behaviors of male and female negotiators are perceived differently.

o   Here are two studies that make this point persuasively.

Exchange Tactics

§  The results of one study suggest that not only do men and women receive different outcomes during salary negotiation but also the same tactic may have opposite effects, depending on its use by a male or a female employee.

·         The use of exchange tactics had a positive effect on the outcome of salary negotiations of male employees and a negative effect on the outcome of female employees.

·         When women engage in negotiation behavior that runs counter to the other party’s gender-based expectations, the result can be a cycle of mistrust and competition that turns the negotiation into a more contentious encounter.

Aggressive Tactics

§  One study investigated reactions to people who negotiate aggressively.

·         Results showed that both male and female job candidates were less likely to be hired when they bargained aggressively.

·         However, women were far less likely than men to be hired when aggressive.

·         In short, women were punished more severely than men for exactly the same action.

Gender Stereotypes Affect Negotiator Performance

o   In an important series of studies, researchers examined how the performance of male and female negotiators varies depending on the kinds of stereotypes activated in a particular situation.

§  Their analysis draws upon a social psychological theory of “stereotype threat” – performance anxiety that afflicts individuals in certain social categories who fear their performance will confirm a negative stereotype.

§  Here are a couple of the key findings from the studies of this phenomenon.

Stereotypes Undermine the Performance of Female Negotiators

§  When stereotype threat is activated—by telling negotiators that the bargaining task is diagnostic of one’s ability as a negotiator—women do worse because of the negative stereotypes that are active, and men do better because of the positive stereotypes in play.

§  In contrast, when negotiators are told explicitly that the task is not diagnostic of ability, there are no differences in the performance of male and female negotiators.

The Negative Effect of Stereotypes about Gender Differences Can Be Overcome

§  There is also evidence that negative stereotypes of women at the bargaining table can sometimes improve performance.

·         In the same study as mentioned above, when explicitly mentioning that masculine traits lead to better performance, women actually outperformed men in mixed-gender negotiations.

III. Overcoming Gender Differences

·         Much of the research described in this chapter places female negotiators at a disadvantage, suggesting that women are worse off at the negotiation table.

o   Here, we mention three categories of interventions that help to overcome some of the liabilities for women in the realm of negotiation.

A.    Motivational Interventions

·         In negotiation, views of men’s and women’s abilities differ and people apply double standards in judging the action of others.

o   One way to break this pattern is to emphasize the mutual dependency of both parties in the negotiation relationship.

o   This dilutes the double standard by making the negotiation less about self-promotion for each party.

·         Sex differences in negotiation performance have been found to result from gender stereotypes about male and female ability and behavior.

o   One way to overcome gender stereotypes in negotiation is to connect those stereotypes explicitly with negotiation outcomes.

o   Activating a negative stereotype may motivate a person to disprove it.

·         There is also evidence that individuals will act to overcome stereotypes when they are motivated to make a positive impression on the other party.

o   Both men and women who were motivated to make a good impression acted in ways that contradicted gender stereotypes: women acted more assertively and men yielded more value.

o   Even so, although the men managed to produce a positive impression of themselves from the other party, the women were judged more negatively.

B.     Cognitive Interventions

·         Having a powerful mindset can be an important tool in negotiation.

o   Such mindsets make a difference in behavior: power becomes action.

o   In negotiation, approaching the negotiation with a powerful frame of mind can lead to higher outcomes for the female negotiator, who might otherwise be at a disadvantage.

§  When induced to think about power, a woman’s aversion to negotiating is diminished and they react much more like men.

§  Other ways to change the mindsets of female negotiators include focusing on things the negotiators have in common that transcend gender, such as common goals or identities;

·         Redefining what it means to be a good negotiator to include stereotypically feminine attributes; and

·         Increasing perceptions of control through structured training.

·         Cognitive interventions can also take the form of reframing the nature of the negotiation task itself.

o   Research shows women do as well as men when negotiating on behalf of others, suggesting female negotiators may overcome some gender-role disadvantage by reframing negotiations as something undertaken to serve a larger objective.

C.    Situational Interventions

·         Power differences may be responsible for many of the differences observed between male and female negotiators – given equal power, they perform equally well

o   Overcoming gender differences may require diluting structural imbalances of power in negotiation situations.

o   One way is to alter the social roles that women assume in a negotiation.

·         Keep in mind that power in negotiation is often a function of alternatives: the person at the table with better alternatives is, other things equal, the more powerful party.

o   While gender stereotypes can be overcome by making parties aware of them, they may persist if there is a significant power imbalance between the parties.

D.    Section Summary

·         The assumption that negotiators benefit when they exhibit stereotypically male behaviors is built on a fundamentally false premise.

o   There are situations where competitiveness is appropriate, others where cooperation is essential, and still others where there is a blend of impulses and motives.

o   What really matters is the ability to accurately perceive the situation and your opponent and to make sound tactical choices that are not clouded by unwarranted stereotypes and irrelevant assumptions.

·         Research suggests women may be disadvantaged in settings where gendered role assumptions persist, Box 14.2 presents some practical suggestions for managing negotiation in those settings.

IV. Do Gender Differences Really Exist?

·         Discussion in this chapter revolved on the notion of gender differences in negotiation outcomes, explained by how men and women approach negotiation differently and which may be reduced or eliminated.

o   An alternative view offers an explanation for the differences researchers find between male and female negotiators rooted in “paradigmatic barriers” to equal outcomes.

·         Here, “paradigmatic barriers” means that how negotiation is studied and taught tends to bias the understanding of what it actually means to perform well as a negotiator.

o   Simulated negotiation research focuses on short-term relationships, competitive tactics, and materialistic outcomes – all more indicative of male negotiators.

·         Some call for changes in the dominant negotiation research paradigm to provide greater emphasis on longer-term situations, giving women’s strengths a fair chance to shine.

o   If not for how the dominant paradigm colors our view of what it means to succeed at negotiation, there would be no gender differences.

Chapter Summary

A growing body of evidence suggests that women and men behave differently in negotiation situations and are treated differently both before and during negotiations.  Taken at face value, these findings tend to suggest that women are at a disadvantage when they negotiate simply because they are women. This disadvantage may manifest itself in several elements of the negotiation process: aspirations, opening offers, aggressiveness of interaction, concessions, and outcomes, among others. Yet having noted these potential disadvantages, it is important to keep in mind that the broad-brush differences that researchers have uncovered between male and female negotiators are quite small in statistical magnitude.

The more important findings are those that speak to the underlying theoretical basis for gender differences in negotiation. Several arose over the course of this chapter, including differences in emphasis on relationships in negotiation, views of the embeddedness of negotiation in broader social contexts, beliefs about ability and worth, notions of how to use power, and ways of framing negotiations. The empirical research on gender differences in negotiation suggests a number of important principles: Men and women conceive of negotiations in different ways, communicate differently in negotiation, and are treated differently in negotiation; the tactics used by men versus those used by women have very different effects; and perceptual stereotypes have important effects on how men and women negotiate.

Many of the gender differences that we have discussed are open to various alternative explanations.  Recent trends in research on gender in negotiation are promising because of the renewed interest in the subject and rejuvenated attention to theoretical explanations. Our understanding of gender differences will continue to benefit from studies that go beyond simple empirical documentation of differences to explore the underlying social and psychological mechanisms that account for how men and women experience negotiation differently.

We began this chapter by distinguishing between the terms sex and gender, and we observed that negotiation research has emphasized gender rather than sex in describing both existing research findings and in discussing conceptual underpinnings and implications.  This research has relied on the use of biological sex to test and measures differences, rather than assessing gender roles as a predictor variable.  Weaknesses in the field are that sex role and gender identity are theoretically important factors in understanding individual differences in negotiation but not studied.

Gender is, of course just one of many possible individual differences with a role in negotiation processes and outcomes.  In Chapter 15, we discuss several others.

 

 



Chapter 15

Individual Differences II:

Personality and Abilities

 

 

Overview

In the previous chapter, we examined in depth one particular individual difference: gender.

  • In this chapter we will look more broadly at the      range of other differences that have been studied in connection with      negotiation.

  • We begin with a brief review of early research on      individual differences. We then focus on more recent research on      individual differences and negotiation, segmenting our discussion into two      major categories:

    • dimensions of personality that appear to have an influence on negotiation, and

    • the role of native abilities in negotiation, including cognitive ability and       the relatively new domain of emotional intelligence

  • The chapter      then concludes with a discussion of the behavioral approach to studying      individual differences in negotiations, which explores how superior      negotiators behave differently from average negotiators.

Learning Objectives

1.          Explore specific personality traits that influence negotiation behaviors and processes.

  1. Consider      the role of native cognitive, emotional, and cultural abilities in      negotiation encounters.

  2. Gain insight into how behaviors of expert negotiators differ      from those of less experienced negotiators.


Chapter Outline

  1. Personality and Negotiation

A.    Conflict style

B.     Social Value Orientation

C.     Interpersonal Trust

D.    Self-Efficacy and Locus of Control

E.     Self-Monitoring

F.      Machiavellianism

G.    Face Threat Sensitivity

H.    Epistemic Motivation

I.        The “Big Five” Personality Factors

  1. Abilities in Negotiation

A.    Cognitive Ability

B.     Emotional Intelligence

C.     Perspective-Taking Ability

D.    Cultural Ability

  1. An Alternative Approach: Studying Experienced      Negotiators

  2. A Concluding Note

  3. Chapter Summary

 


I.       Personality and Negotiation

·         Personality traits are stable tendencies to think, feel, or behave in certain ways that can be identified and measured.

o   People differ on all kinds of attributes but descriptors such as “happy” or angry” do not amount to personality traits unless they are markers of stable ways of thinking or acting that can usefully predict other aspects of behavior.

o   Personality traits are sometimes referred to as “dispositions,” and we use them interchangeably here.

·         There has been quite a bit of controversy among scholars in psychology and organizational behavior about the overall importance of dispositions.

o   To simplify the debate, on one side are those who argue that the study of personality is theoretically thin and that dispositional effects are less important than situations in predicting attitudes and behaviors.

o   On the other side are those who concede that situations matter but insist that dispositions by themselves are significant predictors of relevant behaviors.

§  In short, dispositions and situations both matter.

·         In this section, we review nine approaches to studying personality that have shown promise as predictors of negotiation behavior.  These include:

o   Conflict style

o   Social value orientation

o   Interpersonal trust

o   Self-efficacy and locus of control

o   Self-monitoring

o   Machiavellianism

o   Face threat sensitivity

o   Epistemic motivation

o   The “Big Five” personality factors

A.    Conflict Style

·         Dealing with conflict is a central part of the negotiating process.

o   In Chapter 1, we identified five modes of behavior commonly used to deal with conflict: contending, problem solving, inaction, yielding, and compromising.

§  Do negotiators choose a style by rational choice – or is the style used consistently due to a personality predisposition to do so

o   Also in Chapter 1, there are two levels of concern underlying the five conflict management styles – the degree of concern shown for your own outcomes and the degree of concern for the other party’s outcomes.

§  One researcher proposed two personality dimensions which can represent these two levels of concern.

·         The degree of assertiveness a person maintains for their own preferred solutions or outcomes, ranging from high to low.

·         The degree of cooperativeness a person shows toward working with others to achieve mutual goals, ranging from high to low.

§  Bringing these two dimensions together (Figure 15.1) leads to the identification of five major conflict management styles:

·         A compete style – high on assertiveness and low on cooperativeness

·         An accommodate style – low on assertiveness and high on cooperativeness

·         A yield style – low on both assertiveness and cooperativeness

·         A collaborate style – high on both assertiveness and cooperativeness

·         A compromise style – moderate on both assertiveness and cooperativeness

·         Research has generally supported the model’s two dimensions, as well as the premise that conflict management styles result both from the strategic choices an individual makes and from individual tendencies to use certain styles regardless of the situation.

·         Conflict style tendencies might lead to particular behaviors, given certain kinds of conflict situations.

o   If stakes are high and outcomes derive from individual effort, then individuals with strong compete modes should dominate.

o   In contrast, if the stakes are low, an individual is more likely to ignore the conflict (yield mode) or allow the other to reap what little resources are available (accommodate mode).

·         Individual differences in conflict management style have been correlated with other dispositions.

o   There has not been much direct empirical research connecting conflict styles with other stable personality traits, although Box 15.1 does present one interesting example.

B.     Social Value Orientation

·         Social value orientations are preferences people have regarding the outcomes they prefer in social settings where interdependence with others is required.

o   Some people have a proself or egoistic orientation – they are primarily concerned with personal outcomes and unconcerned with outcomes obtained by the other party.

o   Others have a prosocial or cooperative orientation – a preference for outcomes that benefit both self and others with whom they are interdependent.

§  A prosocial orientation is a tendency to prefer a collaborating conflict management style – refer back to Figure 15.1.

·         Negotiation is clearly an example of the kind of social interdependence where these social value orientations can play a role.

o   Prosocial negotiators achieve more integrative outcomes (higher joint gain) than pro-self negotiators, who behave more distributively.

·         Research links individuals’ social value orientation with their levels of happiness with the deals they negotiate.

o   One study found that judgments of satisfaction after the negotiation were higher for prosocials – who could find satisfaction either through their own goals or those of the group, so they were more easily satisfied.

·         Differences in negotiation behavior and outcomes that result from social value orientation are significant, but can be diluted by aspects of the bargaining situation.

o   When both parties had an exit option, prosocial individuals made more threats, exchanged less information, and reached lower joint outcomes.

o   So, with good alternatives mutually available, the differences between prosocial and pro-self negotiators tended to dissipate.

·         Prosocial versus egoistic motives in negotiation can be rooted either in stable individual differences or in elements of a particular situation – with the same effects.

C.    Interpersonal Trust

·         One of the fundamental dilemmas in negotiation is the degree to which negotiators should trust the other party.

o   The trustworthiness of the other party may change over time.

·         Interpersonal trust may be defined as “a generalized expectancy held by an individual that the word, promise, oral, or written statement of another individual or group can be relied upon.”

o   Interpersonal trust is determined by the experiences that people have in dealing with others.

·         The implications for negotiation of a dispositional tendency to trust others are significant.

o   High trusters impose high moral standards on themselves and behave ethically.

o   Low trusters may feel less pressure to tell the truth.

§  Interestingly, high trusters are not more easily deceived than low trusters.

·         There is a “self-fulfilling prophecy” aspect to dispositional trust.

o   Someone with high interpersonal trust is likely to approach the other person, in attitude and style, in a way that communicates trust, and the other may reciprocate.

o   In contrast, a low-trust individual conveys suspicion and mistrust and may lead the other party to respond in kind.

§  Beware, as low trusters sometimes exhibit trusting behaviors to exploit the other party and maximize self-interest.

§  Also keep in mind that the effects of trust on deception in negotiation is culturally variable.

D.    Self-Efficacy and Locus of Control

·         Self-efficacy is a judgment about your own ability to behave effectively in a given situation.

o   It refers to people’s beliefs in their capabilities to mobilize the motivation, cognitive resources.

o   And courses of action needed to exercise control over events in their lives.

·         Self-efficacy plays an important role in complex interpersonal behavior, including negotiation.

o   For example, a negotiator’s self-efficacy predicts their likelihood of choosing to negotiate, rather than accept mediation.

o   Those who believe themselves more skilled at using distributive or integrative tactics employed these strategies more often and achieved higher outcomes in distributive or integrative problems, respectively.

·         A construct related to self-efficacy is locus of control, which is the extent to which people perceive that they have control over events that occur.

o   Those who attribute the cause of events to external reasons, such as luck, have a high external locus of control.

o   Those who attribute the cause of events to internal reasons, such as ability, have a high internal locus of control.

§  Some studies show “internals” are tougher negotiators.

§  Also, they are less likely to influenced by the other party’s first offer.

§  They also reached agreements with higher joint payoffs.

§  In other words, “internals” appear to be good at both value creation and value claiming.

·         Both self-efficacy and locus of control speak to what are sometimes labeled “control perceptions” – self-judgments regarding our ability to master situations.

o   Research suggests that negotiators with a propensity to perceive control have an advantage over those who don’t.

o   Still, negotiating successfully requires a willingness to assume the risks and, just as in control perceptions, people vary in their willingness to take on risk.

E.     Self-Monitoring

·         Self-monitoring refers to the extent to which people are aware of and responsive to the social cues that come from one’s social environment.

o   High self-monitors are attentive to external, interpersonal information that arises in social settings and are more inclined to treat this information as cues to how they should behave.

o   Low self-monitors are less attentive to external information that may cue behavior and are guided more in their behavioral choices by inner, personal feelings.

·         Empirical findings indicate that self-monitoring is an important individual difference that influences negotiation.

o   Having the motivation to monitor the social context, read it accurately, and adjust to it can be an asset in negotiation.

F.     Machiavellianism

·         Those scoring high in Machiavellianism (high Machs) tend to be cynical about others’ motives, more likely to behave unaltruistically and unsympathetically toward others, and less willing to change their convictions under social pressure.

o   They are thought to be more likely to tolerate behavior violating social norms and are more inclined to advocate the use of deception interpersonally.

·         Personality psychologists have come to regard Machiavellianism as one of three “offensive yet non-pathological” traits known collectively as the “dark triad” of personality: the other two are narcissism and psychopathy.

·         Numerous studies explored the relationship between a Machiavellian orientation and behavior in various situations – we describe a few here as they apply to negotiation.

o   High Machs were no different from low Machs in the frequency of lying, but once accused, high Machs maintained their ability to lie with far greater credibility.

o   High Machs attempted significantly more manipulative behaviors than low Machs, in both the total number and variety.

o   High Machs displayed a more opportunistic sense of timing with regard to making or breaking a coalition, and were usually a member of the winning coalition.

o   High Machs are egoistic, focusing more on maximizing their own outcomes with less concern about others, and likely to use a wider variety of influence tactics.

·         It’s been theorized and demonstrated the existence of four conceptual elements of Machiavellianism:

o   Distrust – high Machs are actively distrustful of others

o   Amoral manipulation – high Machs are willing to deviate from moral standards when the opportunity for gain presents itself

o   Desire for control – seeing other people as threatening, high Machs wish to dominate interpersonal situations.

o   Desire for status – high Machs are driven to pursue goals such as wealth, power, and status in order to feed a desire to accumulate external indicators of success.

·         A couple of studies have directly examined the influence of Machiavellianism on negotiation.

o   One study found that high Machs did better than low Machs in distributive negotiation.

o   High Machs were more likely to approve of the use of deceptive tactics.

o   Taken together, these findings suggest that high Machs are willing to use a variety of tactics to pursue their objectives and, in doing so, may intimidate the other party into adjusting strategy in ways that make the latter worse off.

G.    Face Threat Sensitivity

·         Face refers to the value people place on their public image or reputation.

o   Some of us are by disposition more susceptible to reacting in a negative way to threats to face.

·         A study explored how face threat sensitivity (FTS) might work as an element of the personality of negotiators.

o   Face is important in negotiation because threats to one’s image will make a negotiator competitive in a situation that might otherwise benefit from cooperative behavior.

o   Negotiating dyads with at least one high FTS negotiator were less likely to create value that could benefit both parties and less likely to reach cooperative settlements.

H.    Epistemic Motivation

·         Psychologists use the term epistemic motivation to describe an individual’s “desire to develop and hold a rich and accurate understanding of the world, including the negotiation problem at hand.”

o   When epistemic motivation is high, people analyze situations, weigh arguments, and solve problems through effortful thinking

o   In contrast, when epistemic motivation is low, people are more likely to form quick impressions and make snap judgments based on well-learned rules.

§  Epistemic motivation can be induced in people.

·         Epistemic motivation matters in negotiation because the situation can be complex, and people don’t always have all of the information they need about the other party and about the negotiation task;

o   Accordingly, searching for and thinking about new information in order to develop a deep understanding of the situation should yield better outcomes, especially in integrative negotiations.

·         Personality traits that catalyze epistemic motivation—a willingness to seek out and process novel information—are generally quite helpful to negotiators facing complex situations with integrative potential.

I.       The “Big Five” Personality Factors

·         One way of moving the study of personality toward a more unified and coherent position is to focus on a few key personality categories, or factors, under which most individual traits can be subsumed.

o   This is what personality psychologists had in mind when they developed the Five-Factor Model of personality, also known as the “Big Five” and include:

§  Extraversion – being sociable, assertive, talkative.

§  Agreeableness – being flexible, cooperative, trusting.

§  Conscientiousness – being responsible, organized, achievement oriented.

§  Emotional stability – being secure, confident, not anxious.

§  Openness – being imaginative, broad-minded, curious.

·         Research examined how the Big Five personality factors are related to negotiator behavior and outcomes – in both distributive and integrative negotiations.

o   In distributive bargaining, negotiators higher in extraversion and agreeableness were more likely to do worse for themselves as they are prone to the trap of anchoring.

o   In a more complex integrative negotiation, cognitive ability was more important than personality.

o   A high degree of motivation to do well overcame the liability of certain personality traits in negotiation.

·         One study investigated the “fit,” or match, between negotiator and task.

o   For instance, a low-agreeableness negotiator “fit” a competitive, distributive situation,

o   While a high –agreeableness negotiator is better matched to a situation with integrative potential.

§  These findings show the importance of staffing negotiations with individuals possessing specific dispositions, depending on the situation.

·         A new angle on the role of the Big Five traits looked at how the combination of both negotiators’ traits affects processes and outcomes.

o   Findings show that when negotiators’ personalities match – both high or both low on extraversion and agreeableness – the emotional tone of the interaction is more positive.

o   Individual differences not only speak to your personal qualities as a negotiator but may also render you well- or poorly suited to negotiate with a particular counterpart.

Section Summary

o   In this section, we discussed the role of personality in negotiation in terms of a variety of dispositional traits.

§  Convergence around the Big Five focuses the question on whether personality traits are best viewed separately or in clusters of related traits.

§  On the other hand, some narrow traits may do a better job predicting negotiation behavior than these broad personality factors.

o   Personality is also potentially important in negotiation as people view the actions of other parties through a lens of personality.

§  Although interests and positions determine much of what happens in negotiation, negotiators tend to interpret the behavior of the other party in terms of personality.

§  The result can easily be misperception

II.     Abilities in Negotiation

·         In this section, we examine the relationship between four kinds of abilities and negotiation behavior:

o   Cognitive ability, which is the traditional conceptualization of intelligence

o   The more recently developed concept of emotional intelligence

o   Perspective-taking ability

o   The ability to be effective cross-culturally

A.    Cognitive Ability

·         Cognitive ability refers to “a very general mental capability that, among other things, involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience.”

o   Cognitive ability, which is synonymous with the general notion of intelligence,

§  Influences reasoning, decision-making, information processing capacity, learning, and adaptability to change, particularly in complex situations

§  These aspects of thinking and mental processing are clearly related to much of what goes on in the cognitive side of negotiation.

·         Studies examining cognitive ability in complex integrative negotiation settings found a strong link between negotiator cognitive ability and the integrativeness of settlements reached.

·         But what about purely distributive negotiation situations, do negotiators with high cognitive ability do better?

o   One study found no link between intelligence and performance.

o   Interpret with caution as the task in the study as a basic, single-issue negotiation.

o   Box 15.2 provides a related application of the role of intelligence in negotiation.

B.     Emotional Intelligence

·         Researchers define emotional intelligence (EI) as encompassing a set of discrete but related abilities:

o   the ability to perceive and express emotion accurately.

o   the ability to access emotion in facilitating thought.

o   the ability to comprehend and analyze emotion, and

o   the ability to regulate appropriately your own emotions and those of others.

§  Interest in EI grew among scholars who see it as appropriately rooted in the scientific analysis of human emotion.

§  And a growing body of research has shown that EI can predict job performance in a variety of settings.

·         To the extent that EI captures stable and measurable tendencies involving the perception, comprehension, and regulation of emotion, it may be an important individual difference for the study of negotiation.

o   Negotiators high in EI may be better able to use emotions to influence the negotiation outcome—part of a process referred to as emotional tuning.

·         Despite widespread beliefs that EI is important, few studies have empirically investigated the role of EI in negotiation.

o   More research is needed to fully understand the role of EI in negotiation and to resolve lingering questions about the best way to measure EI.

C.    Perspective-Taking Ability

·         The ability to take the other person’s perspective, especially during planning, should enable negotiators to prepare and respond to the other party’s arguments.

o   Perspective-taking ability is defined as a negotiator’s cognitive capacity to consider the world from another individual’s viewpoint, which enables the negotiator to anticipate the other’s behavior.

·         Perspective-taking ability can help negotiators do better for themselves in competitive situations.

o   Negotiators high in perspective-taking ability appear to be able to increase the concessions the other party is willing to make.

o   They also do better in competitive situations as they are less susceptible to the detrimental effects of being anchored by the opponent’s extreme offer.

·         The ability to see the other party’s point of view is especially important during integrative negotiation as negotiators need to understand the other party’s needs and interests and work to craft an agreement satisfactory to both parties.

o   This ability has been shown to predict joint outcomes – in fact, merely thinking about perspective taking prior to an integrative negotiation can lead to higher joint outcomes.

·         One study demonstrated that perspective taking can be a double-edged sword.

o   Perspective takers may have judged fairness of allocation in a less self-interested way, but when the time came to actually make an allocation decision, they behaved in a more self-interested way – they took more of the available resources for themselves.

o   This is blamed on “reactive egoism” as when the perspective taker was considering how others would probably act more selfishly, leading the perspective taker to arrive at a decision to act selfishly in return.

·         A social condition that may cloud or reduce people’s ability to understand others’ perspective in the first place is the experience of having power or feeling powerful; see Box 15.3 for a clever experimental illustration.

D.    Cultural Ability

·         Context is important in understanding individual differences in negotiation because situations may define whether or not some trait or ability actually has an effect.

o   Consider national cultures: personality traits may function in one culture very differently than in another.

o   Big Five traits, such as agreeableness and extraversion, affect American negotiators but not Chinese, while other factors, such as harmony, affect Chinese negotiators but not Americans.

·         One thing researchers have learned is that people differ in their ability to adapt to culturally diverse situations.

o   “Cultural intelligence” (CQ), captures cognitive, motivational, and behavioral tendencies that play out in intercultural interactions.

o   For instance, the cognitive aspect of CQ refers to how an individual acquires and uses knowledge of cross-cultural differences (and similarities).

o   The motivational aspect captures a person’s energy directed at cultural adaptation.

o   Behavioral aspects include verbal and nonverbal skills when communicating across cultures.

o   CQ predicts personal effectiveness in cross-cultural situations, with high CQ individuals more likely to make accurate cultural judgments, perform well on intercultural tasks, and adjust to international situations.

·         The impact of CQ on intercultural negotiation was investigated in a pair of studies.

o   A survey revealed that people high in CQ were more likely to be cooperatively oriented (a prosocial orientation) and to have a desire to accurately understand their surroundings (high epistemic motivation).

o   In the second study, researchers paired American and East Asian students in a negotiation simulation with integrative potential showing that CQ is a “key predictor of intercultural negotiation effectiveness.”

III.  An Alternative Approach:  Studying Experienced Negotiators

·         Are good negotiators born or made?

o   The position a person takes on this questions is important as research shows a person’s view on this issue is strongly related to negotiation outcomes.

o   Studies showed those who believe negotiation is a skill outperformed those who believed negotiating abilities are fixed, by a wide margin.

o   The advantage was found in both claiming and creating value.

·         If there is value in believing that negotiation is a skill, there is also value in trying to understand the actions of people who are already good at it.

o   Three approaches have been used to study the behavior of successful negotiators:

§  Comparing expert and amateur negotiations in simulated negotiations

§  Comparing experienced and naïve negotiators in simulated negotiations

§  Studying high-profile negotiators.

o   Each of these approaches has its strengths and weaknesses, none are ideal.

1. Expert versus amateur negotiators

o   Expert and amateur negotiator’s performance in a simulated negotiation showed that while both were more likely to reach integrative solutions, experts were more integrative at the beginning of negotiations than were amateurs.

o   Experts also tended to receive higher average outcomes than amateurs, although the difference was not very large.

2. Experienced versus naïve negotiators

o   One study examined the effects of prior opportunities to engage in integrative bargaining on judgments, behaviors, and outcomes in negotiation.

§  Experienced negotiators made more accurate judgments about the other party’s priorities as they gained experience and the likelihood of negotiating favorable agreements increased with experience.

o   Another study explored how experience in one negotiation encounter influences the quality of negotiated outcomes in subsequent encounters.

§  Those whose first negotiation ended in impasse were more likely to reach another impasse in their next negotiation.

§  Those who reached impasse the first time but reached a deal the second time arrived at agreements of lower quality compared to those who successfully reached a deal the first time.

3. High-profile negotiators

o   Another approach is to look at the professional lives of famous negotiators.

§  A study of interviews of first-hand accounts from professionals revealed a “master negotiator.”

§  This individual had a blend of intelligence, attitudes, and skills, including both cognitive ability and emotional intelligence, along with self-motivation, patience, pragmatism, perspective-taking ability, creativity, and strategic vision.

IV. A Concluding Note

·         In closing, the text revisits and reinforces observations made at the start of the preceding chapter about the value of understanding how personal differences are connected with negotiation processes and outcomes.

o   The importance of individual differences may be underappreciated due to the reliance in negotiation research on experiments and simulations.

·         The authors believe individual differences matter for several reasons.

o   Although negotiators can’t “choose” their abilities or traits, there are times when a leader or manager can choose a negotiator and in making that choice may have access to information about relevant personal attributes of candidates.

o   Some individual differences point to disadvantages for which the savvy negotiator can compensate – perhaps by becoming aware of a disadvantage and seeking to overcome it through concerted effort, or perhaps by assembling a negotiating team that capitalizes on others’ strengths in order to limit their own weaknesses.

o   Understanding how individual differences affect negotiators for better or worse can help us improve how we perceive, interpret, react to, and act upon the other party’s actions and strategies.

Chapter Summary

In this chapter we reviewed early and contemporary research on the effects of individual differences— personality traits and abilities—on negotiation.  We discussed several aspects of personality that have some promise for characterizing differences among negotiators, including conflict management style, social value orientation, interpersonal trust, self-efficacy, locus of control, self-monitoring, Machiavellianism, face threat sensitivity, and the Five-Factor Model. We then examined the role of abilities in negotiation, including cognitive ability, emotional intelligence, perspective-taking ability, and cultural intelligence.  We also explored a behavioral approach to studying individual differences. Rather than searching for underlying personality or ability dimensions, this approach concentrates on describing how expert or accomplished negotiators behave and compares it with the actions of less experienced or less experienced negotiators.

Although the study of individual differences continues to pose significant challenges, we see a future for research in this area. Researchers must be careful, however, to measure differences rigorously and to analyze behavior across diverse negotiation situations. It is true that negotiators cannot “change” their personalities or other stable individual differences, but they can learn to compensate for the limitations these characteristics might bring and to capitalize on behavioral tendencies that may follow from the characteristics of other parties. Moreover, constituencies and organizations frequently make choices about who will negotiate on their behalf; in these circumstances, individual differences can play an important role in negotiator selection. It is reasonable to conclude, accordingly, that individual differences can have an important effect on the process and outcome of negotiation.





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